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 ABSTRACT 
 
A Power Model of Management Team Restructuring and Executive Exit in IPO-
Stage Firms: Antecedents and Performance Effects. (August 2004) 
Jun Li, B.S., Peking University; 
M.S., Peking University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Albert A. Cannella, Jr. 
 
 
 
Despite an abundance of executive turnover research in the context of large 
public firms, little has focused on top executive change in entrepreneurial settings.  This 
study attempts to develop a foundation of theory and evidence on management team 
restructuring and executive exit in new venture firms, especially for ventures which 
eventually go public.  Taking a political perspective, the study develops and empirically 
tests a power model of management team restructuring and executive exit in the pre- and 
post-IPO periods.  
A central thesis of this study is that the relative power of the executive cadre 
shifts as an entrepreneurial firm converts from a private venture to a public company, 
due to the drastic change in firm political coalition structure and the skill requirements 
for executives. The change of power distribution among the top executives affects the 
likelihood of management team restructuring and executive exit. Both firm level and 
individual level factors were examined.  The study also investigates the performance 
implications of pre-IPO management team restructuring and post-IPO executive exit. 
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Empirical results support the major propositions of the power model.  VC 
prestige was found to have a positive impact on management team restructuring and new 
executive entry before the IPO.  Technical skills are negatively associated with pre-IPO 
executive exit but positively associated with post-IPO executive exit.  The addition of 
new senior executives in the post-IPO period increases the likelihood of executive exit.  
In addition, when firm performance is low, adding new outside directors tends to 
increase the probability of executive exit in the post-IPO stage.  The study found that 
firms that had restructured management teams before the IPO tend to have lower 
likelihood of executive exit in the post-IPO period.  In the post-IPO stage, executives 
with prior public company managerial experience have a significantly lower likelihood 
of exit than non-managerial executives. 
Further, the study found that pre-IPO management team restructuring improves 
the firm’s pre-money market valuation at the IPO.  The exits of managerial executives 
in the post-IPO period have negative effects on subsequent average ROA.  The exits of 
financial executives negatively affect average shareholder return in the years following 
the exit events. 
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CHAPTER I   
INTRODUCTION 
The role of executive leadership in strategy formation and organization 
performance has been extensively addressed in the strategic management literature. 
Emanating from Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) upper echelon perspective, research on 
strategic leadership suggests that organizational outcomes reflect the characteristics and 
preferences of their top executives.  In the past two decades, a rich stream of literature 
has developed investigating top executives and their influences on organizations (see 
Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996 for a comprehensive review). 
Despite an abundance of top executive research, a review of this area reveals that 
much work has been conducted in the context of well-established firms, yet little has 
focused on top executives in entrepreneurial settings.  This is unfortunate since scholars 
have long suggested that the influence of top executives in entrepreneurial firms is more 
salient than that in large established firms (Cooper, Gimeno, & Woo, 1994; Daily & 
Dalton, 1992).  As entrepreneurial firms often lack resources and legitimacy (Singh, 
Tucker, & House, 1986), they do not have much to rely on except for their top 
executives.  Also, new ventures are less constrained by history, organizational inertia, 
and precedent (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990), therefore their top executives usually 
have higher levels of managerial discretion (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987) and more 
latitude than their larger firm counterparts (Daily & Dalton, 1992; Norburn & Birley, 
1988).  Due to their important influence on new venture strategy and performance,    
____________________ 
This dissertation follows the style and format of the Academy of Management Journal. 
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recently, scholars have called for research on strategic leaders in entrepreneurial settings 
(Daily, McDougall, Covin, & Dalton, 2002). 
To date, the majority of studies on entrepreneurial executives focus on how top 
executives (either their demographic characteristics or team-process characteristics) 
affect venture strategies and performance (e.g., Chandler & Hanks, 1994; Ensley, 
Pearson, & Amason, 2002; West & Meyer, 1998).  A common underlying assumption 
of these studies is that venture executives (and their characteristics) are stable over time, 
i.e., the studies emphasize the initial characteristics of top executives and do not account 
for changes in the entrepreneurial team as the venture grows.  However, it has been 
suggested that during different developmental stages, the competencies and behaviors 
required for entrepreneurial executives are likely to change (Birley & Stockley, 2000), 
which necessitates executive changes.  Also, as a new venture grows, the actions of its 
top executives become more constrained in its formalization and professionalization 
process (Burton & Khurana, 2000), therefore likely eliciting executive changes.  
Furthermore, since new ventures typically rely heavily on external investments for 
sustainable growth, empirical evidence suggests that conflict over power and control of 
the new firm is frequently present as the firm develops, especially to the point of 
professional management (Clifford, 1973).  Therefore, a new venture’s growth is often 
accompanied by executive change and management team restructuring.  With only a 
few exceptions (e.g., Boeker & Karichalil, 2002; Chandler, Honig, & Wiklund, 2002; 
Rubenson & Gupta, 1996; Willard, Krueger, & Feeser, 1992), however, there is no 
systematic investigation on the change of top executives in an entrepreneurial firm and 
even less research on the performance implications of these changes.  
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More importantly, theoretical discussion of top executive change in new venture 
contexts is lacking.  Largely influenced by agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), 
current large-corporation studies on executive change usually take a governance 
perspective, suggesting that the primary force of executive change come from the 
disciplining actions of owners taken to align the interests of the agents with their own 
(Kesner & Sebora, 1994).  However, applying agency theory directly in new venture 
firms may not be appropriate because of the marked differences existing between large 
corporations and entrepreneurial firms.   For example, unlike their large-corporation 
counterparts, founding executives in new ventures usually hold large proportions of 
ownership (Wasserman, 2003), thus the problem of managerial opportunism, which is a 
major concern of agency theorists for large public corporations, may not exist to the 
same extent in entrepreneurial settings.  Also founding executives have strong desires to 
personally oversee and control the venture they created (Mintzberg, 1984; Schein, 1983).  
Due to their strong presence in entrepreneurial firm, they may have greater control over 
the boards of directors than professional managers in large public corporations and have 
the ability to influence the succession processes.  Further, agency theorists suggest one 
of the reasons of executive departure in large public companies is because executives 
and owners are quite different in their risk tolerance therefore often have conflicts on 
firm strategic decisions (Eisenhardt, 1989), however, such differences are less salient in 
entrepreneurial firms as founding executives typically are risk-seeking and willing to 
bear the uncertainties involved in new ventures (Shane, 1995).  All these differences 
violate the assumptions of agency theory, making it difficult to simply extrapolate 
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agency theory to explain management team restructuring and executive exit in new 
venture firms. 
Another perspective of executive turnover in extent research emphasizes the 
power distribution between firm stakeholders and management in explaining executive 
turnover (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Hambrick, 1981; Pfeffer, 1992; Shen & Cannella, 
2002a).  While much of this perspective has been employed in large company contexts, 
recently it has been applied to entrepreneurial settings (see Fiet, Busenitz, Moesel, & 
Barney, 1997).  However, more work needs to be done.  In particular, how the power 
of executives changes over the new venture’s different developmental stages, how this 
change relates to executive replacement, and what factors induce executive changes in 
these different stages still remain unclear. 
PURPOSE 
This study attempts to develop a foundation of both theory and evidence on top 
executive change in new venture firms, especially for ventures which eventually go 
public.  Drawing heavily from the literature in organization theory, strategic 
management, and entrepreneurship, and mainly taking a political perspective, the present 
study develops and empirically tests a power model of management team restructuring 
and executive exit through different phases in the development of an IPO firm, with 
special attention to the pre- and post- IPO periods.  The model proposes that the power 
of the executive cadre changes during these two phases, therefore affecting the 
likelihood of management team restructuring and executive exit.  According to the 
model, executive change reflects the power distribution in a venture firm, which is 
determined by both firm level and individual level factors.  The model also explores the 
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performance implications of pre-IPO management team restructuring and post-IPO 
executive exit. 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
The present study makes several contributions to research on strategic leadership, 
entrepreneurial teams, and IPO firms.  First, it develops a theoretical model for 
explaining management team restructuring and executive exit in entrepreneurial firms.  
With few exceptions, previous studies on executive changes focus on large corporations 
or established organizations, and largely ignore young venture firms.  As executive 
change has important implications for new venture strategy and growth and has different 
patterns relative to those in established companies, the model enriches the current 
executive turnover literature by investigating the antecedents as well as consequences of 
executive change in a different context. 
Second, this study attempts to fill a gap in entrepreneurial team research by 
examining how entrepreneurial executives change over the time.  As argued by Kamm 
et al. (1990), entrepreneurial team studies lack sufficient attention to team building 
process and lack a theoretical base.  By looking into executive change in the pre- and 
post-IPO periods, the present study provides a theoretical model to explain executive 
changes in different phases, helping us better understand the team building process of an 
entrepreneurial firm. 
Third, the present study contributes to IPO firm studies.  There has been an 
increase in research on IPO firms in the literature in recent years.  While many studies 
have explored the determinants of going public (e.g., Lerner, 1994; Pagano, Panetta, & 
Zingales, 1998); IPO underpricing (e.g., Hanley, 1993), and post-IPO performance (e.g., 
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Beatty & Ritter, 1986; Ritter, 1991), fewer studies have examined how an IPO firm’s 
executives change over time, especially when a previously private firm transforms to a 
public company.  Although scholars have emphasized the impact of top executives in 
the firm’s IPO process, less have considered how IPO process changes the management 
team.  This study attempts to fill this gap. 
Finally, the present study provides a dynamic approach to the study of executive 
turnover.  Most previous research on executive turnover takes a static, cross-sectional 
approach and assumes that the relationships between certain variables, such as the power 
of executives, firm governance structure, and firm performance are fixed across settings.  
The current study addresses this limitation by examining how changes of these factors 
affect the likelihood of management team restructuring and executive exit over the 
development of an IPO firm. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As noted above, the present study examines both the antecedents and 
performance consequences of executive change in new ventures which eventually 
transform to public companies.  This study has three major research questions: 
1. What are the major antecedents of management team restructuring 
and executive exit in the pre-IPO stage of an IPO firm? 
2. What are the major antecedents of executive exit in the post-IPO 
stage of an IPO firm? 
3. What are the performance implications of pre-IPO management team 
restructuring and post-IPO executive exit? 
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OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
To effectively present the theoretical development, methodology, empirical 
results, and conclusions and implications of this study, I organize the dissertation into 
eight chapters.  Chapter I presents an overview of the dissertation, along with the 
purpose and the contribution of the study, and proposes the major research questions. 
Chapter II reviews the literature of strategic leadership and executive turnover in both 
large company contexts and entrepreneurial settings.  Both theoretical perspectives and 
the major findings of previous studies are discussed.  Chapter III and Chapter IV 
develop a theoretical model and hypotheses of management team restructuring and 
executive exit in IPO-stage firms.  Chapter V provides a detailed explanation of the 
research design and methodology employed to test the hypotheses.  Data sources, 
sample selection, major variables, measurement issues, and statistical analysis 
techniques will be discussed.  Chapter VI reports the results for the data analysis and the 
findings with the level of support for each hypothesis.  Chapter VII discusses the main 
findings of this study.  Chapter VIII discusses the potential impact of the study on both 
theory and practice.  Both limitations and potential contributions of this study are 
presented. 
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CHAPTER II   
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The last few decades have witnessed an explosive growth in the research on top 
executives and their influences on organizational strategies and performance (Finkelstein 
& Hambrick, 1996).  An important research stream in this literature surrounds top 
executive turnover in organizations.  For example, studies have examined the 
antecedents of executive turnover (e.g., Drazin & Rao, 1999), the performance 
consequences of executive turnover  (e.g., Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Shen & Cannella, 
2002b), and the stock market reactions to executive turnover (e.g., Davidson, Worrell, & 
Dutia, 1993).  However, most of the research on executive turnover has focused on 
large, public companies and very few have examined the change of leadership in small 
firms, especially in entrepreneurial ventures.  Scholars have argued that some marked 
differences exist between large companies and small companies which may prevent us 
from applying the findings about large-company executive turnover directly to small 
firms (Wasserman, 2003). 
The following section will review the relevant literature on strategic leaders and 
their turnovers (both the antecedents and the consequences) in both large, public 
companies and entrepreneurial firms.  In particular, this paper focuses on executive exit 
in the initial public offering firms (hereafter IPO firms) therefore the literature 
surrounding IPO process will also be discussed.  The chapter is organized into four 
parts: (1) Strategic leadership and executive turnover (mostly of which emphasizes 
large-companies); (2) Strategic leadership in entrepreneurial firms; (3) Executive 
turnover in entrepreneurial firms; and (4) Executives in the IPO context.  The objective 
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of this chapter is to give readers a basic understanding of current executive turnover 
research and set the stage for the power model of management team restructuring and 
executive exit in IPO-stage firms developed in this study. 
STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP AND EXECUTIVE TURNOVER 
As corporate leaders who retain the ultimate responsibility for the design and 
implementation of firm strategies, top executives have been a common topic of research 
in organizational science (Cannella & Monroe, 1997).  Studies on strategic leaders date 
back to early years as organization theorists emphasized the roles of top executives in 
determining organization outcomes (Barnard, 1938; Selznick, 1957; Thompson, 1967).  
Recently, this research stream has been reinvigorated by the upper echelon perspective 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and has developed into a formal strategic leadership theory 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).  Generally speaking, the literature of strategic 
leadership suggests that organizations are reflections of their top executives and the 
decisions they make.  Scholars have shown, both theoretically and empirically, that top 
executives and their characteristics importantly affect strategic choices, such as R&D 
spending (Barker & Mueller, 2002), alliance formation (Tyler & Steensma, 1998), 
innovation (Hoffman & Hegarty, 1993), and also affect their firms’ financial 
performance (Day & Lord, 1988; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993).  
Given the significant influence of top executives on firm strategy and 
performance, it is not surprising that a large percentage of studies in this area have 
focused on the change of the leadership – executive turnover in organizations (Kesner & 
Sebora, 1994).  According to Kesner and Sebora (1994), studies on executive turnover 
can be categorized into three major groups: (1) the antecedents of executive turnover, 
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i.e.,  the environmental, organizational or personal factors leading to executive 
departure (e.g., Boeker, 1992; Datta & Guthrie, 1994; Puffer & Weintrop, 1991; 
Wiersema & Bantel, 1993); (2) the consequences of executive turnover, including the 
subsequent organizational effects and market reactions to the event of executive change 
(e.g., Beatty & Zajac, 1987; Davidson, Worrell, & Cheng, 1990; Kesner & Sebora, 
1994); and (3) executive turnover process, i.e., the pattern, timing, and selection decision 
of the turnover event (e.g., Dyck, Mauws, Starke, & Mischke, 2002; Guthrie & Datta, 
1997; Ocasio & Kim, 1999).  In relation to the topic of this paper, I will briefly review 
the first and second themes in the following section. 
Antecedents of Executive Turnover 
Scholars studying the antecedents of executive turnover commonly draw from 
three theoretical perspectives.  The first is resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978), which predicts that replacement of executives results from the 
organization’s response to external environmental forces.  The second perspective, 
probably the most dominant, is that of agency theorists who argue that a major reason 
for executive turnover is the monitoring and disciplining activities of boards of directors, 
who are charged with overseeing the firm and upholding the interests of its shareholders. 
Hence, organizational performance, board composition, and ownership structure 
characteristics are typical antecedents of executive turnover in this perspective.  The 
third perspective taken by scholars is power and socio-political perspective, which 
suggests that executive turnover is a social and political process, involving power 
struggles and contests between the management and the investors (or owners), and even 
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among the top executives.  This perspective then, primarily focuses on power-related 
antecedents in explaining executive turnover in organizations. 
Resource Dependence Perspective  
Environmental Change.  Because top executives are at the boundary of the 
organization and its environment (Keck & Tushman, 1993),  a number of scholars have 
suggested that executive turnover acts as an organizational mechanism adapting to 
environmental changes (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967; Wiersema & 
Bantel, 1993).  Adopting a resource dependence perspective (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), 
scholars argue that, in face of environmental changes, organizations tend to select 
executives whose skills or characteristics are more ‘suited’ to the new context and 
replace those who are ill suited to align their organizations with the environment.  This 
notion has been empirically tested by studies of executive turnover in organizations 
following drastic environmental changes.  For example, scholars have investigated the 
impact of regulatory change (Guthrie, Grimm, & Smith, 1991; Miles, 1982; Smith, 1988; 
Thomas & Ramaswamy, 1993), technological change (Jenkins, 1975), and competitive 
landscape change (Pettigrew, 1985) on executive turnover.  Other scholars have 
examined the impact of industry conditions, such as industry stability, concentration and 
growth on executive tenures (Guthrie & Olian, 1991; Rajagopalan & Datta, 1996).  
Although these studies do not directly examine the phenomena of executive turnover, the 
findings suggest that environmental change encourages incumbent executive turnover 
within organizations.  However, some scholars question the direct effect of 
environmental shifts on executive change, arguing that this effect may be constrained by 
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incumbent executives’ power (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and other inertial forces (e.g., 
Fredrickson & Iaquinto, 1989). 
Agency Perspective 
Firm Performance.  Poor firm performance has long been investigated by 
scholars as an important precursor of executive turnover (Allen & Panian, 1982; Beatty 
& Zajac, 1987; Puffer & Weintrop, 1991; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977; Schwartz & Menon, 
1985; Tushman, Virany, & Romanelli, 1985; Warner, Watts, & Wruck, 1988).  A 
consensus of these studies is that firm performance is negatively related to executive 
turnover, so as firm performance falls, the probability of executive turnover rises.  This 
hypothesis is rooted in agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) which advocates that 
boards of directors have the right and responsibility to replace incompetent executives in 
order to safeguard shareholder interests.  Although this logic is straightforward, 
empirical results are mixed (Puffer & Weintrop, 1991).  As Puffer et al. (1991) found in 
their review, poor performance is associated with executive turnover in some studies 
(e.g., Allen & Panian, 1982; Lubatkin & Chung, 1985), but not in others (e.g., Harrison, 
Torres, & Kukalis, 1988; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993).  Moreover, firm performance only 
explains a small amount of variation in executive turnover (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1996).  Two major reasons have been suggested contribute to this weakness.  First, 
different measures of performance have been used in these studies (Pitcher, Chreim, & 
Kisfalvi, 2000; Puffer & Weintrop, 1991); and second, which is more important, 
previous studies have ignored other factors which may either compound the 
performance-turnover relationship or  moderate this relationship.  For instance, the 
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power dynamics between incumbent executives and board members, which has 
important implications for executive tenure, has been largely overlooked by studies that 
draw from the agency perspective (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Shen & Cannella, 2002a; 
Zajac & Westphal, 1996). 
Board Composition.  According to agency theory, the board of directors is a 
mechanism through which shareholders can monitor and control the opportunism of 
managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  Agency arguments suggest that boards can act as an 
effective monitoring system only if they are independent (Fama, 1980), therefore 
including outside directors will enhance the board’s ability to monitor management 
actions and firm performance, since outside directors usually do not have bilateral 
dependence relationships with incumbent executives (Boeker, 1992; Zahra & Pearce, 
1989).   
In the executive turnover literature, scholars have paid much attention to the 
effect of board composition (proportion of inside and outside directors) on the likelihood 
of executive turnover.  For example, Weisbach (1988) found inside directors and 
outside directors behave differently toward replacement of executives, and firms 
dominated by outside directors are more likely to replace incumbent executives when 
firm performance is poor.  Similarly, Boeker (1992) found that executive dismissal is 
less likely in poorly performing firms with higher proportions of inside board members.  
More recently, Barker, Patterson, and Mueller (2001) show that increased outside 
representation on the board is associated with executive turnover.  However, other 
studies have reported no relationship between board composition and the likelihood of 
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executive turnover (e.g., Allen & Panian, 1982; Chaganti, Mahajan, & Sharma, 1985; 
Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977). 
Although the inconsistency in empirical studies may be due to measurement 
problems, i.e., the non-uniform classification of inside and outside members (Dalton, 
Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998), a more realistic view of board involvement suggests 
that a weakened relationship between board composition and executive turnover reveals 
two facts of corporate governance:  First, boards of directors may not always actually 
exercise their responsibilities since top executives may dominate the board through the 
selection of directors (Mace, 1971).  Second, even if outside directors are willing to 
exercise their responsibilities, the effectiveness of their control may be weakened by the 
political coalition between inside directors and incumbent executives, as incumbent 
executives may ally together when facing replacement risks initiated by outsiders 
(Boeker, 1992; Shen & Cannella, 2002a).   
Ownership Concentration.  Another factor which affects executive turnover is 
the concentration of ownership.  Agency theorists have suggested that a dispersed 
ownership structure decreases the control of owners on actions of managers (Berle & 
Means, 1932) while owners of large blocks of shares have both incentive and power to 
align managers’ interests with their own (Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993).  Similarly, Hill 
and Snell (1989) argue that concentrated ownership makes it easy for large stockholders 
to exercise their rights in monitoring management therefore the ability to remove a 
poorly performing manager is high.  In another study, Boeker (1992) found that firms 
with dispersed ownership were less likely to dismiss incumbent executives when 
performance declined. 
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Power and Socio-Political Perspective 
Top executives are the most powerful organizational members in the modern 
corporation (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Pearce & DeNisi, 1983).  Unlike lower-
level managers, the dismissal of top executives is often a political process in which 
power and influence are likely to be exercised (Zald, 1965).  One of the major 
hypotheses in the extent executive turnover literature is that top executives use their 
power to resist a forced turnover (Drazin & Rao, 1999).  Therefore the role of power in 
executive turnover has been a major focus in this literature (Boeker, 1992; Cannella & 
Lubatkin, 1993; Ocasio, 1994).  Prior study has found that there is an inverse 
relationship between top executive power and turnover (e.g., Allen & Panian, 1982).  
Similarly, Boeker (1992)  points out that top executive turnover is more likely when 
organization performance is poor and executive power is low.   
 Finkelstein (1992) has analyzed and validated four sources of executive power: 
structure, ownership, prestige, and expertise.  Among these four dimensions of power, 
structural and ownership power have been the most investigated in studies of executive 
turnover. 
Structural Power.  Structural power is also referred to as hierarchical or 
legitimate power (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984; Daily & Johnson, 1997; Hambrick, 1981).  
Formal positions grant top executives high structural power within the organization 
(Brass & Burkhardt, 1993; Finkelstein, 1992).  Structural power is enhanced when the 
executive holds multiple titles in the organization, for example, jointly serving as 
chairman of the board (Ocasio, 1994).  Research has shown that such appointment may 
allow top executives to nominate board members who will be loyal to them (Belliveau, 
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Oreilly, & Wade, 1996; Wade, Oreilly, & Chandratat, 1990)  therefore mitigating the 
performance-turnover relationship and reducing the likelihood of executive turnover 
(Boeker, 1992).  In addition, evidence has also shown that it is difficult to replace long-
tenured executives, because through long incumbency executives have more 
opportunities to develop social ties with other organizational leaders, and to accrue and 
institutionalize their power within the organization (Drazin & Rao, 1999; Ocasio, 1994).  
Ownership Power.  Executive stock ownership has long been considered a 
source of power by organization scholars (Finkelstein, 1992; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
In their model of CEO dismissal, Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin (1988) propose 
that executives with major stock ownership are less likely to be dismissed since they are 
able to influence board members and their actions.  Many other studies have focused on 
empirical tests of this relationship.  For example, Salancik & Pfeffer (1980) studied the 
relationship between firm performance and executive tenure in 84 U.S. corporations and 
found that executive ownership mediates the relationship between firm performance and 
executive turnover.  Similarly, in their study of managerial successions in 242 large 
industrial corporations, Allen and Panian found that managers controlling significant 
blocks of corporations were less likely to be dismissed when firm performance declined 
than those who owned little stock (Allen & Panian, 1982).  More recently, following the 
power perspective, several studies have further demonstrated the negative relationship 
between incumbent executive stock ownership and the likelihood of turnover (Boeker, 
1992; Shen & Cannella, 2002a). 
Finally, although most studies of executive turnover using a power perspective 
emphasize the relative power of executives to boards of directors, scholars also highlight 
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the power contest among executives and examine its influence on executive turnover.  
For example, Shen and Cannella (2002a) analyzed 387 large U.S. corporation executive 
turnovers and found that non-CEO executives play important roles in the turnover 
process after inside succession.  Specifically, they found that CEO-origin, non-CEO 
directors, CEO tenure, and senior executive ownership all influence the competition for 
power among executives and hence importantly affect the likelihood of executive 
turnover after inside succession.  Another study by Ocasio (1994) explored the power 
contest among top executives themselves and found that the presence of inside directors 
actually increases the likelihood of executive turnover since insiders are competitors for 
corporate leadership roles.        
Consequences of Executive Turnover 
Research on consequences of executive turnover has focused mostly on two 
major outcomes: organizational change and subsequent performance (both financial and 
market performance) (Kesner & Sebora, 1994).  Because executive turnover is typically 
viewed as an intervention mechanism for organizations to adapt to environmental 
changes or to address poor performance, researchers have suggested that executive 
turnovers are beneficial to organizations (Helmich, 1974; Starbuck & Hedberg, 1977).  
However, other scholars argue that turnover of top executives may have disruptive 
effects on organizations and  a corresponding negative effect on performance (Allen, 
Panian, & Lotz, 1979; Haveman, 1993).  Many studies in this research stream attempt to 
contrast the succession impact of insiders – those promoted from within the firm – and 
outsiders, those promoted from outside the firm (e.g., Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; 
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Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Davidson et al., 1990).  Although the majority of studies 
associate greater improvement in performance and radical organizational change with 
outsider executive successions (Dalton & Kesner, 1985; Helmich, 1975; Helmich & 
Brown, 1972; Wiersema, 1992), empirical studies on consequences of executive 
turnover have provided contradictory results (Furtado & Karan, 1990; Pitcher et al., 
2000).   
Organizational Change   
Managerial change has been suggested to have important effects on the firm’s 
current strategy and structure (Kesner & Sebora, 1994).  In particular, many studies in 
this stream support the argument that more strategic changes are associated with outside 
successions than with inside successions (Sakano & Lewin, 1999).  For example, 
Wiersema (1992) examined a sample of Fortune 1000 diversified firms and found that 
firms with outside successions have a greater likelihood of experiencing significant 
changes in strategy.  Similar results can be seen in Helmich and Brown (1972) who 
found succession by outsiders caused great organizational change.  Several studies have 
focused on executive turnovers in declining firms and found that executive turnovers are 
more likely to lead to strategic change in declining firms attempting turnarounds (Barker 
& Duhaime, 1997; Barker et al., 2001; Hedberg, Nystrom, & Starbuck, 1976).  
However, due to the difficulty in measuring strategic change, empirical investigations 
are still limited (Pitcher et al., 2000).  Also, some scholars are skeptical about the 
impact of executive turnover on strategic change, arguing that the effect depends on 
several contingencies, such as pre-succession performance (Friedman & Saul, 1991); the 
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abilities of successors (Greiner & Bhambri, 1989), and political activities within the firm 
(Welsh & Dehler, 1988). 
Firm Performance 
Compared to studies on strategic changes as consequences of executive turnover, 
studies on post-succession performance are numerous (see Furtado & Karan, 1990; 
Kesner & Sebora, 1994).  However, empirical studies linking turnover to subsequent 
performance have produced inconsistent results.  Some scholars found that executive 
turnover, especially outside succession, is positively related to post-succession 
performance (Davidson et al., 1993; Helmich, 1974; Helmich & Brown, 1972). Other 
studies found a negative performance effect of executive succession (e.g., Beatty & 
Zajac, 1987; Carroll, 1984). And some scholars have reported that there is no 
relationship between executive turnover and firm performance (e.g., Lieberson & 
O'Connor, 1972; Tushman et al., 1985; Zajac, 1990).  Pitcher et al. (2000) argue that 
these inconsistencies can be attributed to both methodological problems and theoretical 
shortcomings.  As Kesner and Sebora (1994) suggest, the effect of executive turnover 
varies depending on successor characteristics and contextual factors.  Similarly, 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996)  suggest that researchers need to consider both 
conditions and characteristics of successions in investigating post-succession 
performance, such as pre-succession performance, the characteristics of both incumbents 
and successors and the conditions surrounding succession. 
Scholars also have examined the investor reaction to the event of executive 
turnover as one performance measure (Kesner & Sebora, 1994).  As Furtado and Karan 
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(1990 :69) argued, market response to managerial change can be viewed as either due to 
the gain or loss of “human capital” of the company, or as a response to the “signal” of 
the change.  However, empirical results are mixed.  Some scholars report positive 
reactions (Davidson et al., 1990), yet others find negative (Beatty & Zajac, 1987), or no 
relationships (Warner et al., 1988; Weisbach, 1988).  Others propose a contingent view 
and find that whether or not investors react positively to the event of executive turnover 
depends on firm’s pre-succession performance (e.g., Friedman & Singh, 1989).  
Although results are mixed, recent event studies have provide sufficient evidence that in 
the U.S., executive succession does affect investor perceptions of firm value (see Sakano 
& Lewin, 1999).  Moreover, scholars find that investor reaction differs between 
turnover initiated by boards as compared to turnover initiated by executives (e.g., 
Friedman & Singh, 1989; Furtado & Rozeff, 1987).   
Conclusions 
Executive turnover has been studied from three major theoretical perspectives.  
Resource-dependence theory emphasizes that executive turnover results in the responses 
of organizations adapting to environmental changes.  Agency theorists propose that the 
monitoring and disciplining actions of boards of directors are the major forces behind 
managerial changes.  The power and socio-political perspective argues that power 
distribution in the organization and socio-political factors importantly influence the 
likelihood of executive replacement.  Scholars also have investigated the consequences 
of executive turnover, arguing that change in the executive cadre has important 
implications for strategic change and subsequent performance.  However, in most cases, 
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the impact of executive change on firm strategy and performance is contingent upon 
organizational contexts as well as succession characteristics. 
Extent research also suggests that executive power is an important factor 
influencing the likelihood of executive turnover.  Although executive power is 
emphasized particularly in the studies from the power and socio-political perspective, 
scholars from resource dependence theory and agency theory also provide evidence of 
the influence of incumbent executive power in their studies on the antecedents of 
executive turnover.  Particularly, studies have provided consistent evidence that 
executive ownership power reduces the risk of replacement, but the influence of 
structural power on executive turnover remains inconclusive.  Another important 
antecedent of executive turnover is poor organizational performance.  Studies from the 
three perspectives have reported consistent evidence that declining performance 
increases the likelihood of managerial changes in organizations. 
STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP IN ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS 
The review of extent research on strategic leadership shows that the majority of 
studies in this area focus on top executives in large public firms instead of 
entrepreneurial firms.  Although there have been various definitions of an 
entrepreneurial firm in the literature (Daily et al., 2002), in this paper an entrepreneurial 
firm is defined as a new venture created by an individual or group of individuals, 
independently from any association with an existing organization (Low & Macmillan, 
1988).  Particularly I focus on technology-based venture firms.  Although recent years 
have witnessed an increase in the studies of entrepreneurship in both the popular and the 
academic press, research on strategic leadership in new ventures is very fragmented.  
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Recently, scholars have called for more systematic research of strategic leadership in 
entrepreneurial settings (Daily et al., 2002).  Daily and her colleagues argue that the 
impacts of strategic leadership in entrepreneurial settings are likely to be very 
pronounced since top executives have much more discretion in making strategic 
decisions and setting strategic direction in new venture firms.  In order to help 
understand top executive turnover in entrepreneurial settings, the following section 
briefly reviews the studies on the influence of founders and entrepreneurial teams on 
strategic choices and performance in new venture firms. 
The Founder’s Role 
A founder is the individual who creates the business.  There has been persistent 
evidence suggesting that a new venture is largely an extension of the founder (Chandler 
& Jansen, 1992; Mintzberg, 1988).  Chandler and Jansen (1992:78) suggest that the 
founder typically has two roles: (1) the entrepreneurial role, which involves scanning the 
environment, selecting opportunities, formulating strategies to take advantage of those 
opportunities; and (2) the managerial role, which involves acquiring resources, 
developing programs and procedures, evaluating performance, and performing other 
tasks essential to implement strategies.  Given the central role of the founder with a 
venture, it has been suggested by many scholars that the founder has a very significant 
impact on firm performance (Chandler & Hanks, 1994; Chandler & Hanks, 1998; 
Sapienza & Grimm, 1997).  According to the Daily et al. (2002) review, empirical 
investigations on the relationship between founders and firm performance comprise 
three categories: (1) studies on the relationship between CEO founder status and firm 
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performance (e.g., Certo, Covin, Daily, & Dalton, 2001a; Jayaraman, Khorana, Nelling, 
& Covin, 2000); (2) studies on the relationship between founder characteristics (such as 
personality, values and belief, education and experience) and firm performance (e.g., 
Chandler & Hanks, 1994; Chandler & Jansen, 1992; Cooper et al., 1994; Sapienza & 
Grimm, 1997);  and (3)  studies on the combined elements from the above two 
categories (Daily et al., 2002).  Although empirical evidence is equivocal and 
sometimes controversial, the majority of this research stream has concluded that 
founders have a very important impact on firm performance, in terms of profitability, 
growth and survival (Daily et al., 2002). 
The Role of Entrepreneurial Team 
Recently, scholars have turned attention to the founding team rather than the 
individual entrepreneur and explored the relationship between founding team 
characteristics and firm performance (e.g., Cooper & Daily, 1997; Ensley et al., 2002).  
Both demographic and process-oriented characteristics of the founding team have been 
investigated.  For example, Weinzimmer (1997) demonstrated that functional 
heterogeneity and team size positively relate to firm growth as large heterogeneous 
teams bring greater diversity of perspective and resources.  Other studies have also 
reported a positive relationship between team size and entrepreneurial firm growth 
(Cooper & Gimeno, 1992; Feeser & Willard, 1990).  More recently, scholars 
investigated how management team dynamics – the personal interactions among 
management team members -- affect firm performance.  For example, Ensley et al. 
(2002) examined the relationship between the interactions within the founding team and 
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firm performance and found that team cohesion is positively associated with venture 
growth.  Similarly, Francis and Sandberg (2000) proposed that friendship within 
entrepreneurial teams generally has a positive impact on venture performance. 
EXECUTIVE TURNOVER IN ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS 
Compared to the abundant research on the performance implications of founders 
or founding teams, studies on executive turnover in entrepreneurial settings are very 
scarce and scattered.  Generally, studies in this area can be classified into two 
categories: (1) studies focusing on the founder’s departure and (2) studies investigating 
the exits of other executive members of the entrepreneurial team.  
Founder’s Departure 
Antecedents of Founder’s Departure 
The phenomenon of an entrepreneurial founder being replaced by a professional 
manager has been widely cited in the entrepreneurship literature (Boeker & Karichalil, 
2002; Rubenson & Gupta, 1992).  A common belief related to this phenomenon is that 
the entrepreneurial founder often has difficulty in developing the skills needed to fulfill 
the evolving needs of the growing venture (Rubenson & Gupta, 1992).  However, 
although there have been very rich anecdotal descriptions of founder departures in the 
business and popular press, theoretical and empirical studies on this topic are rare.  The 
following section will briefly reviews several important studies in this area. 
In an early study of founder departure in 54 Fortune 1000 companies between 
1945 and 1983, Rubenson and Gupta (1992) investigated the antecedents of founder 
replacement.  Although the study was descriptive, several of its conclusions have 
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important implications.  For example, the study challenged the notion that the departure 
of a founder is the norm, and found that founders with professional management skills 
tend to have longer tenures than those without such skills.   Also, they found that 
executives in high-growth firms are more likely to leave than their counterparts in low-
growth firms as they have less time to learn the needed skills.   
In a conceptual study on founder departure, Rubenson and Gupta (1996) 
developed a contingency model of founder tenure to explore the antecedents of founder 
departure, by asking three critical questions: (1) are the needs of the organization 
changing? (2) is the founder able to adapt to those changes? and (3) does the founder 
have the power to impede a required replacement?  Largely based on the growth stage 
and organization life cycle literature (Clifford, 1973),  Rubenson and Gupta’s 
conceptual model suggested that the interplay between the evolving organization and the 
unique characteristics of the founder determines whether or not the founder will step 
aside.  Specifically, the authors proposed that the founder’s tenure is negatively related 
to firm size, growth rate, and product proliferation, but positively related to the founder’s 
educational level, general management experience, functional diversity, and industry 
familiarity.  In addition, several structural and environmental characteristics are 
proposed to affect the founder’s tenure, such as ownership structure, board composition, 
promotion policy regarding promotion from within, family dominance, and industry 
turbulence. 
As one of the few empirical studies in this literature,   Boeker and Karchalil 
(2002) examine both the firm and the executive level factors leading to founder 
departure using a sample of 78 semiconductor firms.  The results of the study verified 
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several propositions from the Rubenson and Gupta (1996) model.  For instance, the 
study found that founder departure is positively related to firm size, but negatively 
related to the founder’s ownership and board membership.  The study also suggested 
there is a U-shaped relationship between founder departure and firm growth, suggesting 
that both high growth firms and low growth firm have high rates of founder departure.  
In addition, founders with R&D functional backgrounds or who are also CEOs were 
found to be less likely to leave. 
More recently, Wasserman (2003) used field research and grounded theory 
building to investigate founder successions in 202 Internet firms.  Wasserman argues 
that traditional agency theory explanations of executive turnover may not be applicable 
to entrepreneurial settings.  The study found that two critical events are related to 
founder departures in these firms: the completion of product development, and the 
raising of each round of funds from outside investors.  An interesting finding of this 
study is that contrary to conventional views, the founder-CEO’s success in achieving 
critical milestones actually increases the likelihood of his/her replacement.   
 Consequences of Founder Departure 
 Scholars have often suggested that founder departure is beneficial for an 
entrepreneurial firm’s growth, and many studies have compared the performance of 
founder-led firms with that of non-founder or professionally-led firms (see Daily et al., 
2002 for a review).  Yet relatively little attention has been paid to the impact of founder 
departure on firm performance.  Further, existing studies have reported inconsistent 
results.  For example, Carroll (1984) found that founder departure has a 
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disproportionate  negative impact on the likelihood of organizational survival.  
Beckman et al. (2003) reported that founder turnovers increase the likelihood of an IPO, 
frequently an important performance indicator for new or young firms. 
Executive Turnover in Entrepreneurial Teams 
Despite the increasing awareness of the importance of entrepreneurial teams in 
entrepreneurship and strategy literature (e.g., Cooper & Daily, 1997; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1990; Kazanjian & Rao, 1999), studies on the development of new 
venture teams remains relatively rare (Kamm et al., 1990).  Although there have been a 
number of studies on executive turnover in new venture firms in venture capital studies 
(e.g., Fiet et al., 1997; Hellmann & Puri, 2002), studies of executive turnover in the 
entrepreneurial team are still scarce and scattered.  
Recently, there have been several studies shedding light on this topic in the 
strategy and entrepreneurship literatures.  An early study by Ucbasaran et al. (2001) on 
58 owner-managed ventures is possibly the first study to systematically investigate the 
antecedents of executive team turnover in the entrepreneurial firm.  The authors 
examined both the environmental and the team level antecedents of entrepreneurial team 
changes.  The results suggest that the high levels of political and competitive pressures 
are positively associated with entrepreneurial team turnovers, and prior joint experience 
among entrepreneurial team members lowers the likelihood of member turnovers. 
Another study by Chandler, Honing, and Wiklund (2002) examined founding 
team member changes in new venture teams with a combination of three studies.  They 
found that a new venture tends to add and/or drop entrepreneurial team members in 
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order to adapt its resource base to changed circumstances over time.  Although some 
results require further speculation, the study indicated that the turnover of team members 
was not significantly associated with performance in the emergence phases but was 
positively and significantly related to sales growth performance when new venture was 
more stable.  Therefore the results suggest that executive team turnover may have 
different impacts on performance during different developmental stages of new ventures.  
Another study by Bruton et al. (1997) investigated the impact in CEO dismissals in 
venture-backed firms, and found that CEO dismissal by boards of directors on which 
venture capitalist(s) reside has a significant positive effect on firm performance.  
More recently, Beckman, Burton and O’Reilly used longitudinal models to 
examine the influence of founding teams on the success of IPOs.  The authors reported 
that executive turnovers in an entrepreneurial team have influential impacts on 
subsequent performance (measured as the likelihood of going public).  Specifically, 
they found that the addition of new executives was the most important factor increasing 
the likelihood of an IPO, and non-founder executive turnover slows this process 
(Beckman et al., 2003). However, these studies did not directly explore the antecedents 
of executive changes in the entrepreneurial team. 
Conclusions 
Although numerous studies in the entrepreneurship literature have emphasized 
the important influence of founder executive(s) or entrepreneurial teams on venture 
strategy and performance, little attention has been paid to executive change in new 
venture firms.  A few important studies are reviewed in this section.  Scholars have 
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investigated founder departures and non-founder executive turnovers in entrepreneurial 
firms.  A review of these studies reveals that research in this area is scarce and 
fragmented, and largely lacks strong theoretical foundations. 
A typical scenario of executive change in entrepreneurial firms is the founder 
replacement as venture firms transit to professional-management stages.  It is assumed 
that venture growth often outpaces the entrepreneurial founder’s capacity.  Although 
this notion has been widely cited in both the popular and the academic press, empirical 
studies are still warranted.  Scholars consistently report that the ownership of founder 
executives is negatively associated with turnover.  Firm attributes (such as size, growth 
rate, etc.) and team level factors (such as prior work experience, etc) are also found to 
impact entrepreneurial executive turnover. 
 In spite of the limited quantity, current research sheds important light on the 
study of executive turnover in entrepreneurial settings.  Scholars have proposed that the 
traditional agency perspective may not fit entrepreneurial settings in which founding 
executive(s) typically hold large amount of equity in the firm.  Instead, scholars argue 
that a contingency perspective is more appropriate for explaining executive changes in 
new venture settings as new ventures face different strategic contingencies and resource 
dependences in their development stages (Rubenson & Gupta, 1996; Wasserman, 2003). 
Extent research also has examined the performance implications of executive 
turnover in new venture firms.  The majority of studies focus on founder departures, but 
the results are mixed.   
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EXECUTIVES IN THE IPO CONTEXT 
The Initial Public Offering 
As an important source of financial capital for the entrepreneurial firm, the initial 
public offering (i.e., to sell stock to the general investing public for the first time, 
hereafter IPO) provides the financial resources required to pursue aggressive growth 
strategies.  The IPO allows the firm to access large amounts of capital, the opportunity 
to restructure the balance sheet, and also brings greater name recognition to the company 
(Rasheed, Datta, & Chinta, 1997).  Other than the benefits to the firm, the IPO also 
provides the initial investors (either informal private investors or professional venture 
capitalists) an turnover mechanism for harvesting their investments (Prasad, Vozikis, 
Bruton, & Merikas, 1995).  Therefore a successful IPO presents an important milestone 
of venture development as well as a higher valuation for the initial investors so that they 
can extract value from the growing entrepreneurial firm. 
Executives in the IPO Context 
The literature on venture capital has frequently noted that the quality of the top 
executives is the most important factor the venture capitalist(s) consider before selecting 
a new venture to fund (Hall & Hofer, 1993).  Similarly, in the IPO process, as required 
by the Security Exchange Commission (hereafter “SEC”) regulation, top executives’ 
information (including their backgrounds, prior work experience and board 
memberships) must be reported in the official documents with the SEC which are 
released to investors and made public.  Also, on “road shows” (Ritter, 1998), the 
backgrounds of top executives are showcased.  It has long been suggested that the 
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quality of upper echelons (including the board of directors as well as top executives) 
directly influences investor perceptions and decisions to provide financial resources to 
the firm engaging in the IPO process (see Bochner & Priest, 1993). 
Recently, scholars have investigated the roles of top executives in the IPO 
context, looking at how top executives influence IPO performance.  Using market 
signaling theory (Akerlof, 1970), Cohen and Dean (2001) test the impact of top 
executives on IPO performance (measured with the total proceeds – total capital raised 
in the IPO) in 218 IPO firms (including non-web based and web-based firms).  They 
found that IPO performance was positively associated with top executives’ experience 
and education, and this relationship is greater in non-web based firms.  Similarly, 
Higgins and Gulati (2002) investigated the upper echelons (board of directors and top 
managers) of IPO firms in the biotechnology industry and found that upper echelon 
affiliations with prominent firms differentially affect a venture firm’s IPO performance 
(measured by net proceeds, number of institutional investors, and number of dedicated 
institutional investors).  More recently, scholars have started to investigate the influence 
of the top management team on IPO outcomes.  For instance, Beckman et al. (2003) 
analyzed how top management team demographic characteristics affect IPO 
performance, measured as the likelihood that a firm achieves an IPO.   
Conclusions 
The review of the literature of entrepreneurial executives in the IPO context 
yields little study on executive changes in this setting.  The majority of studies have 
focused on how top executive or entrepreneurial team characteristics affect the firm’s 
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IPO performance, yet little work has focused on the change of executives in this 
particular context.  However, both the popular and the academic press strongly suggest 
that going public probably presents the most salient transition process of the 
entrepreneurial firm from entrepreneurial management to professional management 
(Daily et al., 2002), as well as significant changes in firm structure (Stoughton & 
Zechner, 1988), which may have great impact on executive tenure within the firm.  The 
existing gap calls for systematic study on both the antecedents and consequences of 
executive change in the IPO context. 
SUMMARY 
Resource dependence theory, agency theory and power and socio-political views 
are three major theoretical perspectives used in executive turnover in large companies.   
Studies from these perspectives all report that executive power and poor performance 
have important influences on the likelihood of executive turnover.  Because of the 
importance of executives to organizations, changes in the executive cadre have 
important implications for firm strategy and subsequent performance. 
To date, little study has focused on executive change in entrepreneurial settings.  
Current studies on this topic are scarce and scattered, and often lack theoretical bases.  
A typical scenario of executive change in entrepreneurial firms is the founder departure 
and executive replacement as the venture transits to a professionally managed firm.  
Although this phenomenon has been widely cited in both the popular and the academic 
press, theoretical and empirical studies are lacking.  The findings of existing studies 
suggest that both contextual and individual factors influence the likelihood of 
entrepreneurial executive turnover. 
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 More importantly, the review of the literature on entrepreneurial executives in 
the IPO context yields little study on either the antecedents or the consequences of 
executive turnover in IPO firms, suggesting an important need for systematic study on 
these topics.
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CHAPTER III   
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT (I) & (II): THE 
ANTECEDENTS OF MANAGEMENT TEAM RESTRUCTURING 
AND EXECUTIVE EXIT IN IPO-STAGE FIRMS 
This chapter develops a theoretical framework for understanding executive 
changes in IPO stage firms, especially the management team restructuring and executive 
exit in the immediate pre- and post- IPO periods.  The earlier literature review suggests 
that executive change in the IPO context has rarely been systematically studied -- either 
theoretically or empirically, despite its importance to the growth and success of an IPO 
firm.  The purpose of this chapter is to start filling this gap by establishing a theoretical 
model for understanding executive change in the IPO context and developing 
hypotheses. 
The literature review suggests that the agency perspective which is 
predominately employed in research on executive turnover in large public firms may not 
be fully applicable for the entrepreneurial setting (Cannella & Baglieri, 2001; Daily et 
al., 2002; Wasserman, 2003).  Instead, as discussed below, a power and socio-political 
perspective seems more promising in investigating executive change in entrepreneurial 
firms. The following section will discuss executive power evolution in entrepreneurial 
firms during their transitions from private ventures to public companies.  The objective 
is to construct the theoretical base for developing the power model of management team 
restructuring and executive exit in IPO-stage firms.  
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THEORY 
A Political Perspective on IPO-Stage Technology Startups 
I took a political perspective of technology startup firm due to the following 
reasons.  First, startup firms are characterized by powerful individuals who come 
together to form the corporation. Startup firms usually lack resources and legitimacy 
(Singh et al., 1986),  and do not have much to rely on except for the top executives and 
investors who bring their knowledge and financial resources to the firm.  Therefore, the 
ownership of a startup firm is typically highly concentrated in the hands of a few 
individuals or groups.  However, these individuals or groups do not have uniform 
interests (Espenlaub, Garrett, & Mun, 1999).  Both business press and academic 
research have widely cited the divergent interests and conflicts between the executives 
and the investors of new venture firms (e.g., Higashide & Birley, 2002).  Also, unlike 
public companies, where executives share a unitary set of interests as apposed to those of 
owners, management in startup firms usually have diverse, frequently conflicting 
interests as well  (Pfeffer, 1981).   
Second, technology startups typically face high ambiguous, uncertain 
environment, disagreements about strategic policy are sure to arise in the startup firm 
(Timmons, 1999; West & Meyer, 1998).  Because startup firms lack history and 
precedent (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990), the parties must work to resolve conflicts 
together, that is, disagreements must be removed through negotiations between the 
executive leadership of the firm and its financial investors.  Some likely casualties of 
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these conflict resolution processes are the executives and outside directors who represent 
the powerful owners of the firm (Shen & Cannella, 2002a).   
Third, in any startup situation, there is a high degree risk (Timmons, 1999). 
Executives in technology startups must be aware that possible firm failure may cause 
them to lose financial incentives and requires them find new employment elsewhere.  
The pressure of securing an equivalent job appointment subsequent to possible failure 
makes executives sometimes ally themselves with others (especially with powerful 
investors) to maintain the networks of contacts therefore lowering their risks of 
employment (Cannella & Baglieri, 2001).  Coupled with the diverse interests and 
frequent conflicts among the parties in a startup firm, executive’s coalition behavior may 
influence the management process of the firm.       
In particular, the political view is appropriate for analyzing an IPO-stage startup 
firm.  Writers from both the popular and academic press have concluded that the IPO 
process is a complex, tedious and often political one.  Before going public, the 
entrepreneurial firm generally needs to seek an underwriter (or syndicate of 
underwriters) to coordinate the selling.  The “road show” (Ritter, 1998) is a critical part 
of pre-IPO preparation in which the entrepreneurial firm is pitched to potential investors 
and the stock price is marketed.  The initial offering price is always a result of 
negotiation between the underwriter and the entrepreneurial firm and is ultimately 
determined the day prior to the IPO.  A very common phenomena of the IPO stock price 
is “underpricing”, which means the firm offers a price that is lower than the price that 
prevails in the immediate after-market (Certo et al., 2001a; Prasad et al., 1995).  Since 
underpricing represent a direct wealth transfer from the founders and initial shareholders 
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to the underwriters (Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002), scholars have suggested that the IPO 
process is a political process, which involves motivations, decisions, and actions of 
different players.  Rasheed et al. (1997 :12) described the conflicts involved in this 
process: 
“For example, issuers like to maximize the offering price per share to enhance 
their returns. In contrast, investors would like the lowest offering price, so that they can 
earn above-market returns when they subscribe to the issue.  Underwriters, on the other 
hand, seek to maximize their income from the issue while reducing potential losses, 
including loss of prestige.” 
The divergent interests of different parties involved in the IPO process suggest 
that an inherently political setting is present in the IPO-stage firm.  Scholars have 
suggested that different goals and motivations of entrepreneurial executives and 
investors often lead to disagreements and conflicts (Higashide & Birley, 2002).  For 
example, venture capitalists may not be as interested in the long-term growth of the 
venture firm as the entrepreneurial executives are.  Moreover, an IPO-stage firm 
imposes a problem of information asymmetry (Rock, 1986), that is, the success of 
entrepreneurial firm is often uncertain, and it is very difficult for potential investors to 
fully assess the capability of entrepreneurial executives before investing in the IPO firm. 
To solve this problem, the initial investors (venture capitalists and other original 
shareholders) frequently require the executive team to address the perceived weaknesses, 
in which case the investors may push for a change of executive team (Wasserman, 
2003).  However, entrepreneurial executives may not want to leave the firm as they 
have developed personal attachments to the company and may think replacement 
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humiliating (Hellmann, 1998).  As such, it is expected that political contests and 
struggles over the control of the firm are inevitable in an IPO-stage firm. 
Executive Power in Organizations 
Power is critical to understanding the decisions made by social actors in 
organizations (Pfeffer, 1981).  Researchers have long been interested in investigating 
the sources of power within organizations.  Hickson et al. (1971) propose that operating 
departments, divisions, or subunits have power if they control strategic contingencies, 
which are activities on which other subunits depend.  Specifically, the power of a 
subunit depends on how effectively it copes with uncertainty; how central the unit’s 
activities are to the workflow; and how easily the activities could be substituted.  
Following that logic, Pfeffer (1981) argues that power stems from the control of 
resources or skills in the five dimensions of the organization: (1) provision of resources, 
which involves allocation of financial, human, and information resources which other 
members rely on; (2) coping with uncertainty, which includes the ability to manage or 
absorb uncertainties; (3) irreplacebility, which involves possession of unique skills or 
capabilities that are difficult to substitute; (4) decision influence, which requires the 
ability to influence decision rights in an organization; and (5) political influence, which 
requires the political skills to influence others within or outside the organization.   
Similar logic can be applied to executives in organizations.  Each of the five 
dimensions can create executive power.  For example, Hambrick (1981) proposes that 
environment and strategy create two critical contingencies an organization faces, and 
how executives cope with uncertainties associated with these two contingencies 
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importantly affect their power in the organization.  Specifically, Hambrick (1981) 
argues that formal authority, coping behaviors (functional expertise and environmental 
scanning), and personal characteristics are three bases of power in an organization.   
More recently, Finkelstein (1992) describes four basic dimensions of executive 
power and provides validations and measurements for these dimensions.  According to 
Finkelstein (1992), power accrues to executives from four major sources:  (1) the 
organizational structure and hierarchical authority -- the official organizational position 
of the executive; (2) executive’s ownership – the shareholdings of the executive in the 
organization (3) executive’s expertise –the skills and abilities of the executive to deal 
with environmental and organizational contingencies;  and (4) executive’s prestige – the 
executive’s personal status, reputation in the institutional environment.  In this study, I 
followed Finkelstein (1992) dimensions of executive power. 
High technology ventures provide particularly excellent settings for 
consideration of the importance of executive power in explaining executive turnover and 
management team change, because the above-mentioned four sources of power become 
especially salient in these firms.  Technology ventures are less constrained by inertia 
and precedent, giving founders and top executives very high managerial discretion 
(Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987).  Research has shown that founders and top executives 
of young firms usually wield the greatest influence on strategies and management 
(Meyer & Dean, 1990).   Also, contrary to public companies, executives in venture 
firms usually own significant portion of shares of the company, which gives them ability 
and chances to exercise ownership power.  Executives in technology ventures gain 
much power also because they posses highly-specialized knowledge and their expertise 
            
          
    
 
40
and prior experience can act as buffer against the liabilities of newness for the firms 
(Stinchecombe, 1965).  This is particularly important when an executive’s expertise is 
in an area critical to the firm (Hickson et al., 1971).  Additionally, executive prestige is 
another important source of power because it helps the venture reduce the level of 
uncertainty of the institutional environment by enhancing the firm’s legitimacy, status 
and providing external information of value to the firm (Finkelstein, 1992).  
Executive Power Evolution in IPO-Stage Technology Startups 
Organizational life cycle theory (Adizes, 1979; Greiner, 1972; Kazanjian, 1988; 
Kimberly & Miles, 1980; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Terpstra & Olson, 1993) suggests that 
an organization progresses sequentially through several major stages of development.  
A central premise of this theory is that as organizations move through various stages of 
growth, both organizational attributes and the major problems facing organizations 
change, resulting in the need for different management skills, priorities, and structural 
configurations. The transition between different stages is profound since the firm faces 
dramatic changes and great challenges of obtaining and replenishing human capital in 
the organization (Welbourne & Cyr, 1999).  For a technology venture which eventually 
goes public, the initial public offering is the milestone point in the life cycle of the 
company.  In order to achieve continuous growth, an IPO firm needs to overcome many 
“bottleneck problems” imposed by the lack of necessary resources and skills, because 
the requirements for resources and skills are quite different in the IPO stage compared to 
the early startup stage.  The so-called phenomenon of an “entrepreneurial growth 
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ceiling” (Welbourne, Neck, & Meyer, 1998) describes this type of problem as a venture 
converts from a private to a public organization. 
The above arguments suggest that top executive power within an organization 
evolves with the development of the organization.  Prior research on power evolution in 
organizations has suggested that power distribution within an organization changes as 
organization evolves through different stages (Mintzberg, 1984).  As noted by 
Mintzberg (1984 :208), “ … the shifts in power seem to lie at the root of transitions in 
the organization, these trends might be particularly well explained by considering stages 
of organizational development from the perspective of power”.  In addition, as 
Finkelstein (1992) emphasized, the internal sources of uncertainties, such as conflicting 
preferences of top managers in decision-making processes, and the controls and 
influences of outside shareholders on top managers, also shape the internal contingencies 
of the firm and affect the power distribution in the management team.  
A central thesis of this study is that the power distribution among the dominant 
coalition changes as the firm grow; in particular, as the entrepreneurial firm converts 
from a private company to a public one, there are drastic changes in both resource and 
skill requirements for executives.  Moreover, as was mentioned, an IPO-stage firm 
presents a political arena which involves conflicts of interests, goals, and orientations 
from different powerful players (such as entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and large 
investors) (Higashide & Birley, 2002; Rasheed et al., 1997).  The transition from a 
private venture to a public company induces changes in political coalition which forms 
the firm’s dominant coalitions, therefore induces executive changes. The following 
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section will propose a power model of management team restructuring and executive 
exit in IPO-stage firms and develop hypotheses. 
THE POWER MODEL OF MANAGEMENT TEAM RESTRUCTURING AND 
EXECUTIVE EXIT IN IPO-STAGE TECHNOLOGY STARTUPS 
As a critical event in a venture’s lifetime, the IPO provides the venture additional 
resources for survival and growth (Prasad et al., 1995).  A successful transition of a 
private company to a public one involves much more than publicly listing the stock.  As 
a privately held technology venture goes public, two major types of changes occur.  
First, the executive and managerial skills needed to be successful change in the IPO 
process.  For example, as a venture transforms to a public company, technological 
expertise decreases in importance, and managerial skills increase in importance (Virany 
& Tushman, 1986).  Second, the political coalition that comprises the firm’s dominant 
coalition is changed by the IPO.  A large volume of new shares are sold and a large 
volume of existing shares transfer to new owners.  This causes sharp changes to the 
ownership structure of the firm, and these changes are likely to importantly alter the 
political coalition of the firm. 
Adopting a political perspective, I propose a power model (see Figure 1) to 
explain the antecedents of management team restructuring and executive exit in the pre- 
and post-IPO stages.  The drastic differences in the resource and skill requirements for 
executives and the firm political coalition structure between the pre-IPO and post-IPO 
stage suggest that executive power evolves over these two stages, affecting the 
management team restructuring and executive exit.  The following section is divided 
into two parts: (1) hypotheses regarding the antecedents of pre-IPO management team 
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restructuring and executive exit; and (2) hypotheses regarding the antecedents of post-
IPO executive exit.  In each part, both firm level and individual level factors are 
examined. 
Hypothesis Development (I): Antecedents of Management Team Restructuring and 
Executive Exit in the Pre-IPO Stage 
Studies on IPO firms suggest that these firms frequently change their ownership 
and corporate governance structure in preparation for going public (e.g., Aggarwal & 
Klapper, 2003).  Since the quality of the management team is a very important signal to 
potential investors, private ventures often change their management teams in order to 
impress the investors at the time of IPO (Hellmann & Puri, 2002).  Therefore a typical 
factor affecting executive change in the pre-IPO stage is the pressure from the investors 
to develop a professionalized management team.  This frequently occurs among venture 
capital-backed startups (Hellmann & Puri, 2002).  On the other hand, as discussed 
earlier, taking a venture public through IPO is a complex, tedious, and expensive 
process, in which many decisions must be negotiated, because the company has little 
prior experience to fall back upon (Prasad et al., 1995).  The parties to decisions 
(technical, financial, and managerial executives, and large investors) have different 
motivations, inclinations, and objectives (Rasheed et al., 1997), so it is expected that 
power and political struggles will be present before the IPO, eliciting management team 
restructuring and executive exit.  The following section considers two types of factors 
which may impact management team restructuring and executive exit in this stage: (1) 
the firm level factors which reflect the “needs” or the pressures of investors to 
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professionalize the management team, i.e., factors reflecting investor power at this stage, 
and (2) the individual factors reflecting executive power within the pre-IPO political 
arena.  According to the previous discussion, both types of factors have impact on the 
likelihood of management team restructuring and executive exit in pre-IPO stage firms.  
Firm Level Factors 
VC Control.  The role of venture capitalists in the creation of public companies 
has been widely studied by finance and VC scholars (Barry, Muscarella, Peavy III, & 
Vetsuypens, 1990; Lerner, 1994).  Research suggests that venture capitalists are actively 
involved in the management of ventures that they finance, often taking positions on the 
board of directors along with concentrated equity shares (Megginson & Weiss, 1991; 
Sahlman, 1990).  As VCs usually invest in young, high-risk entrepreneurial ventures 
with unpredictable cash flows and uncertain future prospects, they must carefully select 
ventures.  To venture capitalists, the quality of the management team is one of the most 
important criteria they use to select venture for investment (Hall & Hofer, 1993).  
Similarly, Fried and Hisrich (1995) argue that a major role of VCs is to serve as a 
disciplinary force on management.  Because the VC industry is typically a small tight-
knit community where VC performance is closely monitored (Sahlman, 1990), VCs have 
very strong incentives to monitor venture management in order to establish a trustworthy 
reputation, not only to secure follow up funds from syndicates (Jain & Kini, 1995), but 
also to make it easy for them to find investment banks willing to take their companies 
public (Espenlaub et al., 1999; Megginson & Weiss, 1991).  
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Unlike other financial resource providers, VCs not only have strong incentives to 
monitor management teams in private ventures, they also specialize in particular 
industries and have detailed knowledge of the ventures they finance (Lerner, 1995).  
This allows them to be more able to screen candidate companies and monitor their 
management.  In addition, they can bring to the venture not only financial resources, but 
also managerial and technical expertise since they have talent reservoirs from their 
current and prior investments that they can call upon (Cannella & Baglieri, 2001).  
Evidence has shown that before the venture goes public, VCs play an active role in the 
professionalization of start-up companies, such as establishing human resource policies, 
the adoption of stock option plans, the hiring of a marketing VP, and even the 
replacement of founding managers with outside CEOs (Hellmann & Puri, 2002). 
Although VCs may have power to replace the founding executives, such 
replacement is not without resistance. Founding managers usually have strong desires to 
control their own firm and are motivated to retain themselves as much as they can of 
their business value (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989).  They have strong psychological 
attachments to the ventures (Rubenson & Gupta, 1991) and may look replacements 
humiliating (Hellmann, 1998).  As such, executive exit in VC-backed firms is often the 
result of power contests between executives and VCs.  However, in the pre-IPO stage, 
because of the resource constrains problem, the power of founding mangers is weakened 
by the venture’s high dependency on external resources.  Research has shown that 
technology-based ventures require large resource commitments to conduct exploratory 
research and development (Shane, 2002).  Particularly, securing financial capital is 
central to the evolution of new venture (Timmons, 1994).  In technology-based 
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ventures, initial financial capital requirement is very high and often exceeds founders’ 
resources (Chandler & Hanks, 1998), thus executives may accede to the demands of 
outside capital providers, such as VCs (Wasserman, 2003).  In addition, the legitimating 
role the venture capitalist is important for venture’s IPO performance (Hoffman & 
Blakely, 1987).  Therefore founding executives may have to relinquish their controls in 
order to exchange for critical resources from VCs (Hellmann, 1998).  The relative 
power of executives is diminished also when most venture-backed ventures use stage-
financings prior the IPO, which allows VCs the options to terminate their involvement if 
executive performance is unsatisfactory.  Summarizing the above arguments, I expect:   
Hypothesis 1.1:  VC control increases management team restructuring in the 
years immediately prior to the IPO. 
Hypothesis 1.2: VC control increases new executive entry in the years 
immediately prior to the IPO. 
 Hypothesis 1.3:  VC control increases the likelihood of executive exit in the 
years immediately prior to the IPO. 
VC Prestige.  Another factor which influences the power relationship between 
founding executive and venture capitalist is VC’s prestige.  The VC literature has 
shown that reputation play important roles in VCs’ success in both follow-up capital 
markets and the IPO market (Gompers, 1996).  Prestigious VCs have strong incentives 
to monitor and involve in venture management, including restructuring the management 
team before the IPO.  This is because prestigious VCs have much industrial experience 
and well-established relationships with professional managers within the industries 
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where they focus their investments.  This makes it easier to find appropriate personnel 
to replace entrepreneurial managers when needed.  For ventures that pursue public 
offerings, prestigious VCs are valuable as they have established good relationships with 
investment banks and potential customers, and they are more proficient than less 
prestigious VCs in timing the IPO (Gompers, 1996).  Because prestigious VCs can 
provide such benefits to the ventures, they have much power over entrepreneurial 
executives in the pre-IPO stage.  For example, they can establish high performance 
expectations and make strict contractual covenants for executives as preconditions for 
funding the venture (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984), therefore increasing the risks of executive 
exit before the IPO.     
In contrast, less-prestigious VCs are typically young and less experienced in the 
VC industry.  Evidence has shown that these VC firms are more eager to go public 
earlier than established and prestigious VC firms.  Gompers (1996) observed this 
“grandstanding” phenomenon and argued that a major incentive for young VC firms to 
take their companies public earlier is to raise the VC firm’s profile in the market and 
attract capital for new venture capital funds, since taking a company public is interpreted 
by investors as a signal of their ability and skills in financing start-up companies.  
Compared to prestigious VCs, less-prestigious VCs have shorter relationships with 
executives and serve on the boards of their IPO firms for shorter lengths of time 
(Gompers, 1996), which weakens their ability to screen and monitor the quality of 
venture team, and also diminish their value to the ventures.  Therefore less-prestigious 
VCs do not have much power in the negotiations with entrepreneurs as prestigious VCs 
simply because they cannot provide the same benefits to the venture as prestigious VCs 
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do.  From entrepreneurial executive’s perspective, managers with strong desires to 
control the firm may be willing to contract with less-prestigious VCs because they have 
less power over the venture.   Therefore, the rush to public market combined with the 
limited pool of talent that they can draw upon, make it difficult for less-prestigious VCs 
to replace executives in the pre-IPO stage.  Hence, I expect: 
Hypothesis 2.1:  VC prestige increases management team restructuring in the 
years immediately prior to the IPO. 
Hypothesis 2.2:  VC prestige increases new executive entry in the years 
immediately prior to the IPO. 
Hypothesis 2.3:  VC prestige increases the likelihood of executive exit in the 
years immediately prior to the IPO. 
Individual Level Factors  
Prior research on executive turnover suggests that executive individual 
characteristics can be an important factor affecting executive tenure within an 
organization (Kesner & Sebora, 1994).  The following section will discuss two 
important individual characteristics of executives in entrepreneurial settings: human 
capital and social capital, as these two types of capital have important influences on the 
power of executives. 
Human capital refers to the knowledge and skills of individuals (Becker, 1964).  
The knowledge and skills are acquired over a lifetime through education, training, and 
experience.  In a new venture, the human capital resides in the founding team and other 
employee, constituting a repository of different knowledge and skills (Chandler & 
            
          
    
 
49
Hanks, 1994).  As new venture firms usually lack resources due to “the liability of 
newness” (Stinchecombe, 1965), the skills and capabilities the management team brings 
to the business constitute an important resource for the firm (Chandler & Jansen, 1992).  
Entrepreneurship research has emphasized, and mostly concluded, that human capital 
provided by founding members or top executives has a great impact on venture 
performance (Cooper et al., 1994; McGee, Dowling, & Megginson, 1995).  As 
discussed earlier, the skills and capabilities help executive gain expert power in the 
organization (Finkelstein, 1992). 
Another important type of resource entrepreneurial executives contribute to new 
ventures is social capital (Coleman, 1988, 1990).  Leenders and Gabbay (1999 :2) 
define social capital as “the set of resources, tangible or virtual, that accrue to an actor 
through the actor’s social relationships, facilitating the attainment of goals”.  Social 
capital theory suggests that social relationships can provide access to necessary 
resources and external knowledge which may leverage the productivity of the human 
and financial capital committed to the venture (Bourdieu, 1985; Portes, 1998).  In recent 
years, entrepreneurial studies have shown the role of executive social capital in venture 
growth and success.  For example, Shane and Stuart (2002) investigated the relationship 
of resource endowment and performance in 134 university startups, and found that 
ventures with founders who have direct or indirect relationships with venture investors 
are more likely to receive venture funding and less likely to fail.  Other studies also 
have supported the important role of executive social capital to venture growth and 
overall performance (e.g., Steier & Greenwood, 2000).  According to Finkelstein 
(1992), social capital help enhance executive’s prestige power in the organization. 
            
          
    
 
50
In the pre-IPO stage, the executive’s technical skills, external directorships, and 
executive’s founding status have important implications for executive power in the 
organizations.  Hence these factors are described below as the key individual level 
antecedents of executive exit. 
Technical Skills.  A technology venture is typically created because a person or 
persons with substantial technical and scientific knowledge needs capital and 
management skills in order to capitalize on their technical knowledge.  While technical, 
financial and managerial knowledge are all important for a venture’s growth, life cycle 
theory suggests that the relative importance of each type of knowledge varies across 
different developmental stages (Kazanjian, 1988; Miller & Friesen, 1984).  In the early 
stage of a technology venture, the focus of the venture is typically on the technical issues 
involved in developing the company’s initial product or service.  At this stage leading 
the organization requires a relatively narrow range of skills, because the tasks to be 
accomplished are predominately in research and development; general management, 
marketing and financial skills are less critical.  Particularly for ventures aiming to 
secure venture capital and eventually launch a successful IPO, the finishing of the initial 
product is critically important as it serves as a concrete indicator of the success and 
future prospects of the company (Wasserman, 2003).  Also, a major source of 
competitive advantage for a technology-based venture resides in the firm’s capability to 
keep a sustainable competitive advantage through continuous innovation on products 
and services.  Therefore, potential investors in the IPO market will be more concerned 
with a venture’s research and development capability than other types of skills.  This 
relative emphasis on technical skills is also due to the lack of solid financial performance 
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history as technology-based ventures usually emphasize growth over profitability in the 
early stages.  Therefore, due to the importance of technical skills in the pre-IPO stage, 
executives with technical skills will have greater power than other executives and have 
less risk of exit. 
Hypothesis 3: Technical skills decrease the likelihood of executive exit in the 
years immediately prior to the IPO.   
External Directorships.  Research has shown that executives who serve as 
outside directors on other company boards bring many types of resources to the focal 
firm (Mizruchi, 1996).  Geletkanycz, Boyd, and Finkelstein (2001 :809) summarize 
these benefits, arguing that executives with external directorships can help the firm 
reduce the level of uncertainty surrounding external resource dependence, bring the firm 
greater access to strategic information and opportunities, and confer legitimacy and 
status benefits on the firm.  These benefits are particularly significant for a technology 
venture seeking a successful IPO.  First, technology ventures are typically resource-
constrained, so the external directorships of executives can provide the firm with more 
opportunities to secure additional resources for product development.  Second, having 
executives with external directorships sends a positive signal to potential investors about 
the quality of top executives, enhancing the legitimacy of the new venture team in the 
IPO setting.  Scholars have concluded that such signals positively affect the valuation of 
the firm at the time of IPO (Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001b).   
Prior research has demonstrated that CEOs often use their external ties to gain 
status over and influence other stakeholders within the firm (Belliveau et al., 1996).  
Similarly, the power of executives will be enhanced if their external directorships 
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contribute considerable strategic benefits to technology-based ventures.  Indeed, during 
the pre-IPO periods, both the founder(s) and outside investors intend to recruit and retain 
those executives with external directorships to overcome resource constrains problem 
and enhance the legitimacy of the firm.  Therefore I expect that executives with external 
directorships will have much power and be less likely to exit the firm in the pre-IPO 
stage.   
Hypothesis 4: External directorships decrease the likelihood of executive exit in 
the years immediately prior to the IPO.   
Founding Status.  Founders are the initiators of the startup firms.  For 
technology startups, a major purpose the firm is to capitalize on the specialized 
knowledge of founders.  As the initiator(s) of a venture, the original founding 
manager(s) play a critical role in startup and later development stages of the venture, 
such as acquiring necessary resources, building external networks and recruiting other 
executives, etc.  As such, a founder typically holds the center position of the 
management team in a private firm.  The centrality of the founder in the firm is formed 
also because a startup’s long-term success is dependent on the firm’s vision, which in 
turn, is reliant on the founder’s characteristics (Schein, 1991).  Research has indicated 
that founders are more likely to have long-term horizons than non-founder executives, 
reflecting their greater concern with the long-range development and the survival of the 
organization (Schein, 1983).  Therefore founders have strong desire to oversee and 
control the activities of the startups (Mintzberg, 1984).  Additionally, founders also tend 
to own a large proportion of the venture’s equity, and have important influence over the 
venture’s policies.  Clearly founder managers wield great power in their ventures’ 
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management due to their roles and responsibilities. Meanwhile, founder’s ownership 
tends to insulate and protect their positions within their firms as well (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976).   
The above arguments lead to: 
Hypothesis 5: Founding status decreases the likelihood of executive exit in the 
years immediately prior to the IPO.   
Hypothesis Development (II): Antecedents of Executive Exit in the Post-IPO Stage 
As noted earlier, the initial public offering is a critical milestone in the 
development of a startup firm.  The IPO provides the venture access to outside capital 
market, yet also weakens the controlling roles of entrepreneurial executives in the firm.  
After IPO, the entrepreneurial team’s ownership proportion decreases. Particularly, as 
new investors and/or new senior managers are brought in, the IPO also changes the 
relative power of entrepreneurial executives and the political coalition within the firm.  
The relative power of executive changes also because the skills and resources needed by 
the firm change.  The following section considers both firm level and individual level 
factors affecting the likelihood of post-IPO managerial change because of these changes 
brought by the IPO.  The firm level factors include: (1) addition of outside directors; (2) 
addition of post-IPO new senior executives; and (3) pre-IPO management team 
restructuring.  The individual level factors (executive characteristics) include: (1) 
managerial skills (including prior public company managerial experience and formal 
business education); (2) financial skills (prior public company financial experience) and 
(3) technical skills. 
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Firm Level Factors 
Addition of Outside Directors.  The duties of boards of directors can be 
described in terms of three overlapping roles: service, resource dependence, and control 
(Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996).  Much corporate governance research has 
concluded that board composition, especially the proportion of outside directors, has a 
great influence on governance effectiveness (Daily & Schwenk, 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 
1989).  The prevailing argument holds that outside directors more effectively control 
managerial opportunism since outside directors are independent and more objective than 
inside directors when evaluating executive performance (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; 
Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  Specifically, research has shown that 
when performance is unsatisfactory, companies with outsider-dominated boards are 
more likely to have executive replaced than for companies with inside-dominated boards 
(Weisbach, 1988).   
While the control role of outside directors has been emphasized in large public 
companies, scholars tend to argue that this role is less prominent in small or private 
firms (Forbes & Milliken, 1999) due to either a higher ratio of inside directors (Lorsch, 
Zelleke, & Pick, 2001) or CEO/founder entrenchment (Finkelstein & Daveni, 1994).  
Scholars also suggest that in small, private firms, outside directors provide more service 
and counseling (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000).  Similarly, it is suggested that 
outside directors play a key role in facilitating small firm life-cycle changes, particularly 
the transition to professional management (Daily & Dalton, 1992).   
            
          
    
 
55
IPO firms are new to the public market, and differ from privately held, owner- 
managed ventures and from old, established public companies.  As the venture transits 
to a public company, new investors bring outside directors to the board to protect their 
interests.  After the IPO, the firm needs to fulfill certain requirements to formalize its 
board of directors, and these tend to increase the capacity to exercise control by outside 
directors.  Further, an IPO represents the first time that the firm’s board is subjected to 
public scrutiny, and firms may select more outside directors to send a positive signal to 
investors about the quality of the firm’s monitoring system (Certo et al., 2001b).  
Moreover, from the outside directors’ perspective, there is more incentive to exercise 
control after an IPO.  Outside directors are usually representatives of large investors, 
whose interests are different from entrepreneurial managers and VCs.  As, such, they 
need to monitor management’s opportunism to protect these large investments.  Last, 
outside directors are very concerned about their reputations as expert decision makers 
(Fama, 1980).  Therefore when management opportunism is present in the IPO 
management team, concern for their reputations motivates outside directors to act.   
Additionally, from a power and socio-political perspective, adding new outside 
directors give rise to power contest among initial shareholders (executives and VCs) and 
new investors.  Executives and VCs favor insider-dominated boards, because inside 
directors represent the common interests of incumbent executives and VCs, and they 
usually take side with these current executives when conflicts arise between investors 
and management team.  Also inside directors have more firm-specific knowledge 
making them superior to outside directors in assisting executives in formulating firm 
strategies (Zahra, 1996).  However, new investors, especially large investors, like to 
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have their own representatives on the boards, and they are much better placed to find and 
bring prestigious new directors to the firm because they have better connections with 
professional talents in public companies. As new outside directors are relatively new to 
the firm and have not had adequate time to develop relationships with entrepreneurial 
executives, they may have little confidence in those charged with managing the firm 
(Wasserman, 2003).  The lack of confidence, coupled with the conflicts around the 
selection of board of directors between the original and new investors increase the 
tension between new investors and insiders, encouraging executive exit in the post-IPO 
firm.  
Hypothesis 6: The addition of outside directors increases the likelihood of 
executive exit in the first few years following an IPO.  
Pre-IPO Management Team Restructuring.  Pre-IPO management team 
restructuring refers to the deletion(s) and/or the addition(s) of chief executives in the 
management team prior to the IPO.  Related to the present study, chief executives 
include chief executive officer, chief financial officer, chief technology (scientific) 
officer, and chief operating officer.  Pre-IPO management team restructuring is 
expected to decrease the need to change executives in the post-IPO period.  Most high 
technology ventures are in high-risk industries with unpredictable cash flows and 
uncertain future prospects.  Hence, the investors in private ventures must carefully 
select which venture management teams they finance.  This is particularly important for 
venture capitalists.  As discussed earlier, reputation concerns are very strong incentives 
for VCs to monitor the venture management teams.  The payoff for the VC is that when 
they establish a trustworthy reputation, they are better able to access the IPO market on 
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favorable terms (Espenlaub et al., 1999; Megginson & Weiss, 1991).  Because VCs 
usually specialize in particular industries and have detailed knowledge of the ventures 
they finance (Lerner, 1995), they can effectively screen investment candidates and 
monitor their management.  They can bring to the venture not only financial resources, 
but also managerial and technical expertise.  Therefore if a venture has experienced a 
pre-IPO management team restructuring, the executives has been adequately screened 
and the venture has had a carefully selected management team in place, therefore the 
venture will have a lower likelihood of executive exit in the post-IPO period. 
Hypothesis 7: Pre-IPO management team restructuring decreases the likelihood 
of executive exit in the first few years following an IPO. 
Addition of Post-IPO New Senior Executives.  Because of high uncertainty of 
outcomes, technology ventures engage in continuous experimentation (Starr & 
Macmillan, 1990), and thus constantly seek new resources, competencies and 
capabilities for sustaining their competitive advantages and growth (Birley & Stockley, 
2000).  Particularly, going public changes a private firm in many ways, therefore 
requiring new skill sets (for example, financial reporting, public and investor relations) 
which are not previously as critical among venture executives.  In order to make a 
smooth transition to a public company and keep its sustainable long- term growth, 
technology ventures may hire new senior executives from outside.  Chandler et al. 
(2002) suggest that adding new members to the entrepreneurial team will have an 
important impact on new venture performance. 
While adding outside senior executives may be beneficial for a venture’s long- 
term performance, it may also increase the likelihood of post-IPO executive exit.  
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Compared to large established companies, young, technology-based IPO firms have 
close-knit management teams.  The arrival of new senior executives limits the 
opportunities for incumbent executives to be promoted to higher positions.  As a result, 
the ambitious executives may choose to leave the companies to pursue alternative job 
opportunities.  Also, research has suggested that new outside senior executives are 
usually appointed by large investors (VCs) to replace the current founding managers 
when investors perceive problems with the original founding executives (Hellmann, 
1998).  Because of their close ties to large investors, new senior executives often lack 
integration with incumbent management teams.  Meanwhile, adding new executives 
from outside the company may make the original team feel disfranchised (Maruca, 
2000).  Also, as new senior executive typically stands for the interests of investors, they 
may pursue different directions of firm development with that of incumbent executives.  
Therefore conflicts between the new executives and incumbent ones are also likely to 
arise, leading to a high rate of executive exit.  Hence, I expect, 
Hypothesis 8: The addition of post-IPO new senior executives increases the 
likelihood of executive exit in the first few years following an IPO. 
Individual Level Factors 
As discussed earlier, new venture executives tend to be powerful not necessarily 
because of their ownership positions, though ownership is important, they can obtain 
power through the knowledge resources and talents that they bring to the firm.  The 
following section will discuss how the individual characteristics of executives may affect 
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the relative power of executives in the post-IPO firm, and influence the likelihood of 
exit. 
According to organizational life cycle theory (Kazanjian, 1988), as firms grow, 
different problems and challenges need to be addressed, resulting in the need for 
different knowledge and skills.  Scholars have suggested that this change could 
necessitate augmentation and transition in the entrepreneurial team (Birley & Stockley, 
2000).  This is especially important for ventures in emerging and dynamic industries 
(Churchill & Lewis, 1983; Greiner, 1972).  Similarly, entrepreneurship scholars note 
that managerial work is quite different from entrepreneurial work, and a transition from 
entrepreneurial work to managerial work is necessary for long-term venture success 
(Willard et al., 1992).  Although important, it is often difficult for founding executives 
make such transition (Hambrick & Crozier, 1985; Rubenson & Gupta, 1992). 
Therefore, it is expected that the power of top executives with respect to their 
skills and resources needed by the firm will be diminished if the executives cannot meet 
the challenges of the transition.  However, some scholars have suggested that 
entrepreneurial executives may have the ability to adapt to this transition if they posses 
the skills needed by the new public firm (Rubenson & Gupta, 1992).  Hence, the 
likelihood of post-IPO executive exit depends on whether current executives are willing 
and able to meet the challenges of the transition.   
This paper considers three different skills of pre-IPO executives and the 
associations between these skills and the likelihood of post-IPO executive exit: (1) 
managerial skills (including prior public company managerial experience and formal 
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business education); (2) financial skills (prior public company financial experience) and 
(3) technical skills. 
Prior Public Company Managerial Experience.  Contrary to popular stories 
of lone college drop-out entrepreneurs, most new technology ventures are founded by 
people with prior employment experience (Cooper, 1985; Robinson & Sexton, 1994).  
Managerial skills are mostly tacit knowledge and are commonly acquired through prior 
experience (Cooper et al., 1994).  Particularly, public company managerial experience 
are directly reflective of the executive’s ability to make the transition from a private to a 
public company.  Related to the present study, public company managerial experience 
refers to executive work experience as top executive in public traded companies.  
Research has concluded that an entrepreneur’s prior work experience has a major impact 
on the venture’s human capital stocks (Burton, Sorensen, & Beckman, 2002), and that 
prior work experience shapes the manager’s outlook and the predispositions which he or 
she brings to the venture (Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  Additionally, managers’ prior 
work experience contributes social capital to the venture in terms of interpersonal 
networks and access to valuable resources, therefore buffering the liabilities of newness 
and smallness (Burton et al., 2002).  For instance, entrepreneurs with prior senior 
management experience likely have more legitimacy with external constituents and are 
more likely to obtain external resources and support.   
Executives with prior public company managerial experience are particularly 
important for an IPO firm.  Because of the problem of information asymmetry between 
executives and owners in the post-IPO context (e.g., Rock, 1986), an executive’s prior 
managerial experience may signal to potential investors the ability and capacity of that 
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executive to manage a newly public firm (Higgins & Gulati, 2003).  Studies have 
demonstrated, for example, that venture capitalists are particularly interested in the 
backgrounds, experiences, and managerial capabilities of entrepreneurs (Macmillan, 
Siegel, & Subba Narasimha, 1985).  As a privately held venture transforms to a public 
company, it is expected that executives with prior public company managerial 
experience will have more expert power, because the managerial skills from such 
experiences better prepare the executives for the wide range of problems confronting the 
new public firm.  Therefore, 
Hypothesis 9: Prior public company managerial experience decreases the 
likelihood of executive exit in the first few years following an IPO. 
Formal Business Education.  Scholars have argued that the level of executive 
educational attainment contributes to the effectiveness of a top management team 
(Cooper & Gimeno, 1992).  In the IPO context, the educational backgrounds of top 
executives also signal to investors the quality of the founding team (Cohen & Dean, 
2001). While previous studies have often considered the level of general education of 
top managers, business education is also very important in a new IPO firm.  Numerous 
studies have shown that the transition from a private venture to a public company 
dramatically increases managerial complexity for entrepreneurial managers (Boeker & 
Karichalil, 2002; Wasserman, 2003).  This is especially the case for technology 
ventures which typically compete in risky, uncertain, and high growth contexts.  
Without adequate business education, venture executives will be less able to spot 
opportunities or generate a wide range of possible alternatives (Rubenson & Gupta, 
1992).  Conversely, executives with formal educations in business will be better 
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equipped to deal with the variety of managerial problems generated by their ventures’ 
transitions to public firms. 
In addition, organizational life cycle theory suggests that as firm develops from 
startup stage to growth stage, the organization becomes more formal and standardized, 
and the structure form becomes more functional (Hanks, Watson, Jansen, & Chandler, 
1993).  Going public represents such critical point of venture development.  
Accordingly, executives’ functional or specialty knowledge are emphasized therefore 
general business principles can be applied to the organization.  This creates great 
dependence on executives who have obtained formal business educations.  Therefore,   
Hypothesis 10: Formal business education decreases the likelihood of executive 
exit in the first few years following an IPO. 
Prior Public Company Financial Experience.  The financial expertise needed 
in a public company differs importantly from that needed by a typical startup firm 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  Because raising financial capital is such an important part 
of the entrepreneurial process (Cooper et al., 1994), for CFOs in privately held startups, 
a major task is to help the startup acquire financial capital for growth.  In this sense, the 
CFO of a privately held venture serves more as a financial resource acquirer than a 
financial resource manager.  As the firm goes public, it enters into a new growth stage 
with significant financial funding through the sale of its stock.  This transition will 
cause the financial reporting systems to change dramatically.  For public company 
CFO’s, the key responsibilities include financial reporting, budgeting, and financial 
strategy and the primary responsibility is to manage the financial system for the entire 
firm (Mian, 2001).  In addition, public companies face close scrutiny, not only from 
            
          
    
 
63
their own shareholders, but also from the investment community, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), and prospective investors.  Because the required skills 
differ sharply from those needed before the IPO, the original financial executives may 
not be proficient at these critical tasks (Hambrick & Crozier, 1985).  However, if the 
executives have had previous public company financial experience, they will be better 
prepared for such challenges.  Indeed, studies show that public firm CFOs that do well 
are likely to be heavily recruited by other firms and they can often leave the firm in 
pursuit of more attractive job opportunities elsewhere (Mian, 2001).  A new IPO firm, 
therefore, can probably attract an experienced public company CFO, if needed.  
Therefore in the post-IPO period, I predict that an executive with prior public company 
financial experience will be less likely leave the position than one without such 
experience. 
Hypothesis 11: Prior public company financial experience decreases the 
likelihood of executive exit in the first few years following an IPO.   
Technical Skills.  The IPO represents a key event in the life of a technology 
venture, because it suggests that the success of the venture’s technology is perceived as 
likely.  Before undertaking an IPO, most technology-based ventures have achieved one 
or more key milestones in product development.  Prior to the incredible (and 
unsustainable) IPO market of the late 1990s, firms had to demonstrate positive cash 
flows and usually sustained profitability before an IPO was even possible.  Now that the 
IPO boom is over, the market is returning somewhat to these earlier requirements.  For 
these reasons, it is expected that the value of technical expertise will decline among the 
very senior officers of the firm, as the technology has been proven prior to the IPO, and 
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the post-IPO firm is more concerned with commercialization than with development.  
Wasserman (2003) made a similar observation that after achieving major milestones of 
product development, ventures shift emphasis toward the sales and revenues of their 
products. 
Having said the above, technical skills are clearly very important to the post-IPO 
technology-based firm.  However, unlike the pre-IPO setting in which technical skills 
dominate the venture, in the post-IPO phases, financial and management skills are of 
increasing importance.  This is complicated by the fact that most technical executives 
have little or no prior experience in managerial or financial contexts.  After the IPO, a 
technology venture faces more frequent and stricter scrutiny from the business press and 
investors on financial performance and product development progress (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977).  Investors demand quick and successful technology commercialization.  In other 
words, although technical skills are still important for the venture’s long term 
competitive advantage, they no longer tend to dominate as the pressure for positive cash 
flows and profitability increases in the new public firm.  Virany and Tushman (1986) 
demonstrated that as successful ventures evolve, they shift their emphasis on executives’ 
skills from engineering expertise to sales and marketing skills.  Therefore, as the 
dependence on technological expertise decreases after the IPO, the likelihood of exit 
among technical executives in the post-IPO period will increase. 
Hypothesis 12:  Technical skills increase the likelihood of executive exit in the 
first few years following an IPO.   
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Failure to Meet Performance Objectives: The Moderating Effect 
Research on executives of large firms has shown that poor financial performance 
is one of the most important reasons behind executive turnover (Fredrickson et al., 
1988).  Privately held technology ventures, competing in knowledge intensive and 
sometimes capital intensive industries, often lack one or more key resources.  Their 
financial performance during initial years is typically shaky at best.  However, since 
investors emphasize high growth potential and are especially interested in the very high 
returns of successful IPOs, to some extent financial difficulties are tolerated in pre-IPO 
venture firms.  As the private venture goes public, its executives face higher pressure to 
deliver solid financial performance.  After the IPO, the venture faces more frequent and 
stricter scrutiny from the investment community with respect to financial performance 
and product development progress (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  As shareholders of the 
newly public firm emphasize the long term growth of the venture, and therefore place 
more emphasis on its financial performance and demonstrated growth, failure to meet 
performance objectives may result in investor wealth loss, shrinking the wealth of 
founders and insiders, and a general distrust of management’s abilities.  This will lead 
to conflicts among the firm’s dominant coalition.  Therefore, I expect that firm’s 
ongoing performance moderates the positive relationships between the following related 
factors and the likelihood of executive exit in the first few years following an IPO. 
Hypothesis 13-1:  The positive relationship between the addition of outside 
directors and the likelihood of executive exit will be strengthened when the firm’s 
financial performance is poor in the first few years following an IPO. 
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Hypothesis 13-2:  The positive relationship between the addition of post-IPO 
new senior executives and likelihood of executive will be strengthened when the firm’s 
financial performance is poor in the first few years following an IPO. 
SUMMARY 
The present chapter develops a power model of management team restructuring 
and executive exit in IPO-stage firms.  Following the model, hypotheses were generated 
concerning the factors influencing the occurrence of management team restructuring, 
new executive entry, and executive exit in the pre-IPO stage, as well as the occurrence of 
executive exit in the post-IPO stage.  The following chapter will develop hypotheses 
concerning the performance effects of pre-IPO management team restructuring and post-
IPO executive exit. 
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CHAPTER IV   
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT (III): PERFORMANCE EFFECTS 
OF PRE-IPO MANAGEMENT TEAM RESTRUCTURING AND 
POST-IPO EXECUTIVE EXIT 
The reviewed literature on executive turnover suggests that executive turnover 
has important implications for firm performance, although the empirical evidence is 
inconsistent (Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Pitcher et al., 2000).  Given the importance of 
entrepreneurial executives to venture firm growth and performance, it is expected that 
the change of executives in entrepreneurial firms will have a critical influence on firm 
performance.  However, as reviewed in the previous chapter, there has been very little 
research published in major management or entrepreneurship journals investigating the 
change of executives in entrepreneurial settings, as well as the consequences of the 
change for new venture performance.  This section begins to fill this gap by exploring 
the performance implications of management change in IPO-stage firms. 
It should be noted that previous studies of large company executive turnover 
have emphasized the impact of successor origin on subsequent firm performance (e.g., 
Friedman & Singh, 1989).  In entrepreneurial settings, however, this differentiation 
loses its importance, as internal succession requires a promotable group of lower-level 
executives while most entrepreneurial firm do not have that depth of talent.  Scholars 
have shown that most executive turnover is followed by external successors in 
entrepreneurial firms (Wasserman, 2003).  Therefore successor origin may not be an 
important factor in determining the turnover-performance relationship in this setting. 
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PRE-IPO MANAGEMENT TEAM RESTRUCTURING, VENTURE CAPITAL 
AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
In entrepreneurial ventures, founding executives of technology firms bring 
different skills and abilities to their ventures.  The weaknesses of individual executives 
can often be offset by the strengths of others.  Scholars studying entrepreneurial 
management teams have concluded that diverse team provides more complete 
knowledge which integrates technical, managerial, market familiarity and financial 
control abilities in the venture (Chandler & Lyon, 2001).  In the IPO context, the 
broader the range of knowledge of the management team, the greater confidence 
investors should have in the venture’s overall ability to address multiple problems 
arising after the IPO, indicating its potential future success.  Research has shown that as 
a new venture develops, it continuously adds and drops management team members to 
adapt its resource base to the changed contingencies (Chandler et al., 2002).  Therefore 
I expect there is a positive impact of pre-IPO management team restructuring on firm 
performance.   
VCs play important roles in developing the management team in the pre-IPO 
stage.  As discussed earlier, VCs not only have strong incentives to monitor 
management teams in private ventures, they also have specialized knowledge about 
particular industries and the ventures they finance (Lerner, 1995; Warner et al., 1988).  
Because they have strong connections with the investing community and professional 
managers, they can bring to the venture not only financial resources, but also managerial 
and technical expertise.  The VC literature has demonstrated the value of venture capital 
involvement in the professionalization of private firms.  For example, Bruton et al. 
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(1997) found that CEO dismissal by boards of directors on which venture capitalist(s) 
reside have a significant positive effect on firm performance.  Other studies also have 
demonstrated that VC involvement in management of private ventures has positive 
impact on venture growth (Lerner, 1995; Megginson & Weiss, 1991).  Indeed, scholars 
have demonstrated that venture capitalist effectively screen the ventures they back and 
help certify the quality of their IPOs (Espenlaub et al., 1999).  These arguments suggest 
that the relationship between pre-IPO management team restructuring and firm 
performance will be stronger in a VC-controlled firm than that in a non-VC-controlled 
firm, simply because of the above benefits VCs bring to the firm.  Therefore, I expect,  
Hypothesis 14: Pre-IPO management team restructuring has a positive effect on 
firm performance. 
Hypothesis 15: The positive relationship between pre-IPO management team 
restructuring and firm performance will be strengthened when the firm is controlled by 
VCs. 
POST-IPO EXECUTIVE EXIT, EXECUTIVE BACKGROUND, AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE 
The previous discussion on antecedents of executive exit in the IPO context 
suggests that executive exit may originate from resource-dependency concerns or socio-
political concerns, or both.  As discussed earlier, a major reason for executive exit in the 
IPO firm is because the venture’s growth outpaces the skills and capabilities of its 
executives.  If replacing an executive is intended to remedy the skills or resource 
limitations of the founding team, the exit is likely to have a positive impact on firm 
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performance. This logic is consistent with resource-based theory (Barney, 1991; 
Wernerfelt, 1984).  Because the entrepreneurial team constitutes the fundamental set of 
knowledge-based resources for a new venture (Chandler & Jansen, 1992), the removal of 
incapable executives and hiring of better ones will enhance the overall skills and 
capabilities of the entrepreneurial team, and therefore have a positive impact on 
subsequent performance. On the other hand, as previously discussed, the entrepreneurial 
setting presents a fertile arena for political contests among various players, executive 
exits resulting from power contests may not have positive effect on firm performance, 
because power contests involves divergent motivations and self-interests of powerful 
parties of the firm.  Prior research on large company executive succession suggests that 
politically oriented management change is likely to have a negative impact on 
organizational performance (Ocasio, 1994).    Therefore, executive exit originating 
from political contests in IPO stage firms may have a negative impact on firm 
performance. 
The above arguments suggest that we can use exiting executive’s background to 
identify the extent of political contests in post-IPO stage firms.  The logic is very 
straightforward.  After the IPO, the firm develops to a new growth stage in which 
managerial and financial skills are gaining increasing importance (Virany & Tushman, 
1986).  Therefore, if the exiting executive had prior public company 
managerial/financial experience, it is expected that such exit will have negative impact 
on subsequent firm performance.  This is because, on one hand, the exit weakens the 
resource and knowledge base of the management team; on the other hand, such exit 
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indicates there is a high degree of political and power contest within the firm, because 
executives with the highly needed expertise are forced out from the company. 
Therefore, I expect: 
 Hypothesis 16.1: The exits of executives with prior public company managerial 
experience in the post-IPO stage negatively affect firm performance. 
Hypothesis 16.2: The exits of executives with prior public company financial 
experience in the post-IPO stage negatively affect firm performance. 
SUMMARY 
The present chapter develops the hypotheses regarding the performance effects 
of pre-IPO management team restructuring and post-IPO executive exit.  In the 
following chapter, I discuss the methods used for testing the hypotheses generated in the 
proceeding and the present chapter. 
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CHAPTER V   
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the methodology used to test the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter III and Chapter IV.  It consists of three sections.  The first section describes 
the sample and data collection process.  The second section discusses measurement 
issues.  The last section describes the statistical methods employed in this research. 
SAMPLE 
I focus the analysis on the U.S. biotechnology industry.  The reasons for 
choosing the biotechnology industry are as follows.  First, previous studies have shown 
that initial public offerings (IPOs) are critically important to the biotechnology industry 
due to the capital-intensive nature of this industry (Finkle, 1998).  Because IPOs are a 
critical part of the study, I need a sample frame with an adequate number of IPO firms.  
Second, the biotechnology industry is one in which highly specialized scientific 
expertise is the driving force behind the creation of the firm (Nonaka, 1994).  The 
knowledge-intensive nature makes the biotechnology industry an ideal setting for 
investigating how executives’ knowledge and the skills they bring in the venture might 
influence the power distribution of the management team and how that power may shift 
during the different developmental stages of the firm.  Third, most previous research 
that has studied executives and/or founding teams in the IPO context are conducted in 
the biotechnology industry (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999).  
Thus using a sample of biotech IPO firms allows us to compare the findings of the 
present study with previous ones. 
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IPOs made between January 1, 1991 and December 31, 1999 were identified 
from the Securities Data Corporation database (SDC).  Using the global new issuers 
database (U.S. public common stock only) in the SDC database and restricting the IPO 
firm’s primary industry to biotechnology (the Standard Industry Codes are 2836 and 
8731, representing biological products, except for diagnostic substances, and 
commercial physical and biological research respectively), a total of 156 companies 
were identified as dedicated biotechnology IPO firms in the initial sample.  
Several steps were taken before the final sample was obtained.  First, as the 
study is focusing on independent entrepreneurial firms, IPO firms that are either spin-
offs or subsidiaries of large firms were excluded, as these firms are not really start-ups 
(this step excluded 12 firms from the original sample).  Second, to restrict the analysis 
to small venture firms, those with 500 (or above) employees or assets of over 500 
million, or those that had been established for more than eight years at the time of IPO 
were excluded (this step excluded 23 firms from the original sample).  These sampling 
criteria are in line with previous studies on new ventures (McDougall, Shane, & Oviatt, 
1994; Robinson, 1999; Welbourne & Andrews, 1996).  In addition, 27 firms had to be 
dropped because their IPO prospectuses are not available, leaving 94 firms in the final 
sample. 
As the present study investigates management team and executive changes in 
both pre- and post- IPO periods, multiple data sources were used.  A key data source is 
the prospectus the firm registered with the SEC prior to the IPO.   The prospectus 
contains a wealth of information regarding the firm’s management, its business, the risks 
it faces, and the capitalization of the offering.   For the current study, a large portion of 
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data about the pre-IPO firm, such as executive backgrounds, management team 
composition, principal investors, lead underwriters, and financial performance were all 
collected from prospectus.  For executives exited before the IPO, the background data 
were collected from company documents the firm registered with the SEC before the 
prospectus date (such as S-1 registration statement) as well as company websites.  The 
executive exit events were also double checked with the “history of executive change” 
section in the investor reports listed in the Business and Industry Research Center 
Database. 
Post-IPO executive exit was identified through a comparison of the management 
section of each firm’s prospectus with the officer-and-director list of each annual report.  
The latter were collected from Compact Disclosure. 
Two types of firm performance are investigated in this study: the firm’s IPO 
performance and its financial performance in the post-IPO period.  Data on IPO 
performance were collected from the SDC database, and data on post-IPO financial 
performance were obtained from COMPUSTAT and CRSP.   
MEASURES 
The following section discusses measures used for testing the hypotheses 
developed in the previous chapters.  As the present study examines management team 
restructuring and executive exit pre- and post-IPO, as well as their performance 
implications, measures for testing hypotheses in these three parts are discussed 
separately. 
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Antecedents of Management Team Restructuring and Executive Exit in the Pre-
IPO Stage 
Dependent Variables 
Pre-IPO Management Team Restructuring.  Pre-IPO management team 
restructuring measures how frequent the management team changes its members (adding 
or dropping executives) prior to the IPO.  To test the immediate effect of the upcoming 
IPO event on the top management team, in this study, I define pre-IPO period as the 
two-year-period before the firm’s IPO.  Pre-IPO management team restructuring in this 
period (RESTRU) is defined as: 
Number Number
of of
Executive Executive
Entries Exits
Management
Team
Size
at
IPO
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
Pre-IPO Executive Exit.   Executive exit events were identified from 
prospectuses as well as various types of company documents the firm filed with the SEC 
before the IPO.  In this study, if the executive is reported as a resigned or a former 
executive, and no longer employed with the firm, he/she is counted as an exiting 
executive.  Exits due to death, illness and mergers were excluded from the sample.  A 
dummy variable PREEXIT was created, and was coded as 1 if the executive exited the 
firm within two years prior to the IPO, and otherwise 0.  
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Independent Variables 
VC Control.  Venture backing refers to the existence of venture capital 
involvement prior to the IPO (Barry et al., 1990).  A dummy variable, VC control 
(VCCONTROL), was coded as 1 if 50% of the shares of the IPO firm are controlled by 
venture capital firms before the IPO, and otherwise 0.  Venture capital backing 
information was obtained from the SDC database and verified against each firm’s 
prospectus.  VC ownership percentage information was collected from the prospectus. 
VC Prestige.  VC prestige is measured with a dummy variable (NVCA).  
Venture capital firms which are members of National Venture Capital Association 
(NVCA) are considered to be high prestigious VCs.  Established in 1973, the National 
Venture Capital Association (NVCA) is the trade association that represents the venture 
capital industry, and currently is the U.S. venture capital industry’s leading source of 
advocacy, networking, professional development and information.  For non-VC backed 
firms, this variable is equal to zero. 
Technical Skills.  Technical skills was operationalized through a dummy 
variable.  If an executive’s primary position shown in the prospectus is in technology 
(for example, research and development), a dummy variable TECH was coded as 1, and 
0 otherwise. 
External Directorships.  An executive’s external directorships serve as a signal 
of the executive’s knowledge and experience as well as a proxy of social capital brought 
to the firm (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2002).  A dummy variable EDIR was created to reflect 
if the executive holds directorships in other companies as of the prospectus date.  These 
data were collected from prospectuses and Compact Disclosure. 
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Founding Status.  A dummy variable FOUNDER was used to capture whether 
an executive is the founder (or co-founder) of the firm, with 1 indicating the founder, 
and 0 otherwise.  The founder information was acquired from company profiles and 
prospectuses. 
Control Variables 
To test the hypotheses regarding management team restructuring and executive 
exit, pre-IPO firm performance, firm size, firm age at the IPO year, and firm 
development stage (whether the firm has started to commercialize its products) were 
used as firm level control variables.  To test the hypotheses regarding executive exit, 
other than the above mentioned firm-level control variables, executive tenure and 
executive ownership were also included.  
Previous research has suggested that good recent firm performance leads to a 
lower likelihood of management team change and executive exit (Kesner & Sebora, 
1994).  Accordingly, firm performance in the pre-IPO period was used as a control 
variable.  Researchers have suggested that measuring private startup performance is 
problematic as these firms are typically young and have limited track records (Stuart et 
al., 1999).  In particular, in the biotechnology industry, the large need for capital 
investment in research and development, and the very long product cycles (Deeds, 
Decarolis, & Coombs, 1997) makes traditional profitability-based performance measures 
inappropriate for this setting.  Instead, growth measures have been commonly used to 
measure new venture performance (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1990; McDougall & Oviatt, 1996).  In this study, I use two growth 
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measures of pre-IPO performance.  One is the average growth rate in revenue per asset 
during the pre-IPO years (REVGROWTH), as revenue generation is also critical 
important for early stage firms (Baum et al., 2000).  Revenue and asset data were 
collected from financial reports in each firm’s prospectus.  Another dimension of 
growth of the venture, the firm’s average growth rate in research and development 
expenditure during the pre-IPO years (RDGROWTH), which serves as a proxy of firm’s 
innovation capability (Baum et al., 2000), was also created as a control.   
Three other firm-level variables were also included as controls.  First, firm 
developmental stage was created as a control, based on whether the firm’s products have 
been commercially introduced into the market or not.  In many firms preparing for an 
IPO, no actual product has been commercially introduced.  As the market introduction 
of the first product significantly changes the firm’s dominant problem (Kazanjian, 1988) 
and thus the management skills required of executives, it is important to differentiate 
firms in these two different stages.  Therefore, firm developmental stage (STAGE) was 
created with a value of 0 for the firms in the pre-sales development stage and 1 for the 
firms that have commenced sales.  Second, firm age at the IPO (AGEIPO) was created 
as a control because it is an important indicator of the life cycle of an organization.  
Firm age at the IPO was calculated as the difference between a firm’s IPO year and the 
founding year.  Third, firm size, operationalized by the number of employees (EMPL) 
and average total assets in the two years prior to the IPO (FIRMSIZE), were also 
included as control variables. 
To test the hypotheses of executive exit, aside from these firm level control 
variables, executive ownership before the IPO (PREOWN) was included to capture the 
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power of executives, as ownership is a clear indicator of dominance in the firm (Allen & 
Panian, 1982; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Ocasio, 1994).  Executive ownership was 
calculated as the percentage of total ownership held by the executive prior to the IPO.  
In addition, executive tenure (TENURE) was used as a control variable.  Executive 
tenure was calculated as the difference between the IPO year and the year the executive 
first joined the company.   
Antecedents of Executive Exit in the Post-IPO Stage 
Dependent Variable 
Post-IPO Executive Exit.  A post-IPO executive exit event is defined as one 
where an executive in the management team at the time of IPO leaves the focal firm in 
three years after the IPO.  At the end of each of these three years, for each executive, a 
dummy variable EXIT was created, and was coded as 1 if the executive exits the firm, 
otherwise 0.  
Independent Variables  
Addition of Outside Directors.  Previous research on governance has shown 
that investors tend to align the board with their interests through board re-composition 
by using their ownership power (Mace, 1971).  This is particularly important in the IPO 
process when outside ownership increases substantially.  New outside directors were 
identified through comparison between the firm’s current director list and the previous 
year’s.  A count variable NEWDIRS was used to measure the addition of outside 
directors, which records the number of new outside directors in each year after the IPO.   
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Pre-IPO Management Team Restructuring.  See “Pre-IPO Management 
Team Restructuring” in previous section. 
Addition of Post-IPO New Senior Executives.   Outside new executives were 
identified from the comparison between the prospectus and the annual reports at the end 
of each fiscal year in the three years after the IPO.  A count variable (NEWEXECS) 
was created to record the number of new senior executives joining the company in each 
year. 
Prior Public Company Managerial Experience.  As discussed above, each 
executive’s background information was obtained through prospectuses, annual reports, 
and company websites.  If the executive had worked for a public company as top 
executive before joining the founding team, the dummy variable PUBLIC was coded to 
1, and otherwise to 0.  Executive’s prior employer information was collected from the 
prospectus. 
Formal Business Education.  Executive formal business education was defined 
as having a degree in a business major.  A dummy variable UBUS was coded as 1 to 
identify those executives who had obtained undergraduate level degrees in business.  A 
dummy variable GBUS was coded as 1 if the executive had a graduate level degree in 
business (MBA or MS in business).             
Prior Public Company Financial Experience.  Because of the importance of 
financial expertise in a public firm (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), the present study links 
financial executives’ prior public company financial experience to their post-IPO exits.  
A dummy variable PPFIN was created.  It was coded as 1 if the financial executive had 
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worked as a chief or senior financial officer in a public company before joining the IPO 
firm, and otherwise 0. 
Technical Skills.  Executive technical skills were operationalized through a 
dummy variable.  If an executive’s primary functional background was in technology 
(i.e., research and development), a dummy variable SCI was coded as 1, and 0 
otherwise.  
Founding Status.  See “Founding Status” in previous section. 
Post-IPO Financial Performance.  Firm financial performance is proposed to 
have moderating effects on the positive relationships between political structure changes 
and executive exits in the post-IPO period.  Shareholder return (RETURN) was used to 
measure the market-based performance of the firm.  IPO firms showing superior stock 
return performance in the post-IPO period are commonly considered successful.  The 
shareholder return was calculated by compounding the daily returns to shareholders from 
CRSP tapes over each fiscal year.  In addition, a dummy variable was also created to 
differentiate high or low return of the firms.  If the shareholder return is lower than the 
average industry value-added shareholder return, the dummy variable was coded as 1; 
for firms with shareholder return higher than this average, the dummy variable was 
coded as 0.    
Control Variables 
Several controls used under the pre-IPO scenario can be applied to the post-IPO 
stage. First, researchers have found that IPO firms are quite heterogeneous in the 
development stages of their product.  I used a dummy variable, firm developmental 
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stage (STAGE), to measure this.  The dummy was set to 1 if the firm has commercially 
introduced their product in the market, and 0 if the firm’s product is still in the 
developing stage.  Similarly, firm age (FIRMAGE) was also included as a control since 
it was importantly related to firm growth.  To capture the level of managerial 
complexity faced by the executive, firm size (FIRMSIZE) was also included as a control.  
In the post-IPO scenario, it was calculated as the natural logarithm of the total assets of 
the firm during each fiscal year after the IPO.  In addition, top management team size 
(TEAMSIZE), executive’s tenure (TENURE) and post-IPO ownership (POSTOWN) 
were also included as control variables in the model of post-IPO executive exit.  
Executive post-IPO ownership was collected from prospectuses, and was measured as 
the percentage of shares the executive owns after the IPO. 
Performance Effects of Pre-IPO Management Team Restructuring and Post-IPO 
Executive Exit 
Dependent Variable (Pre-IPO Restructuring-Performance Model) 
Firm Performance.  To test the performance implications of pre-IPO 
management team restructuring, I examined the IPO performance of the firm.  Two 
measures were used to evaluate the firm’s IPO performance.  First, I followed 
Welbourne and Andrews (1996) and used the firm’s stock price premium (PREMIUM) 
on the first trading day to measure its IPO performance.  This measure has also been 
used by other scholars (e.g., Certo, 2003, etc.).  According to Welbourne and Andrews 
(1996), the price premium reflects the amount of stock price that is beyond the book 
value, and therefore it represents the perceived value of the firm.  The formula is as 
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follows: percent price premium = (stock price – book value) / (stock price).  The stock 
price refers to the closing price of the firm’s stock on the first trading day.  Both stock 
price and book value are reported in the SDC database.  Second, following Stuart et al. 
(1999), I used the firm’s pre-money market valuation as the second measure to 
opertionalize the IPO performance.  The pre-money market valuation of an IPO firm 
was calculated as follows: 
 
        where 
u
p  is the final IPO subscription price; 
t
q  is the number of shares outstanding; 
i
q  is the number of shares offered in the IPO; 
V  is therefore the market valuation of the IPO firm just preceding the first day 
of trading.  As it is the total market capitalization less the dollar amount raised through 
the IPO, it represents the market’s assessment of the value of an IPO firm (Stuart et al., 
1999) 
Independent Variable (Pre-IPO Restructuring-Performance Model) 
Pre-IPO Management Team Restructuring.  See “Pre-IPO Management 
Team Restructuring” in previous section. 
Moderating Variable   
VC Control.  See “VC Control” in previous section.  
( )u t u iV p q p q= −
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Control Variables   
Studies have shown that the underwriter’s prestige has an important influence on 
the firm’s IPO performance as it reduces the uncertainty of investors and grants 
legitimacy to the IPO firm (Higgins & Gulati, 2002; Rasheed et al., 1997; Stuart et al., 
1999).  As such, it was included as control variable (UWRANK).  I adopted the 
widely-used Carter-Mannaster Reputation Ranking for IPO Underwriters 1980-2000 
(revised by Jay Ritter, 2003)1.  The assigned ranking is on a 0-9 scale, with 9 as the 
highest reputation.  Risk factor (RISK), another control variable, was introduced into 
analysis as it represents the risk surrounding an IPO firm.  Following Certo et al. 
(2001a) and Cyr et al. (2000), I used the count of the individual risks factors listed in 
each firm’s prospectus as the measure. Lastly, firm developmental stage, average growth 
rate in research and development expenditures, and number of employees were also 
included as control variables.  
Dependent Variable (Post-IPO Exit-Performance Model) 
Firm Performance.  To test the performance implications of post-IPO 
executive exit, both accounting-based and market-based performance measures were 
used.  I used the average financial performance three years following the post-IPO 
executive exit to assess the exit effect.  This is consistent with previous studies (e.g., 
Kesner & Dalton, 1994).  Firm performance was measured with average return on 
assets (AVRETURN) during the first three years following the year of executive exit, 
                                                 
1 For the construction of Carter-Mannaster Reputation Ranking, see Carter and Manaster (1990).   
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and average shareholder return (AVRETURN) during the fist three years following the 
exiting year. 
Independent Variables 
Exits of Managerial Executives. Exits of executives with prior managerial 
experience in public companies (PPGMEXITS) were measured as the sum of exiting 
executives in the post-IPO period who had prior managerial experience in public 
companies. 
Exits of Financial Executives. Exits of executives with prior financial 
experience in public companies (PPINEXITS) were measured as the sum of exiting 
executives in the post-IPO period who had prior financial experience in public 
companies. 
Control Variables 
The following control variables were included in the analysis of the performance 
consequences of post-IPO executive exit.  First, firm performance of the exiting year 
was controlled.  Prior ROA (ROA_1) was calculated as the ROA during the year of 
executive exit.  Prior shareholder return (RETURN_1) was calculated as the shareholder 
return in the exiting year.  Second, firm size was controlled as firm size has been 
suggested as an important determinant of firm performance (Porter, 1979).  In this 
model, firm size was measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets during 
the fiscal year when the executive exit occurs.  Lastly, firm’s research and development 
expenditures at the exiting year and firm developmental stage (at the IPO time) were 
also included as control variables.    
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STATISTICAL METHODS 
To test the hypotheses developed in the Chapter III and Chapter IV, multiple 
linear regression, Poisson regression, logistic regression and event history analysis were 
used.  These models are discussed as follows. 
Multiple Regression Analysis 
Multiple linear regression analyses was used to test the antecedents of pre-IPO 
management team restructuring, the performance effects of pre-IPO management team 
restructuring and the performance effects of post-IPO executive exit. 
In general, the statistical model of multiple linear regression is specified as: 
0 1 1 2 1 2Y X X Xβ β β= + +  
where  Y  is the vector of dependent variable; 
            0β  is the vector of constants; 
            1X  is the vector of independent variables and control variables; 
            1β  is the vector of estimated coefficients of vector 1X ; 
            2X  is the vector of moderating variables; 
            2β  is the vector of estimated coefficients of vector 21XX . 
Poisson Regression Analysis 
Poisson regression analysis was used to test the model of antecedents of new 
executive entry in the pre-IPO stage.  Poisson regression is often used to analyze count 
data.  It can be used to model the number of occurrences of an event of interest or the 
rate of occurrence of an event of interest, as a function of some independent variables.  
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In present study, the dependent variable of the model is the sum of new executive entries 
in the firm during the pre-IPO years.  In Poisson regression it is assumed that the 
dependent variable -- number of occurrences of an event, has a Poisson distribution 
given the independent variables.  The maximum likelihood method is used to estimate 
the parameters of Poisson regression models.  The Poisson regression model is specified 
as follows: 
1 1 2 2( ... )i i i k kiE xp a b X b X b Xµ = + + + +   
where µ is the expected number of counts for the thi observation.   
Logistic Regression Analysis 
Logistic regression was used to test the model of antecedents of pre-IPO 
executive exit.  Logistic regression allows one to predict a discrete outcome using a set 
of independent variables that may be continuous, discrete, dichotomous, or a mix of any 
of these.  In the power model, the dependent variable is whether or not the executive 
leaves the firm during the two years prior the IPO.  Logistic regression applies 
maximum likelihood estimation after transforming the dependent variable into a logit 
variable (the natural logarithm of the odds of the dependent variable occurring or not).  
Unlike OLS regression, logistic regression does not assume linearity of relationship 
between the independent variables and the dependent, and does not require normally 
distributed variables, does not assume homosceddasticity, and in general has less 
stringent requirements.     
In general, the logistic model is specified as below:  
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( ) 1 1 2 2( )log ...1 ( ) i i
xLogit x x x x
x
θθ α β β βθ
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ = = + + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ −⎣ ⎦  
      where Logit [θ (x)] is the logarithm of the odds of occurrence of the interested 
event. 
Cox Proportional Hazard Analysis (Event History Analysis) 
Event history models are designed to analyzing longitudinal data when the 
dependent variable is a discrete event and timing of the event’s occurrence is of 
particular interest (Yamaguchi, 1991).  In general, event history analysis is concerned 
with the patterns and correlates of the occurrences of events.  In present study, event 
history analysis was used to test the model of antecedents of post-IPO executive exit.   
In present study, the data were converted into executive-year units.  For each 
executive-year, the dependent variable exit is coded 1 if an executive exit occurred in 
that year, and 0 otherwise.  The independent variables were assigned the values they 
had in each person-year, which includes both time-dependent and time-independent 
variables.  Since the interval between the IPO year and the first fiscal year are not the 
same across the sample firms, a Cox proportional hazard model was chosen.  The 
hazard in present model was defined as the probability that an executive exit in the 
interval from t  to t s+ , given that the executive was at the risk of exit at time t .  
Partial likelihood estimations were used in the Cox model. 
In general, a Cox proportional hazard model is specified as: 
0( ) ( )exp[ ( )]i k ikh t h t b X t= ∑  
where 0 ( )h t  is the baseline hazard function,  
      ( )ikX t  is the value of the 
thk co-variate for executive i at time t . 
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SUMMARY 
This chapter discusses the methodology to be used to test the hypotheses 
generated in Chapter III and Chapter IV.  Data sources, sampling procedures, measures 
and statistical methods were discussed.  The following chapter will present the results 
from the analyses respectively.  
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CHAPTER VI   
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Each of the hypotheses developed in the previous chapters were tested and the 
results of the tests are reported in this chapter.  The chapter consists of the following 
four parts: (1) the tests on the hypotheses regarding the antecedents of management team 
restructuring and executive exit in the pre-IPO stage; (2) the tests on the hypotheses 
regarding the antecedents of executive exit in the post-IPO stage; (3) the tests on the 
hypotheses of performance effects of pre-IPO management team restructuring; and (4) 
the tests on the hypotheses of performance effects of post-IPO executive exit.  In each 
part, I will present the descriptive statistics of all variables included in the model, 
followed by the analysis and results. 
ANTECEDENTS OF MANAGEMENT TEAM RESTRUCTURING AND 
EXECUTIVE EXIT IN THE PRE-IPO STAGE 
The Model of Antecedents of Pre-IPO Management Team Restructuring 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and the Pearson correlations of 
all the variables in the study of antecedents of pre-IPO management team restructuring 
(N=92 because two outliers were dropped from final analysis, see discussion below).  
During the two years before the IPO, over 50% of sample firms have management team 
restructuring ratios greater than 58%  (median=.586), suggesting a high rate of team 
restructuring, on average, in pre-IPO stage firms.  Average total assets (log) and number 
            
          
    
 
91
of employees (log) were found to be highly correlated (correlation coefficient =.760, 
p<.001), suggesting that only one of the two might be needed in the model.  
Analysis   
Multiple linear regression models were used to test hypothesis 1.1 and hypothesis 
1.2.  Preliminary regressions showed that neither average total assets (log) nor numbers 
of employees (log) has significant effect on management team restructuring.  Therefore 
I just choose average total assets (log) as the firm size control.  Leverage scores, 
studentized residuals, DF-Fit scores, and Cook’s distance statistics were calculated to 
detect outlier problems.  The results consistently indicated two outliers had 
extraordinary influential effects on the regression models; therefore they were dropped 
for the final analyses.  
Stepwise regression models were made as follows.  The first model (model 1 in 
Table 2) only includes four control variables (firm age, firm size, firm performance, and 
firm developmental stage).  Hypothesized variables were added to the model one by one 
(model 2 and model 3 in Table 2).  Finally, the integrated management team 
restructuring model was estimated (model 4 in Table 2).  For each of the four models, 
the Skewness-Kurtosis tests and the Cook-Weisburg tests were conducted on residuals to 
test normality and homoscedasticity assumptions.  The results indicated that the 
residuals are nearly normally distributed 2   and there were no heteroscedasticity 
problems.  In addition, no multicollinearity relationships exit among the independent 
                                                 
2 Although the p-values for skewness test are slightly less than .05, the joint Skewness/Kurtosis tests fail 
to reject the null hypotheses of normality for residuals of these four models.  
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variables (mean VIF = 1.04, 1.04, 1.07 and 1.15 for the four models in Table 2 
respectively, and none of individual VIFs is greater than 3.0 ).  
Results   
I will report the statistical evidence below, following each of the hypotheses in 
this pre-IPO management team restructuring model. 
Hypothesis 1.1:  VC control increases management team restructuring in the 
years immediately prior to the IPO. 
This hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between VC control and pre-IPO 
management team restructuring during the years before the IPO.  Unexpectedly, the 
results in Table 2 show no support for hypothesis 1.1.  The coefficient for VC control is 
positive in model 2 (b=.030) but negative in model 4 (b=-.010).  Neither coefficient is 
statistically significant.  Therefore hypothesis 1.1 is not supported.  That is, there is no 
evidence to support the prediction that VC control increases management team 
restructuring in the pre-IPO period. 
Hypothesis 2.1:  VC prestige increases management team restructuring in the 
years immediately prior to the IPO. 
This hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between VC prestige and pre-IPO 
management team restructuring.  Consistent with the hypothesis, both model 3 and 
model 4 in Table 2 report that VC prestige has a positive effect on pre-IPO management 
team restructuring (b=.094 and b=.098, respectively).  However, the effect is weak and 
marginal (p<.1).  Therefore hypothesis 2.1 is weakly supported. 
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Among control variables, I found firm age at the IPO year had a significant 
negative relationship with pre-IPO management team restructuring (b=.1, p<.001 in all 
four models of Table 2), suggesting that a young firm may have higher rate of 
restructuring in the management team than a more established firm before going to IPO. 
Besides looking at management team restructuring in this period, as noted earlier, 
I conducted additional analyses on pre-IPO new executive entries, to further develop our 
understanding of the process of management team restructuring.  In this model, the 
dependent variable is PREENTER, standing for the sum of new executives entering the 
management team during the pre-IPO period.  Since the dependent variable is a count 
variable, Poisson regression was used to test the hypotheses.  The following section will 
report the descriptive statistics, analyses and results of this model. 
 The Model of Antecedents of Pre-IPO New Executive Entry 
Descriptive Statistics  
Table 3 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations of all the 
variables in the model of antecedents of new executive entry.  Similarly, the significant 
positive correlation between the two firm size measures, average total assets (log) and 
number of employees (log) suggests only one measure is needed.  Initial regression 
results suggest that neither has a significant effect in the model.  However, when 
comparing the Poisson goodness of fit chi-square, using number of employees (log) 
gives a smaller chi-square and a higher p-value (.08), suggests a model with better fit.  
For this reason, in this model, I chose number of employees (log) as the firm size 
control. 
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Analysis  
Long (1997) suggests that the Poisson regression model rarely fits in practice as 
in most applications the variance of the count data is greater than the mean.  To test if 
this overdispersion problem exits the current count data, I performed a negative binomial 
regression, using the same variables.  The alpha value from the negative binomial 
regression is .033, which is very close to zero.  In addition, the likelihood-ratio test of 
0H  that alpha equals zero shows that we could not reject the null hypothesis (p>.189).  
Therefore, the observed data are Poisson distributed, and there is no need to conduct the 
negative binomial regression.  The results of the Poisson goodness of fit tests supported 
this notion (Table 4).  I first ran a Poison regression analysis of antecedents of new 
executive entry with only control variables entered as predictors.  Then I entered VC 
control and VC prestige into the analysis.  Lastly I ran the analysis with all the 
variables. 
Results 
Statistical results from Poison regressions are presented as below, following each 
of the hypotheses in the model of antecedents of new executive entry in the pre-IPO 
stage. 
Hypothesis 1.2: VC control increases new executive entry in the years 
immediately prior to the IPO. 
This hypothesis predicts that VC control increases the number of new executive 
entries in the pre-IPO period.  Contrary to my speculation, model 4 in Table 4 reports 
that VC control is negatively associated with the number of new executive entries during 
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the two years prior to the IPO (b=-.010, p<.1), although the effect is very marginal.  In 
model 2 of Table 4, I found no significant relationship between VC control and the 
number of new executive entries.  Hence hypothesis 1.2 is not supported. 
Hypothesis 2.2:  VC prestige increases new executive entry in the years 
immediately prior to the IPO. 
This hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between VC prestige and the 
number of new executive entries in the pre-IPO period.  Model 3 and model 4 in Table 
4 indicate that VC prestige is significantly and positively associated with the number of 
new executive entries in pre-IPO stage firm (b=.209, p<.1 in model 3, and b=.299, p<.05 
in model 4).  Therefore hypothesis 2.2 is supported. 
Among the control variables, all the models in Table 4 consistently indicate that 
firm age at the year of IPO had a very strong negative relationship with the number of 
new executive entries in the pre-IPO period (p<.001).  Firm size, measured as the 
logarithm of number of employees, was reported to have a positive relationship with the 
number of new executive entries during the pre-IPO years (p<.05).  All four models in 
Table 4 support this association.  The coefficients of firm performance and firm 
development stage are negative in all four models in Table 4, but neither is significant. 
The Model of Antecedents of Pre-IPO Executive Exit 
Descriptive Statistics  
There are a total of 58 pre-IPO executive exits among all the executives (N=640).  
The percentage is about 9.06%.  Table 5 and Table 6 summarize the distributions of 
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individual level and firm level independent variables over total 58 pre-IPO executive 
exits respectively.   
As shown in Table 5, among the 58 pre-IPO exiting executives, 14 cases 
(24.24%) are technical executives and 44 cases (75.86%) are non-technical positions in 
the firms.  Among total 239 technical executives, only 14 executives left the company 
before the IPO (5.86%), suggesting that technical executives face less risk of exit during 
the pre-IPO period.  The associated Person Chi-square test shows that the difference 
between technical and non-technical executives is significant (p<.05).  Similarly, the 
table indicates that among the 107 founders, only nine of them (8.41%) left the company 
before the IPO.  Among the 58 exiting executives, founders accounted for 15.52%.  
Also, as the table shows, among all 67 executives who hold external directorships in 
other companies, only seven of them exited prior to the IPO; they accounted for 12.07% 
of the exiting executives.  However, for the latter two measures, Pearson Chi-square 
tests yielded no significant results.   
Table 6 shows that, among 58 exiting executives, 25 cases (43.1%) were exiting 
from VC-controlled firms.  The 25 executives only accounted for 10.87% of a total 230 
executives of VC-controlled firms.  In addition, among the 58 exiting executives, 
executives of the firms backed by prestigious VCs accounted for 41.38%.  In both 
tabulations, the results of Pearson Chi-square tests were not significant.  
The means, standard deviations, and correlations of all the variables in the model 
of antecedents of executive exit are summarized in table 7. 
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Analysis 
Logistic regression was used to test the model of antecedents of pre-IPO 
executive exit.  I first ran model 1 with the five control variables (executive tenure, 
executive ownership, firm developmental stage, number of employees, and firm average 
growth rate in R&D expenditures).  Then the two sets of independent variables, firm-
level and executive-level variables, were entered in the model 2 and model 3 separately 
and sequentially.  Finally, an integrated model (model 4) included all the variables.   
Several diagnostic steps were taken before running the models.  First, I checked 
for multicollinearity in the independent variables.  I used the dependent variable in the 
logistic models as the dependent variable; and then ran four multiple linear regressions 
on all the independent variables included in the four models.  The mean of VIF was 
1.08, 1.14, 1.17 and 1.20 respectively, also none of the independent VIFs is greater than 
3.0, indicating no sign of a multicollinearity problem in the independent variables in all 
the four models.  Next, I examined the issue of discrimination problem; the cross 
tabulations shown in Table 5 and Table 6 indicate no sign of such problem3.  Third, 
change in Person Chi-square Statistics and Pregibon’s dBeta were calculated to detect 
any influential patterns in the integrated model.  Among 545 covariant patterns, 8 
patterns (associated with 9 executives in the sample) were identified to have substantial 
influences on model regression.  Removal of these observations lead to significant 
overall improvement of the model.  In the following section, regression results on the 
original sample and the reduced sample were both reported. (Table 8 and Table 9).   
                                                 
3 In fact, STATA can automatically handle the issue of discrimination. 
            
          
    
 
98
Results 
Results from logistic regressions are reported below, following each of the 
hypotheses in the model of antecedents of pre-IPO executive exit. 
 Hypothesis 1.3:  VC control increases the likelihood of executive exit in the 
years immediately prior to the IPO. 
This hypothesis predicts that there is a positive relationship between VC control 
and the likelihood of executive exit in the pre-IPO period.  Model 2 and model 4 in 
Table 8 and Table 9 test this hypothesis.  Although the signs of the coefficients are 
positive as predicted, none of the coefficients is statistically significant (b=.299 in model 
2 of Table 8, b=.253 in model 4 of Table 8, b=.383 in model 2 of Table 9, and b=.347 in 
model 4 of Table 9).  Therefore hypothesis 1.3 is not supported. 
Hypothesis 2.3:  VC prestige increases the likelihood of executive exit in the 
years immediately prior to the IPO. 
This hypothesis predicts that VC prestige positively affects the likelihood of pre-
IPO executive exit.  Model 2 and model 4 in Table 8 and Table 9 test this hypothesis.  
Surprisingly, the signs of the coefficients are negative (b=-.324 and b=-.313 in model 2 
and 4 of Table 8 respectively; b=-.569, and b=-.565 in model 2 and model 4 of Table 9 
respectively).  Among these coefficients, only the one in model 2 of Table 9 is weakly 
significant (p<.1), all others are not statistically significant.  Therefore, hypothesis 2.3 is 
not supported. 
Hypothesis 3: Technical skills decrease the likelihood of executive exit in the 
years immediately prior to the IPO.   
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This hypothesis predicts that being a technical executive decreases the likelihood 
of exit in the pre-IPO stage.  Model 3 and 4 of Table 8 and Table 9 test this hypothesis.  
Results from the four models indicate that being technical executive has a significant 
negative relationship with executive exit (b=-.730 in model 3 of Table 8, b=-.712 in 
model 4 of Table 8, b=-.831 in model 3 of Table 9, b=-.814 in model 4 of Table 9; p<.05 
in all the models).  Hence, hypothesis 3 is strongly supported. 
    Hypothesis 4: External directorships decrease the likelihood of executive exit 
in the years immediately prior to the IPO.   
This hypothesis predicts that executive’s external directorship is negatively 
associated with the likelihood of executive exit in the pre-IPO period.  Model 3, model 
4 in Table 8 and Table 9 test this hypothesis.  The reported coefficients are inconsistent 
in sign, and none is statistically significant (b=-.102, b=-.079, b=.193, b=.232 in the four 
models respectively).  Therefore hypothesis 4 is not supported. 
    Hypothesis 5: Founding status decreases the likelihood of executive exit 
in the years immediately prior to the IPO.   
This hypothesis predicts a negative effect of executive founding status on pre-
IPO executive exit.  Model 3 and 4 of Table 8 and Table 9 test this hypothesis.  All the 
four coefficients in these models are negative as predicted (b=-.204, b=-.207 in model 3 
and 4 of Table 8 respectively; b=-.009, b=-.002 in model 3 and 4 of Table 9 
respectively), but none of them is statistically significant.  Therefore hypothesis 5 is not 
supported. 
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Among control variables, executive tenure is unexpectedly reported to be 
positively associated with the likelihood of pre-IPO exit. This relationship is marginally 
significant (p<.1) in the full-sample model (models 1-4 of Table 8), but is more 
significant (p<.05) in the reduced-sample model (models 1-4 of Table 9).  I also found 
executive exit is negatively associated with firm size (measured by number of 
employees) (p<.05 in models 1, 3, 4 of Table 8, and p<.01 in model 1 and model 3 of 
Table 9).  The regression models report that executive ownership has a negative 
relationship with executive exit in the pre-IPO period, but this association is only 
marginally significant (p<.1). 
ANTECEDENTS OF EXECUTIVE EXIT IN THE POST-IPO STAGE 
The Model of Antecedents of Post-IPO Executive Exit 
Descriptive Statistics 
The unit of analysis of this model is the executive-year.  Among the total 1,447 
observations, 249 executive exits occurred in the risk period – the three years after the 
IPO.  The distributions of these exits over the years are described in Table 10.  The 
table shows a decreasing rate of executive exit in the first three years following the IPO.  
As shown in the table, among the total 249 executive exits, 113 cases (45.38%) occurred 
during the first year after the IPO.  83 cases (33.33%) occurred in the second year 
following the IPO, and 53 cases (21.29%) took place in the third year after the IPO.   
The model of post-IPO executive exit includes both firm level and individual 
level antecedents of executive exit in the post-IPO period.  In particular, I am interested 
in the distributions of executive exits among several executive-level characteristics such 
            
          
    
 
101
as education, founding status, and prior work experience.  Due to the large number of 
independent variables, I only report those of which Pearson Chi-Square tests were 
significant (Table 11).  As shown in Table 11, among 249 post-IPO executive exits, 
there are 202 cases (81.12%) where the executive did not have prior public company 
management experience.  For founding status of exiting executives, among the 249 
executives, 29 cases (11.65%) were founders, and 220 cases (88.35%) were non-
founders.  For formal business education, among these exiting executives, only 62 cases 
(25%) had earned graduate degree in business; 187 cases (75%) did not have formal 
business education at a graduate level. 
The above comparisons suggest that executives with prior public company 
management experience and/or with formal business education at a graduate level, may 
have a lower likelihood of exit in the post-IPO period.  Similarly, the risk of turnover of 
a founder executive is seemingly lower than a non-founder. 
The means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients of all the variables 
were reported in Table 12 and Table 13.  Multicollinearity test shows there is no such 
threat to the variables included in the model (mean of VIF=1.39, and none of the 
individual VIFs is greater than 3.0 ). 
Analysis  
To test the hypotheses, I used Cox event-history model.  In general, event-
history analysis enables us to make causal inferences about how changes in one variable 
affect the likelihood that the focal event will occur (Blossfeld & Rohwer, 1995).  For 
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each of the three years that an executive was at risk, I created a separate observation 
record.  The final sample had 1,447 executive-year observations.   
One of the assumptions of Cox hazard model is that the hazard for any one 
individual is proportional to the hazard for any other individual.  Although the 
importance of meeting this assumption is debated in the literature (Allison, 1984), it is 
recommended that groups need to be stratified if their survivor functions are not 
proportional.  Therefore I ran the long-rank tests for the categorical independent 
variables included in the Cox hazard model.  The results indicated that survivor 
functions of founder executives and non-founder executives are significantly different 
from each other (p>Chi2 = .005).  Therefore, in addition to the Cox proportional hazard 
model, I ran a separate stratified Cox model using stratified estimations to test the 
hypotheses as well.  Actually this is another advantage of using Cox model, that is, it 
allows the estimation of stratified models.  
In each of these models, the regressions were made as follows.  I first ran a 
model only with seven control variables.  Then two sets of firm-level independent 
variables and executive-level independent variables were input sequentially and 
separately.  Then an integrated model including all the independent variables and 
control variables was tested.  Following that, the interaction variables were included 
sequentially in last two models.  Reports of Cox proportional hazard models and the 
stratified Cox models are presented in Table 14 and Table 15 respectively. 
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Results 
Results from the Cox models are reported below, following each of the 
hypotheses in the model of antecedents of post-IPO executive exit. 
Hypothesis 6: The addition of outside directors increases the likelihood of 
executive exit in the first few years following an IPO.  
 This hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between the addition of new 
outside directors and the likelihood of post-IPO executive exit.  Models 2, 4, 5, and 6 in 
Table 14 and Table 15 test this hypothesis.  In the Cox models, the directions of hazard 
coefficients in the first three models (without the interaction variable) are mixed      
(b= -.069, b= -.004, and b= .006, respectively), and none of them is significant.  After 
entering the interaction between addition of outside directors and firm performance, 
model 6 in Table 14 reports a significant negative hazard coefficient (b= -.221, p<.05).  
However, the direction is opposite to what I predicted.  The stratified Cox model 
reports the similar results. The models without the interaction term in Table 15 are 
inconsistent.  However, the coefficient from model 6 of Table 15 is negative and 
significant (b=-.221, p<.05).  Therefore hypothesis 6 is not supported.  That is, no 
evidence to indicate that addition of new outside directors increases the likelihood of 
post-IPO executive exit. 
Hypothesis 7: Pre-IPO management team restructuring decreases the likelihood 
of executive exit in the first few years following an IPO. 
This hypothesis predicts that pre-IPO management team restructuring has a 
negative effect on the likelihood of post-IPO executive exit.  Models 2, 4, 5, and 6 in 
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Table 14 and Table 15 test this hypothesis.  In the Cox proportional hazard models, the 
hazard coefficients are all negative (b= -.679 in model 2, b= -.735 in model 4, b= -.721 
in model 5, and b= -.736 in model 6 of Table 14 respectively) and they are statistically 
significant (p<.01 in all the models).  The hazard coefficients in the stratified Cox 
models report similar results. The hazard coefficients are all negative and significant 
(b=-.672, p<.05 in model 2; b= -.735, p<.01 in model 4; b= -.721, p<.01; and b= -.737, 
p<.01 in model 6 of Table 15 respectively).  Therefore hypothesis 7 is strongly 
supported.  That is, pre-IPO management team restructuring has a significant negative 
impact on the likelihood of executive exit in the three years following the IPO. 
 Hypothesis 8: The addition of post-IPO new senior executives increases the 
likelihood of executive exit in the first few years following an IPO. 
The hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between the addition of post-IPO 
new senior executives and the likelihood of post-IPO executive exit.  Models 2, 4, 5, 
and 6 in Table 14 and Table 15 test this hypothesis.  The hazard coefficients reported in 
the four Cox proportional models are positive as predicted.  Except for model 6, in 
which the hazard coefficient is only weakly significant (p<.1), the hazard coefficients in 
all the other three models are significant (p<.05, p<.05, and p<.01 in Model 2, 4, and 5 
of Table 14 respectively).  The stratified Cox model shows similar results.  The hazard 
coefficients in models 2, 4, 5, and 6 of Table 15 are positive and statistically significant 
(b=.091, p<.05, b=.095, p<.05; b=.190, p<.01; and b=.081, p<.1 in these models 
respectively).  Therefore hypothesis 8 is supported.  That is, the addition of post-IPO 
new senior executives has a positive effect on the likelihood of post-IPO executive exit. 
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Hypothesis 9: Prior public company managerial experience decreases the 
likelihood of executive exit in the first few years following an IPO. 
This hypothesis predicts that executives who have prior public company 
managerial experience are less likely to exit the firm post IPO.  Models 3, 4, 5, and 6 in 
Table 14 and Table 15 test this hypothesis.  The hazard coefficients reported in the Cox 
proportional hazard models are negative and significant as predicted (b=-.302 in model 
3, b=-.306 in model 4, b=-.299 in model 5, and b=-.306 in model 6 of Table 14 
respectively), and all these coefficients are statistically significant (p<.05).  The hazard 
coefficients reported by the stratified Cox models are negative and significant as well 
(b=-.302, b=-.306, b=-.300, b=-.306 in models 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Table 15 respectively).  
Therefore hypothesis 9 is strongly supported.  That is, executive prior public company 
managerial experience negatively affects the likelihood of executive exit in the post-IPO 
period. 
Hypothesis 10: Formal business education decreases the likelihood of executive 
exit in the first few years following an IPO. 
This hypothesis predicts that formal business education negatively affects the 
likelihood of executive exit in the post-IPO years.  Models 3, 4, 5, and 6 in Table 14 and 
Table 15 test this hypothesis.  When undergraduate business degree is used as the 
measure of formal business education, the hazard coefficients reported in the Cox 
proportional hazard models are negative as predicted, but none of them are significant 
(b= -.429, b= -.487, b=-.481, b=-.508 in models 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Table 14 respectively).  
When graduate business degree is used as the formal business education measure, the 
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hazard coefficients in these models display unexpected positive signs, and are strongly 
significant (b=.472, p<.01; b=.487, p<.01; b=.484, p<.01; and b=.488, p<.01 in models 
3, 4, 5, and 6 of Table 14 respectively).  The stratified Cox models indicate similar 
results.  The hazard coefficients for business education measured with undergraduate 
business degree are all negative but none of them are significant (b=-.429, b=-.487, b=-
.482 and b=-.508 in models 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Table 15 respectively).  When graduate 
business degree is used to measure formal business education, the hazard coefficients in 
the stratified Cox models are positive and significant (b=.472, b=.487, b=.484 and 
b=.488 in models 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Table 15, respectively).  Therefore hypothesis 10 is 
not supported.  That is, formal business education does not decrease the likelihood of 
executive exit in the post-IPO period. 
Hypothesis 11: Prior public company financial experience decreases the 
likelihood of executive exit in the first few years following an IPO.   
This hypothesis predicts that prior public company financial experience is 
negatively associated with executive exit in the post-IPO period.  Models 3, 4, 5, and 6 
in Table 14 and Table 15 test this hypothesis.  The hazard coefficients reported in the 
Cox proportional hazard models are unexpectedly positive (b=.228, b=.276, b=.275, and 
b=.297 in models 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Table 14, respectively), but none of them is significant.  
Similarly, the hazard coefficients reported in the stratified Cox models are positive as 
well (b=.229, b=.277, b=.275, and b=.297 in models 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Table 15, 
respectively).  Again, none is significant.  Therefore hypothesis 11 is not supported.  
That is, prior public company financial experience is not negatively associated with the 
likelihood of post-IPO executive exit.   
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Hypothesis 12:  Technical skills increase the likelihood of executive exit in the 
first few years following an IPO.   
This hypothesis predicts a positive association between technical skills and the 
likelihood of executive exit in the post-IPO period.  Models 3, 4, 5, and 6 in Table 14 
and Table 15 test this hypothesis.  The hazard coefficients reported in the Cox 
proportional hazard models are positive as predicted (b=.263, b=.290, b=.287, and 
b=.285 in models 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Table 14 respectively); however, all these coefficients 
are marginally significant (p<.1).  These results correspond exactly the same with those 
of the stratified Cox models (b=.263, b=.290, b=.287, and b=.285 in models 3, 4, 5, and 
6 of Table 15 respectively; p<.1 in all the four models).  Therefore, hypothesis 12 
receives weak support.  That is, technical skills have a positive effect on the likelihood 
of post-IPO executive exit, but the effect is marginal. 
Hypothesis 13.1:  The positive relationship between the addition of outside 
directors and the likelihood of executive exit will be strengthened when the firm’s 
financial performance is poor in the first few years following an IPO. 
This hypothesis predicts a positive interaction effect on post-IPO executive exit 
between addition of outside directors and poor firm performance.  Model 6 in Table 14 
and Table 15 test this hypothesis.  As shown in the tables, the coefficients for the 
interaction between addition of outside directors and poor firm performance in both 
models are positive and significant (b=.266, p<.05 in model 6 of Table 14; b=.266, p<.05 
in model 6 of Table 15).  Therefore hypothesis 13.1 is supported.  That is, the addition 
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of outside directors interacts with poor firm performance to increase the likelihood of 
executive exit in the post-IPO period. 
Hypothesis 13.2:  The positive relationship between the addition of post-IPO 
new senior executives and the likelihood of executive exit will be strengthened when the 
firm’s financial performance is poor in the first few years following an IPO. 
This hypothesis predicts a positive interaction effect on post-IPO executive exit 
between the addition of post-IPO new senior executives and poor firm performance.  
Model 5 in Table 14 and Table 15 test this hypothesis.  Contrary to the prediction, the 
coefficients for this interaction are negative in both the Cox proportional hazard model 
and the stratified Cox model (b=-.133 in model 5 of Table 14, and b=-.133 in model 5 of 
Table 15).  Neither coefficient is significant.  Therefore hypothesis 13.2 is not 
supported.  That is, the addition of post-IPO new senior executives does not interact 
with poor firm performance to increase the likelihood of post-IPO executive exit. 
PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF PRE-IPO MANAGEMENT TEAM 
RESTRUCTURING AND POST-IPO EXECUTIVE EXIT  
The Model of Performance Effects of Pre-IPO Management Team Restructuring 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 16 summarizes the means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients 
for all the variables in the models of performance effects of pre-IPO management team 
restructuring.  The Skewness-Kurtosis tests indicated that none of the variables is 
normally distributed; therefore I suspect the residuals of the models may not be normally 
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distributed.  The correlation coefficients indicate there are no serious threats to the 
variables in the models.  
Analysis 
The firm level IPO price premium and pre-money market valuation are two 
measures of firm performance used to test the hypotheses.  I ran separate models on 
firm performance with these two different measures.  First, I ran the models with 
untransformed dependent variables.  In both models, normality tests show that residuals 
are not normally distributed.  Cook-Weisburg tests indicated that none of the models 
has heteroscedasticity problem.  In addition, there is no multicollinearity relationships 
exit among the independent variables in both models.  
Next, I used the Box-Cox power transformation to address the normality 
problems.  The Box-Cox regressions indicated that a cube transformation was 
appropriate for price premium (theta = 2.962).  Some firms have negative price 
premiums, so I had to use (price premium+1) as the dependent variable in the Box Cox 
regression. That is, the new dependent variable used in the final regression when firm 
performance is measured with price premium is [(price premium+1)^3].  Similarly, a 
logarithm transformation was made on the dependent variable in the model with firm 
performance measured with pre-money market valuation.  The new dependent variable 
in this model is [Log(market valuation+1)]. 
Regressions with these new dependent variables show great improvement in 
meeting the normality distribution assumptions, relative to untransformed models. 
However, results of the combined Skewness/Kurtosis tests suggest that the residuals are 
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still not normal distributed.  Hence, I chose regression with robust standard errors to 
address the remaining normality problems.  In regression with robust standard errors the 
estimates of the regression coefficients are the same as in the standard OLS linear 
regression but the estimates of the standard errors are more robust to departure from 
normality and homogeneity of variance of the residuals.  I enter the control variables, 
the independent variables and the moderating variables sequentially.  Preliminary 
analysis indicated that there was a serious multicollinearity problem when the variable 
VC control and the moderating variable were entered into the analysis.  Therefore I 
dropped the “VC control” variable in models testing the moderating effects.  The results 
of two models are summarized in Table 17. 
 Results 
Results from regressions with robust standard errors models are reported below, 
following each of the hypotheses in the model of performance effects of pre-IPO 
management team restructuring. 
Hypothesis 14: Pre-IPO management team restructuring has a positive effect on 
firm performance. 
This hypothesis predicts that management team restructuring in the pre-IPO 
period has a positive effect on firm performance.  Models 2, 3, 5, and 6 in Table 17 test 
this hypothesis.  As shown in the table, when firm performance is measured with IPO 
price premium, the coefficients are positive as predicted but not significant (b=.357 and 
b=.208 in model 2 and 3 of Table 17 respectively).  When firm performance is 
measured as pre-money market valuation, the coefficients are positive and significant 
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(b=6.089, p<.05; b=6.441, p<.05 in model 5 and 6 of Table 17 respectively).  Therefore 
hypothesis 14 is partially supported.  That is, when firm performance is measured with 
pre-money market valuation of the firm, pre-IPO management team restructuring has a 
positive effect on firm performance. 
Hypothesis 15: The positive relationship between pre-IPO management team 
restructuring and firm performance will be strengthened when the firm is controlled by 
VCs. 
This hypothesis predicts a positive moderating effect of VC control on the 
relationship between pre-IPO management team restructuring and firm IPO 
performance.  Model 3 and model 6 in Table 17 test this hypothesis.  When IPO price 
premium is used as the firm performance measure, the interaction effect is positive but 
not significant (b=.097 in model 3 of Table 17).  When firm pre-money market 
valuation is used as the performance measure, the interaction term displays an 
unexpected negative sign       (b=-2.240), and the coefficient is not significant.  
Therefore, hypothesis 15 is not supported.  That is, VC control does not interact with 
pre-IPO management team restructuring to increase firm performance. 
The Model of Performance Effects of Post-IPO Executive Exit 
Descriptive Statistics   
Table 18 and Table 19 summarize the means, standard deviations, and correlation 
coefficients for all the variables in the models of performance effects of post-IPO 
executive exit.  I use both market-based and accounting-based performance measures to 
measure post-IPO firm performance. Specifically, the dependent variables used in the 
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models are average ROA and average shareholder return of the firm within the three 
years following an executive exit.  I transformed team size to a logarithm form of the 
variable, as the transformation improved the normality distribution of the original 
variable significantly.  The correlation coefficients indicate there are no serious threats 
to the variables in the models.  The original dataset includes a total of 264 executive 
exits; however, because of limited firm performance data, only 171 executive exits were 
included in the model of average ROA, and 163 executive exits were included in the 
model of average shareholder return.      
Analysis 
As two firm performance measures were used, I ran separate models to test the 
hypotheses. Cook-Weisburg tests indicated that both models have heteroscedasticity 
problems.  Thus I use regressions with robust standard errors to cope with this problem 
and the normality problem.  The heteroscedasticity problems disappeared in using this 
approach.  In the model with average ROA, I dropped ROA of the exiting year due to 
the multicollinearity problem (VIF=3.59).  No multicollinearity problem was found in 
the model of average shareholder return.  
I first enter the control variables in the model, followed by each independent 
variable.  The results of two models are summarized in Table 20 and Table 21. 
 Results 
Results from regressions with robust standard errors models are reported below, 
following each of the hypotheses in the model of performance effects of post-IPO 
executive exit. 
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Hypothesis 16.1: The exits of executives with prior public company managerial 
experience in the post-IPO stage negatively affect firm performance. 
This hypothesis predicts that the exits of executives with prior public company 
managerial experience in the post IPO years negatively affect firm performance.  
Models 2 and 4 in Table 20 and Table 21 test this hypothesis.  As shown in the tables, 
when firm performance is measured with average ROA within the three years after exit, 
the coefficient is negative as predicted and overall significant (b=-8.984, p<.1 in model 
2, b= -9.533, p<.05 in model 4 of Table 20).  However, when firm performance is 
measured with average shareholder return within the three years after exit, the 
coefficients are unexpectedly positive and insignificant (b=.111 in model 2, and b=.137 
in model 4 of Table 21).  Therefore, hypothesis 16.1 is partially supported.  That is, the 
exits of managerial executives negatively affect the average ROA in the three years 
following the exits, but have no significant impact on the average shareholder return in 
this period. 
Hypothesis 16.2: The exits of executives with prior public company financial 
experience in the post-IPO stage negatively affect firm performance. 
This hypothesis predicts that the exits of executives with prior public company 
financial experience in the post IPO years negatively affect firm performance.  Models 
3 and 4 in Table 20 and Table 21 test this hypothesis.  As shown in Table 20, when firm 
performance is measured with average ROA within the three years after exit, contrary to 
the hypothesized prediction, the coefficient is positive and insignificant (b= 4.474 in 
model 3, b=6.465 in model 4 of Table 20).  When firm performance is measured with 
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average shareholder return within the three years after exit, the coefficients become 
significantly negative (b=-.278, p<.05 in model 3, and b=-.308, p<.01 in model 4 of 
Table 21).  Therefore, overall, hypothesis 16.2 is partially supported.  That is, the exits 
of financial executives have no impact on the average ROA in the three years following 
the exits, but have a significant negative impact on the average shareholder return in this 
period. 
SUMMARY 
The empirical results regarding the antecedents of pre-IPO management team 
restructuring, new executive entry, executive exit and post-IPO executive exit are 
summarized in Table 22.  As shown in the table, VC prestige has a marginal positive 
effect on management team restructuring and has a significant positive effect on new 
executive entry in the pre-IPO stage.  Technical skills are significantly negative 
associated with executive exit in the pre-IPO stage but have a positive impact on 
executive exit in the post-IPO stage.  In the post-IPO period, the addition of new senior 
executives has a significant positive impact on executive exit.  Pre-IPO management 
team restructuring decreases post-IPO executive exit.  For executives who have prior 
public company management experience, the likelihood of exit in the post-IPO period is 
significantly lower than those without such experience.  Post-IPO poor firm 
performance interacts with the addition of outside directors to significantly increase the 
strength of the effect on the likelihood of executive exit in the post-IPO stage. 
Contrary to my predictions, VC control has no impact on pre-IPO management 
team restructuring, new executive entry and executive exit in the pre-IPO stage.  
Executive formal business education (graduate level) has a significant positive 
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association with post-IPO executive exit.  I found no impact of external directorships on 
executive exit in the pre-IPO period.  No significant evidence was found that founding 
status lowers the likelihood of executive exit in the pre-IPO stage.  Further, there is no 
association between addition of outside directors and post-IPO executive exit.  Among 
control variables, firm age has a significant negative association with pre-IPO 
management team restructuring and pre-IPO new executive entry.  Firm size, measured 
as logarithm of number of employees, has significant negative associations with pre-IPO 
management team restructuring and pre-IPO executive exit, but has a significant positive 
relationship with new executive entry in the pre-IPO stage.  Executive tenure is 
positively associated with executive exit in the pre-IPO stage, but has a significant 
negative association with executive exit in the post-IPO stage.  Top management team 
size has a significant effect on post-IPO executive exit.  Post-IPO firm performance 
(measured as a poor shareholder return dummy) has a significant association with 
executive exit in the post-IPO period.  Another firm size measure, the logarithm of 
average total assets, negatively affects the likelihood of post-IPO executive exit. 
The performance implications of pre-IPO management team restructuring and 
post-IPO executive exit were also investigated.  The results indicate that pre-IPO 
management team restructuring has a significant positive impact on the firm’s pre-
money market valuation.  However, it has no significant impact on the firm’s IPO price 
premium.  After the IPO, exit of managerial executives has a significant negative effect 
on the firm’s average ROA in the three years following the exits; but has no effect on 
firm’s average shareholder return for this period.  Finally, I find that exit of financial 
executives in the post-IPO stage has no significant effect on the firm’s average ROA in 
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the three years following the exit; however, it significantly decreases the average 
shareholder return for this period.     
Discussion of the above results is presented in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION 
This chapter discusses the results presented in the previous chapter.  The first 
section discusses the results regarding the antecedents of management team 
restructuring, new executive entry, and executive exit in the pre-IPO stage.  The second 
section discusses the results regarding the antecedents of executive exit in the post-IPO 
stage.  The last section discusses the performance implications of pre-IPO management 
team restructuring and post-IPO executive exit. 
ANTECEDENTS OF MANAGEMENT TEAM RESTRUCTURING, NEW 
EXECUTIVE ENTRY AND EXECUTIVE EXIT IN THE PRE-IPO STAGE 
This section discusses the empirical results provided in the previous chapter 
regarding the antecedents of management team restructuring, new executive entry and 
executive exit in the pre-IPO stage.  As it has shown, VC prestige and the technical 
skills of executives have significant impacts on Pre-IPO management team restructuring 
and executive exit.  VC prestige also has a significant positive effect on new executive 
entry in the pre-IPO stage.  However, some hypotheses were not supported.  The rest of 
this section discusses these findings and their implications for our understandings of the 
power model of management team restructuring and executive exit in pre-IPO stage 
firms.   
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Firm Level Factors 
VC Control 
The VC literature has widely emphasized the important roles venture capitalists 
play in the professionalization process of private firms (Lerner, 1995; Schefczyk & 
Gerpott, 2001).  The power model proposes that VC control increases the level of 
management team restructuring and the likelihood of executive exit in the pre-IPO 
stages.  Prior studies have shown that in venture-capital-backed firms, a founder is more 
likely to be replaced by an outside CEO (Hellmann & Puri, 2002).  Surprisingly, in this 
study, I didn’t find any significant impact of VC control on pre-IPO management team 
restructuring, new executive entry or executive exit.  The coefficients for VC control in 
models of these events are positive as predicted, but none was statistically significant.  
The lack of significant effects of VC control on pre-IPO management team 
restructuring, new executive entry and executive exit suggests that although VC 
investment confers significant ownership power relative to the executives, VCs may not 
exercise this power effectively.  Evidence from extent research supports this 
speculation.  For example, in a study of VCs’ oversight roles on private biotechnology 
ventures, Lerner (1995) emphasized that the monitoring roles of VCs involve substantial 
costs.  In addition, geographic distance may prevent VCs from overseeing management 
effectively (Lerner, 1995).  Prior research has also indicated that VCs may not be 
involved in the day-to-day operations of their portfolio companies due to time 
constrains, unless major problems arise (Gifford, 1997; Gorman & Sahlman, 1989).  
Therefore the lack of significant impact reported here may be due to the fact that VCs 
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were not differentiated in this study, in terms of their abilities and the costs involving in 
the management of the private firm.       
The failure to witness a significant association between VC control and pre-IPO 
management team restructuring, new executive entry and executive exit may also due to 
sample limitations.  Limited by data availability, I could only focus the analyses on 
firms which eventually go public (IPO firms) and focus the investigation on the two 
years before the IPO.  In fact, research shows that many private VC-backed 
biotechnology firms are acquired or terminated before going public (Lerner, 1995).  For 
companies preparing the IPO, VCs may have screened and carefully recruited the 
management team well before the two year window prior to the IPO.  Hellmann & Puri 
(2002) study of 173 Silicon Valley startup companies found that venture-capital-backed 
firms tend to replace the founder early in the life of the venture.  Unfortunately, I could 
not include management team restructuring and executive exit data before the two years 
prior to the IPO because the data was not available.  Future studies should strive to 
overcome this limitation by following a sample of firm from birth through IPO.  
 
VC Prestige 
The power model proposes that VC prestige has a positive impact on pre-IPO 
management team restructuring, new executive entry and executive exit.  The evidence 
reported in Chapter VI shows that VC prestige has a significant positive association with 
pre-IPO management team restructuring and new executive entry, but does not have a 
significant impact on pre-IPO executive exit. 
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The positive effects of VC prestige on pre-IPO management team restructuring 
and new executive entry suggest that ventures backed by prestigious venture capitalists 
will be more likely to restructure their management teams and/or recruit new executives 
from outside before the IPO.  Studies have shown that prestigious VC’s endorsement is 
an important factor for IPO success (Gulati & Higgins, 2003).  Barry et al. (1990) 
argues that VC expertise and experience in monitoring investments send important 
signals to investors at the time of IPO.  This endorsement is valuable to the firm 
preparing for an IPO, since due to the information asymmetry problems (Rock, 1986), 
external investors often lack detailed information about managers’ abilities.  As such, 
the endorsement of prestigious venture capitalists sends a positive signal to outside 
executives about the potential for success of the focal firm.  Therefore because of the 
important resources they bring to the firm; more prestigious venture capitalists will 
wield greater power against entrepreneurial executives than less prestigious VCs. 
The findings of the VC prestige’s impact also confirm the prior argument that 
VCs become involved in the management of their investment because their reputational 
capital is at stake (Jain & Kini, 1995).  The result has shown that a firm backed by a 
prestigious VC tends to have more restructuring of the management team prior to the 
IPO.  Despite this, the results don’t support the hypothesized positive association 
between VC prestige and pre-IPO executive exit.  This may due to the limitations of 
data on pre-IPO executive exit as well.  The concerns about their reputations may make 
prestigious VCs carefully screen and select the management team in advance of the two 
years prior to the IPO, but data from that time period were not available to the present 
study. 
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Individual Level Factors  
Technical Skills 
The power model proposes that executives with technical skills are less likely to 
exit the firm in the pre-IPO stage.  Results in the previous chapter support this 
hypothesis.  This finding confirms the critical role of technical resources in technology-
based ventures (Kelly & Rice, 2001).  Technical skills influence the founding of the 
firm, the development of current products and services, and contribute importantly to the 
firm’s potential for future growth.  In particular, for biotechnology startups, many of 
them have not commercialized their products, and in some instance, the products are not 
even close to market before the initial public offerings.  As the companies lack a history 
of financial performance, executive technical competence serves as an important 
indicator of the technological promise of the firm to potential investors.  Therefore, the 
significant negative association between executive technical skills and pre-IPO executive 
exit confirms the importance of technical knowledge to a technology-based startup in the 
pre-IPO stage. 
Interestingly, the results in the model of post-IPO executive exit suggest 
technical skills actually increase the likelihood of executive exit in the post-IPO stage.  
Discussion on this different impact is presented in the next section.    
External Directorships 
External directorships were proposed to have a negative impact on executive exit 
in the pre-IPO stage.  The logic is that sitting on other companies’ boards confers 
personal status and prestige, as well as management knowledge and external resources 
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which the executive can bring to the focal firm.  Therefore, executives with external 
directorships may possess greater power than those without.  However, though 
coefficient signs were negative as predicted, the associations between external 
directorships and executive exit in the pre-IPO stage were not significant. 
 The unsupported hypothesis suggests that there is a need to reexamine the role 
of executive external directorships in pre-IPO technology ventures.  Scholars have 
emphasized the roles of executive external ties in established firms (Geletkanycz et al., 
2001; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997).  External directorships help the firm get access 
to strategic information and opportunities, reduce the level of uncertainty, and enhance 
the firm’s legitimacy and status.  However, most of the pre-IPO stage technology 
ventures, as discussed earlier, are still in their early development stages, and the 
dominant problems facing the firms are to demonstrate the value of their technical 
innovation to potential investors (Kazanjian, 1988).  This focus simplifies the 
executive’s management tasks and lowers the need for acquiring business management 
expertise.  Therefore, although external directorships confer prestige power to the 
executive, the effects might be limited due to the emphasis on technological 
development in the firm at the pre-IPO stage. 
Another reason for this unsupported hypothesis might be the lack of variance in 
executive external directorships.  As shown in Table 5, among a total of 640 executives, 
only 67 (10.47%) held external directorships, while nearly 90% executives did not have.  
This may also contribute to the lack of significant impact of external directorships on 
executive exit in the pre-IPO stage.  
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Founding Status 
The power model proposes that executive founding status negatively affects the 
likelihood of executive exit in the pre-IPO stage.  Although the direction of the 
associations between executive founding status and pre-IPO executive exit are negative 
in all the models, none of the coefficients was significant.  The post-IPO executive exit 
model also indicated no significant relationship between executive founding status and 
post-IPO executive exit.  Therefore in any of the models examined, founding status had 
no significant impact on executive exit. 
In retrospect, perhaps this result should not be surprising.  In fact, evidence in 
extent research on the antecedents of founder departure have been very inconsistent.  
Rubenson et al. (1996) argue that due to the complex interplay between the evolving 
organization and the founders, it is hard to examine founder departure without taking 
into account various organizational contingencies and the unique characteristics of 
founders.  Unfortunately, other than founding status, data on the individual 
characteristics of founding executives are very limited in pre-IPO setting.   
 Similarly, the failure to witness a significant association between founding 
status and executive exit may also be due to sample limitations.  That is, founding 
executives who had already left the firm before the two-year-window prior to the IPO 
were not included in the logistic analysis.  Although this does not threaten the validity 
of the present study, it would be desirable if more years of data could be collected in the 
pre-IPO period.  
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ANTECEDENTS OF POST-IPO EXECUTIVE EXIT 
The results presented in Chapter VI revealed a number of interesting findings 
regarding the likelihood of executive exit in the post-IPO period.  The following section 
discusses these findings and their contributions to our understanding of the power model 
of post-IPO executive exit. 
Firm Level Factors 
 Addition of Outside Directors and Its Interaction with Firm Performance  
The power model of post-IPO executive exit proposes that the addition of new 
outside directors in the post-IPO years increases the likelihood of executive exit.  
Interestingly, the results in Chapter VI show that addition of outside directors alone has 
no significant relationship with the likelihood of executive exit.  However, after 
entering the interaction term between addition of outside directors and poor firm 
performance (measured as a below-industry-average-return dummy variable), the 
coefficients of addition of directors become statistically significant.  In the latter model, 
it is also found that there is a significant positive association between the interaction 
term and post-IPO executive exit.  However, although the direction of the interaction 
effect is positive as predicted, the main effect of addition of directors on executive exit 
shows an opposite negative direction.   
The findings suggest that, overall, there is no evidence that the addition of 
outside directors will increase the risk of executive exit in the post-IPO stage.  
However, the impacts of addition of new outside directors are significantly different 
between firms with low financial performance and those with high financial 
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performance.  That is, as firm performance is lower, addition of directors is more likely 
to increase executive exit in the post-IPO period. 
The lack of a significant main effect may be due to the limited power of outside 
directors in the venture firm.  Scholars have argued that when high-technology firms go 
public, their boards tend to be dominated by VCs and entrepreneurial executives (Lorsch 
et al., 2001).  This suggests that to enrich our understanding of the power model, it is 
desirable to investigate the origins of outside directors in future studies, i.e., are they 
coming from the founder’s side or are they standing on outside investors’ sides?   
Firm performance has been proposed as a primary contextual factor influencing 
executive turnover and succession (Kesner & Dalton, 1994).  The above results conform 
to this notion.  The significant interaction affect of addition of outside directors and firm 
performance is consistent with the previous argument that outside directors often rely on 
financial performance to make executive dismissal decisions because they are limited in 
their ability to strategically evaluate firm operations and executive performance 
(Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Mizruchi, 1983).  Furthermore, the positive direction of 
the association between the interaction term and the likelihood of executive exit provides 
support for the power model.  According to the power model, new outside directors are 
relatively new to the firm and they typically have little confidence in entrepreneurial 
executives.  Therefore, poor financial performance sharpens doubts about the abilities 
of the executives and triggers conflicts between new outside directors and executives.       
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Pre-IPO Management Team Restructuring 
Pre-IPO management team restructuring is proposed to have a negative 
relationship with the likelihood of post-IPO executive exit.  The power model suggests 
that pre-IPO management team restructuring implies that the management team has been 
screened and selected by original investors prior to the IPO, therefore the incumbent 
executives tend to possess expert power as their abilities and credentials have been 
accepted by original investors.  The negative association between pre-IPO management 
team restructuring and post-IPO executive exit supports this speculation. 
Addition of Post-IPO New Senior Executives and Its Interaction with Firm 
Performance 
The power model proposes that there is a significant positive association between 
the addition of post-IPO new senior executives and post-IPO executive exit.  As shown 
in the proceeding chapter, the main effect of addition of new executives on post-IPO 
executive exit is significantly positive.  However, no support was found for its 
interaction effect with firm performance on executive exit.   
The positive main effect of addition of post-IPO new senior executives on the 
post-IPO executive exit conforms to speculations that adding new executives in the post-
IPO period increases tensions and conflicts between original entrepreneurial executives 
and new executives (Maruca, 2000).  Prior research in large corporation executive 
turnover has emphasized the power dynamics and contests among senior executives 
(Shen & Cannella, 2002a).  The power model suggests that this type of contest will be 
even more prevalent in new venture settings because venture firms have limited 
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opportunities for executive promotions.  Also, because new senior executives are often 
brought in from outside the company, they have less integration with original team 
members than the founding executives. 
 The predicted, but unsupported interaction effect suggests that poor firm 
performance does not necessarily strengthen the positive relationship between the 
addition of new executives and executive exit in the post-IPO period.  This contradicts 
the power model.  However, an interpretation of this finding may indeed support the 
power model.  That is, new senior executives might be brought in as “firefighters” when 
firm performance falls.  Although investors/owners may trust the ability of new 
executives in helping the firm turn around, new senior executives may still feel intense 
pressure to make a quick return to health.  However, because new executives in 
technology ventures are typically from outside the firm, the lack of inside information 
and integration with the management team may prevent them from implementing 
strategies to improve firm performance effectively.  Therefore, new executives still 
need to maintain good relations with entrepreneurial executives, at least during the 
turnaround period.  For these reasons, the tensions and conflicts between new 
executives and original founding executives might be alleviated, therefore decreasing the 
likelihood of executive exit in post-IPO stage firm. 
Individual Level Factors 
Technical Skills 
The post-IPO executive exit model proposes that technical skills increase the 
likelihood of executive exit after the IPO.  Unlike the pre-IPO stage, in the post-IPO 
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stage, executive technical skills have a significant positive relationship with executive 
exit.   This finding supports one of the basic arguments of this study, that is, the relative 
power of executives decreases if their skills are limited in helping the new public firm 
address the dominant problems after the IPO.  As pointed out earlier, firms have various 
dominant problems as they progress through different developmental stages (Kazanjian, 
1988; Terpstra & Olson, 1993).  Prior to the IPO, technical executives have much 
power because it is the primary concern of the firm to impress potential investors with 
promising technology.  However, as the technology became proven, in the post-IPO 
stage, managerial and public financial knowledge become more important.  Firms in 
growth stages emphasize strategic, administrative and managerial problems (Kuratko & 
Hodgetts, 1989).  The evidence provided here regarding the different effects of 
technical skills provides strong support for the power model and the above arguments. 
Prior Public Company Managerial Experience 
The power model proposes that executive prior public company managerial 
experience decreases the likelihood of executive exit in the post-IPO period.  The 
results in Chapter VI strongly support this hypothesis.  Consistent with the power model 
and prior discussion, this finding suggests that executives with prior public company 
managerial experience will be less likely to exit in the post-IPO period.  This is because 
in post-IPO firms, the managerial and administrative skills developed in prior public 
company managerial experiences better prepare the executives for the wide range of 
strategic and organizational problems confronting the new public firm.  The evidence 
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reported in previous chapter shows strong support for this prediction of the power 
model. 
Prior Public Company Financial Experience 
Prior public financial experience is proposed to negatively affect the likelihood 
of post-IPO executive exit.  No evidence was found to support this argument.  
Although this finding is inconsistent with prior research on the importance of public 
financial experience in new public firms (Mian, 2001), it is not surprising, given that in 
the sample firms nearly 90% of the executives have no prior public company financial 
experience.  Therefore, this lack of variance may be the major factor contributing to the 
lack of significance of the impact of prior public company financial experience on post-
IPO executive exit. 
Formal Business Education 
The power model proposes that executive formal business education has a 
negative impact on the likelihood of executive exit in the post-IPO stage.  When formal 
business education is measured with undergraduate level business degree, the association 
has the predicted sign, but lacks statistical significance.  When is measured with 
graduate-level business degree (e.g., MBA, etc), the association with post-IPO executive 
exit becomes significant, but is opposite to the predicted negative effect.  Therefore 
overall, the results show no evidence that executive formal business education decreases 
the likelihood of post-IPO executive exit. 
These findings are contradictory to current theoretical expectations.  The 
significant positive association between graduate-level business degree and executive 
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exit suggests that graduate-level business education does not necessarily lower the risk 
of executive exit in the post-IPO stage.  Further, the failure to witness a significant 
negative association between undergraduate-level business degree and post-IPO 
executive exit, might again, be due to the lack of variance of undergraduate-level 
business education among sample executives.  An examination of the distribution of 
executive undergraduate-level business degrees confirms this suspicion.  As shown in 
Table 11, among 1,447 cases, there are only 92 cases where executives hold an 
undergraduate business degree (0.06%).  This is not surprising given that many 
executives in the sample have scientific backgrounds.  Therefore the unexpected non-
significant association between undergraduate business degree and executive exit may 
be due to the limitation of current dataset. 
Control Variables 
Several control variables also display interesting findings.  For example, 
interestingly, in the pre-IPO stage model, executive tenure was found to have a positive 
association with executive exit.  But it is found to be negatively associated with the 
likelihood of executive exit in the post-IPO period.  The negative association is 
consistent with the prior argument that tenure helps the executive institutionalize their 
power in the firm (Ocasio, 1999).  The change of direction implies that organizational 
hierarchy and structure becomes more formalized in the post-IPO stage, which facilitates 
the institutionalization of executive power.  Top management team size is found to be 
positive related to the likelihood of post-IPO executive exit.  This finding can be 
explained with the power model, which suggests that the conflicts and power struggles 
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among executives in a larger team may cause executives to leave the firm after the IPO.  
This result is also consistent with the supported positive relationship between addition of 
new executives and post-IPO executive exit.  I found firm size was significantly 
negatively associated with executive exit in the post-IPO stage.  This suggests that 
executives in larger firms have less likelihood of exit than those in smaller firms.  The 
direction of this relationship is contradictory to the prior finding of top management 
team size, as large firms typically have large top management teams therefore they 
should have similar directions of their associations with executive exit.  However, the 
Pearson correlation between firm size and top management team size shows negative, 
although not statistically significant.  This correlation may imply that in the sample, 
firm size and top management team size are not necessarily positively associated with 
each other, which deserves further examination.  Lastly, among the control variables, 
poor financial performance has a significant positive impact on the likelihood of 
executive exit.  This is consistent with prior argument that firm performance is an 
important precursor of executive turnover (Kesner & Sebora, 1994). 
PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF PRE-IPO MANAGEMENT TEAM 
RESTRUCTURING AND POST-IPO EXECUTIVE EXIT 
This section discusses the results in the proceeding chapter regarding the 
performance implications of pre-IPO management team restructuring and post-IPO 
executive exit.  I will discuss the findings of these models as follows. 
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Performance Effects of Pre-IPO Management Team Restructuring 
The power model proposes that management team restructuring in the pre-IPO 
stage has a positive impact on firm performance.  Two performance measures, IPO 
price premium and firm pre-money market valuation at the IPO, were used in the 
analyses.   
The findings suggest that the performance implications of pre-IPO management 
team restructuring, to a large degree, depend on how firm performance is measured.  
When firm performance is measured with IPO price premium, no significant effect was 
found, although the direction is positive as predicted.  However, when pre-money 
market valuation is used as the firm performance measure, a positive association was 
found between pre-IPO management team restructuring and IPO performance.  And 
pre-IPO management team restructuring explains the variance in the firm market 
valuation at a significant level of (p<.05).  That is, management team restructuring 
before the IPO can enhance investors’ market valuation of the firm at the time of IPO.  
This result is consistent with previous research on management team effects of IPO 
performance (Higgins & Gulati, 2003).   
Several control variables included in the models display interesting findings too.  
First, firm developmental stage, in both models, is found to have a consistently positive 
effect on performance at the IPO market. This suggests that at the time of IPO, investors 
put higher values on the firms with commercialized products than early-development 
stage firms.  Underwriter’s prestige also has a strong positive impact on IPO 
performance.  This finding is consistent with previous studies of the effect of 
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underwriter prestige on IPO success (Carter & Manaster, 1990; Higgins & Gulati, 2003; 
Stuart et al., 1999). 
Performance Effects of Post-IPO Executive Exit 
The power model proposes that post-IPO managerial executive exit and financial 
executive exit have negative impacts on average firm performance in the subsequent 
three years following the exit.  Two performance measures, average ROA, and average 
shareholder return, were used in the analyses.   
  The results in Chapter VI indicate that the impact of post-IPO executive exit on 
firm performance depends largely on the type of exiting executive as well as the measure 
of firm performance.  The previous chapter reported that managerial executive exit has 
a significant negative association with firm’s average ROA in the subsequent three years 
following the exit, but has no significant relationship with firm’s average shareholder 
return.  Financial executive exit, on the other hand, was found to have a significant 
negative relationship with average shareholder return during the three years after the 
exit, but has no significant relationship with average ROA during this period. 
Prior research on the performance implications of executive turnover reveals 
mixed results (Pitcher et al., 2000).  However, the above results indicate that the exits of 
managerial executives or financial executives have negative consequences to firm 
performance in the following years, decreasing either accounting-based performance or 
market-based performance.  This is consistent with the power model and prior 
discussion of the importance of the context of executive exit in predicting its 
performance consequences.  According to the power model, executives with prior 
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managerial or financial experience should be valued as their skills and knowledge are 
critically important for firm operation in the post-IPO stage.  Therefore, their exit from 
the company might be due to the power contests in the firm, which will negatively affect 
firm performance. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter discusses the empirical evidence regarding the antecedents of pre-
IPO management team restructuring, new executive entry, executive exit and the 
antecedents of post-IPO executive exit.  Results regarding the performance implications 
of pre-IPO management team restructuring and post-IPO executive exit were also 
discussed.  The significant results were reported and discussed in this chapter.  The 
explanations for the unsupported hypotheses are also included in the discussions. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
  CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Strategic leadership in entrepreneurial settings has received increasing attention 
from both strategic management and entrepreneurship scholars in recent years (Daily et 
al., 2002).  The present study is an endeavor to enrich this research steam by 
investigating management team restructuring and executive exit in IPO-stage firms, 
particularly during the immediate pre- and post-IPO periods.  This concluding chapter 
summarizes both the theory and the empirical evidence of the present study, discuss its 
limitations, and points out its implications for future research and managerial practice. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study examines the antecedents of management team restructuring, new 
executive entry and executive exit in IPO-stage technology ventures.  The performance 
implications of pre-IPO management team restructuring and post-IPO executive exit 
were also investigated. 
The literature review in Chapter II reveals that resource-dependence theory, 
agency theory and power and socio-political perspective have been used to explain the 
antecedents of executive turnover as well as their performance consequences in large 
corporation settings.  However, despite abundant research in large corporations, studies 
on executive and management team change in entrepreneurial firms are very limited; and 
the theoretical foundations need strengthening.  Due to the sharp differences between 
large public company contexts and entrepreneurial firm settings, as well as the unique 
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political settings in the IPO-stage firms, it is concluded in Chapter II that a socio-
political perspective is most appropriate in the context of IPO-stage startup firms.    
Taking a political view of technology startups, Chapter III proposes a power 
model of pre- and post-IPO executive change.  The central thesis developed in the 
model is that the resources and skills needed by the firm and the political coalition 
structure of the firm change substantially when the firm goes public.  The model 
proposes that both firm-level factors (VC investors, outside directors, and new senior 
executives) and individual-level factors (the human capital and social capital of the 
executive) contribute to the relative power of the executive in the firm during these two 
periods, hence having main effects on the likelihood of executive exit in both stages.  
Firm performance is proposed to interact with firm level factors to affect the likelihood 
of executive exit in the post-IPO stage.  In addition, the model also proposes firm level 
factors impact management team restructuring and new executive entry before the firm 
goes public.  Chapter IV also investigates the performance implications of pre-IPO 
management team restructuring and post-IPO executive exit. 
Empirical evidence provides supports for both the pre- and post-IPO power 
model and insights for further improvements.  In the pre-IPO stage, at the firm level, 
VC prestige was found to have a strong positive association with pre-IPO management 
team restructuring and new executive entry.  That is, a venture backed by prestigious 
VCs is more likely to change its management team and recruit new executives during the 
two years prior to the IPO.  VC control, however, has no significant relationship with 
management team restructuring, new executive entry and executive exit.  At individual 
level, executive technical skills are negatively associated with pre-IPO exit as predicted.  
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The other two individual characteristics, executive external directorships and founding 
status, were found to have no significant impact on the likelihood of executive exit.  
Results from performance models indicate that pre-IPO management team restructuring 
improves the firm’s pre-money market valuation at the time of the IPO.   
The analyses of post-IPO models provide some encouraging and interesting 
results.  At the firm-level, I found that adding new senior executives will increase the 
likelihood of executive exit during the three years following an IPO.  Addition of new 
outside directors was proposed to positively impact executive exit, but no such 
association was found.  Instead, evidence shows that when firm performance is poor, 
adding new outside directors tends to increase the probability of executive exit in the 
firm.  Evidence also indicated that executives in the firm which had restructured the 
management team before the IPO tend to have lower likelihood of exit in the post-IPO 
period.  At the individual level, it was found that technical executives have a higher 
likelihood of exit than non-technical executives.  Executives with prior public company 
managerial experience have a significantly lower likelihood of exit than those without.  
Due to data limitations, the hypothesized negative relationship between executive formal 
business education and the risk of exit was not found.  Similarly, there is no evidence to 
indicate that executives with prior public company financial experience have lower risk 
of exit than executives without such experience.  Results of the performance implication 
model reveal that after the IPO, the exit of managerial executives has a negative effect 
on average ROA in the three years following the exit, and the exit of financial executives 
has negative effects on average shareholder return over the same period. 
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Overall, findings from the present study lead to the following conclusions: (1) 
prestigious investors have an important impact on management team restructuring before 
the IPO; (2) the relative power of executives changes as the firm transforms from a 
private firm to a public company, due to the change in the political coalition and the 
resources and skills needed by the firm; (3) pre-IPO management team restructuring has 
positive implications for IPO performance, when measured as pre-money market 
valuation; (4) post-IPO managerial and financial executive exit have negative effects on 
firm performance following the exit event. 
LIMITATIONS 
The present study is not without limitations.  First, due to the data availability 
problems, I can only employ two years prior to the IPO event as the pre-IPO window for 
the power model.  Data on executive exit, management team restructuring, and the 
exiting executives were collected from firm prospectuses for only two years prior to the 
IPO.  The two-year-window limits the ability to study the antecedents of executive exit 
and management team restructuring in the pre-IPO stage.  Although this limitation does 
not threaten the validity of the present study, it would be desirable to observe one or two 
more year prior to the IPO. 
Second, the present study did not directly measure executive power.  Prior 
research has suggested that direct measurement of executive power is often difficult as 
power is a sensitive subject for many managers (Finkelstein & Daveni, 1994; Pfeffer, 
1981).  Due to the difficulty in obtaining direct measures of executive power, the 
present study relied on publicly observable information to infer executive power in the 
model.  Although this does not threaten the logic of the present study, it would be 
            
          
    
 
139
desirable if executive power could be directly measured in the pre- and post-IPO power 
models. 
Third, the present study focuses on biotechnology startups.  As mentioned 
earlier, I chose the biotechnology industry because this is an excellent setting for 
investigating how executives’ knowledge and skills might influence the power 
distribution of the management team in the IPO-stage.  However, the problem of lack of  
variance for particular variables suggests that including multiple high-technology 
industries might be desirable in future studies. 
IMPLICATIONS 
The present study examines the antecedents and performance effects of 
management team restructuring and executive exit in IPO-stage firms.  The study 
provides several important implications for both academic research and managerial 
practice. 
Implications for Theory Development 
The present study develops a theoretical model and empirically tested the model 
for explaining executive change in entrepreneurial firms.  This makes several 
contributions to research on executive turnover, entrepreneurial teams, and IPO firms. 
First, I developed a theoretical model for explaining executive changes in the 
evolution of an IPO-stage entrepreneurial firm.  Different from traditional agency 
theory (Fama, 1980), in which the executives (owners) are considered to share a unitary 
set of interests as opposed to owners (executives), the political view of technology 
ventures argues that management (and owners) in technology startups usually have 
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diverse, and frequently conflicting interests.  The model argues that the relative power 
of investors and managers change over the different phases of development of the firm. 
The power and socio-political views have been employed in large company executive 
turnover studies (Ocasio, 1994; Shen & Cannella, 2002a, b).  The present study furthers 
our understanding of the power and socio-political view by applying this view in a 
different context, and enriches our understanding of the executive turnover literature by 
investigating this phenomenon in entrepreneurial settings. 
Second, by examining both pre-IPO management team restructuring and 
executive exit in IPO-stage firms, this study is filling a gap in entrepreneurial team 
research.  Kamm et al. (1990) argues that entrepreneurial team studies lack sufficient 
attention to team building process and lack a theoretical base.  The present study 
proposes a power and socio-political view of entrepreneurial teams and provides 
empirical evidence for explaining the antecedents as well as performance implications of 
management team restructuring in IPO-stage firms.  Therefore the present study helps 
us better understand the team building process of an entrepreneurial firm. 
Third, by focusing the analysis on entrepreneurial team change during pre- and 
post-IPO periods, the present study contributes to IPO firm studies.  Recent years have 
witnessed increasing research on IPO firms in the fields of entrepreneurship and 
strategic management (e.g., Certo et al., 2001a; Higgins & Gulati, 2003; Nelson, 2003).  
However, very few studies have investigated how the entrepreneurial team changes 
when a previously private firm transforms to a public company and how these changes 
affect firm performance.  The power model views the IPO-stage firm as a political 
context consisting of power contests and interest conflicts among original investors, 
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entrepreneurial executives, new investors, and new senior executives.  Empirical 
evidence presented here supported this view and demonstrated that the relative power of 
entrepreneurial executives and the political structure of the firm have important 
consequences for management team restructuring and executive change. 
Implications for Managerial Practice 
The present study has several implications for managerial practice.  First, for 
technology ventures wishing to go public, it is very important for the founding 
executives to understand that the initial public offering changes resources and skill 
requirements for the executives and the firm’s dominant coalition substantially.  The 
risks of losing control and power in the new public company may be even greater if the 
executive cannot meet the new challenges after the IPO, or if the executives do not have 
advantageous positions in the political contests during this transition.  Second, founding 
executives in private firms should be clear about whether it is worth relinquishing their 
control over the firm in exchange for the long-term development of the firm.  Inviting 
prestigious venture capitalists to join the firm not only enables the firm to get the access 
to financial capital, but also to provide access to other qualified executives.  However, 
this exchange is not without costs.  Founding members should seek a balance between 
the benefits and the risks of relying on prestigious VCs.  Third, the study shows that 
pre-IPO management team restructuring helps the firm achieve better IPO performance, 
at least to some extent.  Hence, in order to achieve a good outcome at the IPO, founding 
executives and original investors need to carefully assemble a qualified management 
team in preparation for the IPO.  Lastly, the present study indicates that post-IPO 
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managerial and financial executive exit tends to lower subsequent performance.  How to 
retain these executives in the firm becomes important in the post-IPO stage.  
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TABLE 1                                                  
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Variables in the Study of                                      
Antecedents of Pre-IPO Management Team Restructuring 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Pre-IPO Management Team Restructuring .601 .293 
2. VC control .391 .491 .060 
3. VC prestige .446 .500 .191 .401*** 
4. Firm age 4.554 1.769 -.655*** .013 -.046 
5. Firm size 15.568 1.235 -.066 -.035 .233 .087 
6. Firm performance 1.301 2.219 .024 .028 .063 -.078 -.101 
7. Firm developmental stage .109 .313 -.243* -.131 -.173 .168 -.107 -.091 
8. Number of employees (Log) 3.720 .821 -.079 .006 .208* .090 .760*** -.068 -.045 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N=92 
*** p<.001; * p<.05 
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TABLE 2                                                                 
Results of Multiple Linear Regression on Antecedents of                                              
Pre-IPO Management Team Restructuring 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept 1.209*** 1.188*** 1.297*** 1.308*** 
Firm age -.104*** -.105*** -.103*** -.103*** 
Firm size -.007 -.006 -.016 -.016 
Firm performance -.005 -.006 -.007 -.007 
Firm developmental stage -.135† -.128 -.114 -.116 
VC control  .030  -.010 
VC prestige   .094† .098† 
________________________________________________________________________ 
F 17.72*** 14.15*** 15.4*** 12.69*** 
R2 .449 .451 .472 .473 
Adjusted R2 .424 .420 .441 .435 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N=92 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.1 
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TABLE 3                                                               
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Variables                                          
in the Study of Antecedents of Pre-IPO New Executive Entry 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Pre-IPO new executive entry 3.755 2.487         
2. VC control .383 .489 -.073        
3. VC prestige .447 .500 .210* .392***       
4. Firm age 4.521 1.770 -.427*** .028 -.035      
5. Firm size 15.599 1.255 .154 -.059 .219* .051     
6. Firm performance 1.407 2.512 -.050 -.009 .117 -.071 -.046    
7. Firm developmental stage .117 .323 -.125 -.151 -.194 .118 -.047 -.114   
8. Number of employees (Log) 3.750 .852 .182 -.023 .174 .039 .771*** -.0540 .043  
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N=94 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
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    TABLE 4                                                                    
Results of Poisson Regression on Antecedents of Pre-IPO New Executive Entry 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept 1.473*** 1.517*** 1.446 1.539*** 
Firm age -1.652*** -1.640*** -.162*** -.160*** 
Number of employees (Log) .162* .160* .140* .125* 
Firm performance -.025 -.025 -.032 -.035 
Firm developmental stage -.274 -.298 -.189 -.205 
VC control  -.099  -.010† 
VC prestige   .209† .299* 
______________________________________________________________________ 
LR Chi2 37.24*** 38.02*** 40.66*** 43.91*** 
Pseudo R 2 .087 .089 .095 .102 
Goodness-of-fit Chi2 113.07 112.28 109.65 106.39 
Prob>Chi2 .043 .041 .059 .077 
______________________________________________________________________  
 
N=94 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.1 
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 TABLE 5                                                                     
Distribution of Technical Executive, Founding Status, and External Directorships over Pre-IPO Executive Exit 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Pre-IPO Executive Exit  Technical Executive (1)  Founding Status (2)  External Directorship (3) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  0 1 Total  0 1 Total  0 1 Total 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
0  357.00 225.00 582.00  484.00 98.00 582.00  522.00 60.00 582.00 
  61.34 38.66 100.00  83.16 16.84 100.00  89.69 10.31 100.00 
 89.03 94.14 90.94  90.81 91.59 90.94  91.10 89.55 90.94 
             
1  44.00 14.00 58.00  49.00 9.00 58.00  51.00 7.00 58.00 
  75.86 24.14 100.00  84.48 15.52 100.00  87.93 12.07 100.00 
  10.99 5.86 9.06  9.19 8.41 9.06  8.90 10.45 9.06 
             
Total  401.00 239.00 640.00  533.00 107.00 640.00  573.00 67.00 640.00 
  62.66 37.34 100.00  83.28 16.72 100.00  89.53 10.47 100.00 
  100.00 100.00 100.00  100.00 100.00 100.00  100.00 100.00 100.00 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
(1) Pearson Chi2(1) =4.754, p<.05 
(2) Pearson Chi2(1) =.066, n.s. 
(3) Pearson Chi2(1)=.174, n.s. 
Note: Numbers in each cell present count, row percentage, and column percentage, respectively. 
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TABLE 6                                                                        
Distribution of VC Control and VC Prestige over Pre-IPO Executive Exit 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Pre-IPO Executive Exit  VC Control (1)  VC Prestige (2) 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
  0 1 Total  0 1 Total 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
0  377.00 205.00 582.00  307.00 275.00 582.00 
  64.78 35.22 100.00  52.75 47.25 100.00 
  91.95 89.13 90.94  90.03 91.97 90.94 
         
1  33.00 25.00 58.00  34.00 24.00 58.00 
  56.90 43.10 100.00  58.62 41.38 100.00 
  8.05 10.87 9.06  9.97 8.03 9.06 
         
Total  410.00 230.00 640.00  341.00 299.00 640.00 
  64.06 35.94 100.00  53.28 46.72 100.00 
   100.00 100.00 100.00   100.00 100.00 100.00 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
(1) Pearson Chi2(1) =1.423, n.s. 
(2) Pearson Chi2(1) =.731, n.s. 
Note: Numbers in each cell present count, row percentage, and column percentage, respectively. 
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TABLE 7                                                               
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Variables in the Study of                                    
Antecedents of Pre-IPO Executive Exit 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Pre-IPO executive exit .091 .287      
2. Executive tenure 2.564 1.845 .060      
3. Executive ownership .025 .061 -.004 .284***    
4. Firm developmental stage .120 .326 -.016 .093 .060    
5. Number of employees 64.413 66.740 -.073 -.002 -.118* .208***   
6. Ave. growth rate in R&D exp. .405 .989 -.019 .016 -.023 -.051 -.153***  
7. VC control .359 .480 .047 -.008 -.059 -.127** -.121** -.203*** 
8. VC prestige .467 .499 -.034 -.089* -.091* -.221*** -.005 -.150*** .350*** 
9. Technical executive .373 .484 -.086* -.047 -.102** -.117** -.085* .002 -.040 .022 
10. External directorship .105 .306 .017 .194*** .269*** .015 -.038 -.001 -.022 -.013 -.222 
11. Founding status .167 .374 -.010 .392*** .375*** -.024 -.063 -.012 .014 -.042 .122 .120 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N=640 
*** p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
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     TABLE 8                                                                        
Results of Logistic Regression on Antecedents of Pre-IPO Executive Exit (Full Sample) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept -2.036*** -2.056*** -1.779*** -1.786*** 
Executive tenure .146† .138† .159† .151† 
Executive ownership -2.746 -2.652 -2.689 -2.643 
Firm developmental stage -.291 -.303 -.385 -.403 
Number of employees -.009* -.008† -.010* -.008* 
Ave. growth rate in R&D exp. -.136 -.128 -.144 -.138 
     
VC control  .299  .253 
VC prestige  -.324  -.313 
     
Technical executive   -.730* -.712* 
Executive external directorships   -.102 -.079 
Founding status   -.204 -.207 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
LR Chi2 9.770† 11.280 15.880* 17.120† 
Pseudo R 2 .025 .029 .041 .044 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N=640 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.1 
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                        TABLE 9                                                                       
Results of Logistic Regression on Antecedents of Pre-IPO Executive Exit (Reduced Sample) 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
     
Intercept -1.978*** -1.965*** -1.706*** -1.682*** 
Executive tenure .195* .1828* .192* .179* 
Executive ownership -6.370 -6.302 -7.342† -7.488† 
Firm developmental stage -.681 -.716 -.763 -.804 
Number of employees -.015** -.013* -.015** -.013* 
Ave. growth rate in R&D exp. -.165 -.166 -.172 -.175 
     
VC control  .383  .347 
VC prestige  -.569†  -.565 
     
Technical executive   -.831* -.814* 
Executive external directorship   .193 .232 
Founding status   -.009 -.002 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
LR Chi2 15.590** 18.760** 22.260** 25.230** 
Pseudo R 2 .045 .054 .065 .073 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N=631 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.1 
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           TABLE 10                                                                          
Distribution of Executive Exit over Post-IPO Years * 
__________________________________________________ 
Exit Year 1 Year2 Year 3 Total 
__________________________________________________ 
0 489.00 395.00 314.00 1198.00 
 40.82 32.97 26.21 100.00 
     
1 113.00 83.00 53.00 249.00 
 45.38 33.33 21.29 100.00 
     
Total 602.00 478.00 367.00 1447.00 
 41.60 33.03 25.36 100.00 
__________________________________________________ 
 
* Numbers in each cell present count and row percentage respectively. 
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TABLE 11                                                             
Distribution of Executive Prior Managerial Experience, Education and Founding Status over Post-IPO Exit 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Pre-IPO Executive Exit   Prior Managerial Experience(1)   Founding Status (2)    Formal Business Education 
(Graduate) (3) 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   0 1 Total   0 1 Total   0 1 Total 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
0  839.00 359.00 1198.00  971.00 227.00 1198.00  960.00 238.00 1198.00 
  70.03 29.97 100.00  81.05 18.95 100.00  80.13 19.87 100.00 
  80.60 88.42 82.79  81.53 88.67 82.79  83.70 79.33 82.79 
             
1  202.00 47.00 249.00  220.00 29.00 249.00  187.00 62.00 249.00 
  81.12 18.88 100.00  88.35 11.65 100.00  75.10 25.00 100.00 
  19.40 11.58 17.21  18.47 11.33 17.21  16.30 20.67 17.21 
             
Total  1041.00 406.00 1447.00  1191.00 256.00 1447.00  1147.00 300.00 1447.00 
  71.94 28.06 100.00  82.31 17.69 100.00  79.27 20.73 100.00 
    100.00 100.00 100.00   100.00 100.00 100.00   100.00 100.00 100.00 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
(1) Pearson Chi2(1) =12.563, p<.001          
(2) Pearson Chi2(1) = 7.548 p<.01          
(3) Pearson Chi2(1)=3.178, p<.01          
Note: Numbers in each cell present count, row percentage, and column percentage, respectively.     
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TABLE 12                                                               
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Variables in the Study of Antecedents of Post-IPO Executive Exit (Part I) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Post-IPO executive exit .172 .378       
2. Executive age 47.114 7.211 .015      
3. Executive post-IPO ownership .020 .047 -.026 .168***     
4. Executive tenure 3.375 2.076 -.06* .136*** .291***    
5. Top management team size 10.504 5.855 .080** -.0490 -.096*** -.257***   
6. Firm size 3.250 .961 .000 -.032 -.118*** .026 -.031  
7. Shareholder return .135 .971 -.030 -.022 .078** .005 -.104*** .042 
8. Poor return dummy  .660 .4739 .092*** .006 -.078** .029 .010 -.040 
9. Addition of new executives 1.269 1.478 .030 -.007 -.013 -.067* -.128***  .191*** 
10. Addition of new directors 1.026 1.755 .003 .032 -.029 .058* -.215*** .019 
11. Pre-IPO management team restructuring .590 .292 .011 -.131*** -.027 -.474*** .048 .056* 
12. Executive public company managerial experience .645 .479 -.017 .038 -.107*** -.166*** -.003 -.009 
13. Executive public company financial experience .100 .300 .019 -.148*** -.122*** -.116*** -.023 -.010 
14. Technical executive .487 .500 .022 .056* .005 .055* .065* .054* 
15. Formal business education (Undergraduate) .064 .244 -.029 -.134*** .008 -.089*** -.044 -.050 
16. Formal business education (Graduate) .207 .406 .0470 -.099*** -.031 -.057 -.042 -.006 
17. Founding status .177 .382 -.072** .100*** .411*** .374*** -.093*** .010 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N=1447 
*** p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
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TABLE 13 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Variables in the Study of Antecedents of Post-IPO Executive Exit (Part II) 
  __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
    Variable                                 7      8      9      10     11    12     13     14   15  16 
  __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  7. Shareholder return        
  8. Poor return dummy  -.577***       
  9. Addition of new executives .005 .002      
  10. Addition of new directors .055* -.029 .093***     
  11. Pre-IPO management team restructuring .082** -.093*** .115*** -.062*    
  12. Executive public company managerial exp. -.058* .074** .001 .013 .050   
  13. Executive public company financial exp. .033 -.008 -.009 .010 .038 .248***  
  14. Technical executive .025 -.005 -.006 -.001 .000 -.069* -.325***  
  15. Formal business education (Undergraduate) .008 .002 .039 .011 .030 -.014 .281*** .254*** 
  16. Formal business education (Graduate) -.018 .011 .027 -.014 .049 .152*** .335*** .443*** .041 
  17. Founding status -.001 -.050 -.010 .035 -.071** -.137*** -.137*** .176*** -.084** -.081** 
  __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  N=1447        
  *** p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05         
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TABLE 14                                                                  
Results of Cox Proportional Hazard Model of Antecedents of Post-IPO Executive Exit 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Executive age .002 -.001 .004 .001 .001 .002 
Executive post-IPO ownership 1.577 2.253 2.217 2.875† 2.821† 2.730† 
Executive tenure -.181*** -.228*** -.186*** -.241*** -.242*** -.242*** 
Top management team size .084*** .088*** .084*** .088*** .090*** .085*** 
Firm size -.164* -.195** -.172† -.201** -.202** -.204** 
Shareholder return .134† .140† .124 .131† .134† .129† 
Poor return dummy .672*** .655*** .696*** .681*** .885*** .443* 
Addition of new executives  .091*  .095* .190** .081† 
Addition of outside directors  -.069  -.004 .006 -.221* 
Pre-IPO management team restructuring  -.679**  -.735** -.721** -.736** 
Public company managerial experience   -.302* -.306* -.299* -.306* 
Public company financial experience   .228 .276 .275 .297 
Technical executive   .263† .290† .287† .285† 
Formal business education (undergraduate)   -.429 -.487 -.481 -.508 
Formal business education (graduate)   .472** .487** .484** .488** 
Founding status   -.176 -.134 -.106 -.103 
Poor Return* Addition of new executives     -.133  
Poor Return* Addition of outside directors                 .266* 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
LR Chi2 113.25*** 123.84*** 127.69*** 139.7*** 142.08*** 146.26*** 
Pseudo R 2 .033 .037 .038 .041 .042 .043 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N=1447 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.1 
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TABLE 15                                                                    
Results of Stratified Cox Model of Antecedents of Post-IPO Executive Exit 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Executive age .002 -.001 .004 .001 .001 .002 
Executive post-IPO ownership 1.831 2.383 2.218 2.876† 2.822† 2.730† 
Executive tenure -.175*** -.224*** -.186*** -.241*** -.242*** -.242*** 
Top management team size .084*** .088*** .084*** .088*** .090*** .085*** 
Firm size -.162* -.194** -.172* -.201** -.209** -.204** 
Shareholder return .136† .138† .124 .131† .134† .129† 
Poor return dummy .665*** .652*** .695*** .680*** .885*** .443* 
Addition of new executives  .091*  .095* .190** .081† 
Addition of outside directors  -.006  -.004 .006 -.221* 
Pre-IPO management team restructuring  -.672*  -.735** -.721** -.737** 
Public company managerial experience   -.302* -.306* -.300* -.306* 
Public company financial experience   .229 .277 .275 .297 
Technical executive   .263† .290† .287† .285† 
Formal business education (undergraduate)   -.429 -.487 -.482 -.508 
Formal business education (graduate)   .472** .487** .484** .488** 
Poor Return* Addition of new executives     -.133  
Poor Return* Addition of outside directors      .266* 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
       
LR Chi2 105.34*** 115.74*** 119.54*** 131.54*** 133.92*** 138.08*** 
Pseudo R 2 .033 .036 .037 .041 .042 .043 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N=1447 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.1 
Stratified by founding status 
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TABLE 16                                                               
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Variables in the Study of                                    
Performance Effects of Pre-IPO Management Team Restructuring 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6       7       8      9  10 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Price premium .413 -.697            
2. (Price premium+1)^3 3.639 1.986 .958***           
3. Pre-money Market Valuation (mil.) 69.374 101.536 .491*** .583***          
4. Ln(pre-money market valuation+1) 12.279 8.487 .770*** .810*** .533***         
5. Pre-IPO management team restru. .600 .296 .003 .000 -.040 .121        
6. Risk factors 19.692 3.286 .021 .090 .011 -.130 .024       
7. Firm developmental stage .117 .323 .145 .163 .117 .110 -.182 .105      
8. Ave. growth rate in R&D exp. .376 .998 .099 .090 -.087 -.029 -.030 .017 -.051     
9. Number of employees (Log) 3.751 .852 -.140 -.118 .201 .162 -.040 -.129 .043 -.134    
10. Underwriter's rank 7.004 2.485 .022 .072 .323** .279** -.024 -.376*** -.026 -.137 .518***   
11. VC control .383 .489 -.047 -.077 -.121 -.026 .060 -.214* -.151 -.178 -.023 .013  
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N=94 
*** p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05  
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  TABLE 17                                                                   
Results of Multiple Linear Regression with Robust Standard Errors                                           
on Performance Effects of Pre-IPO Management Team Restructuring  
  
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent Variable DV=(Price Premium+1)^3 DV= Log(Market Valuation+1) 
 
Intercept .732 .824 1.181 8.734 4.253 4.258 
Firm risk factors .134† .121† .111 -.369 -.370 -.386 
Firm developmental stage 1.231** 1.093* 1.081* 5.446** 6.482** 6.558** 
Ave. growth rate in R&D exp. .212 .248 .1660 .055 .588 .718 
Number of employees (Log) -.383† -.481† -.533† 1.146 1.192 .794 
Underwriter rank .251** .252** .248* .843† .910* 1.138* 
VC control .131 .186  -.315 -.792  
Pre-IPO management team restructuring  .357 .208  6.089* 6.441* 
Pre-IPO management team restructuring* VC control   .097  -2.240 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Number of observations 92 92 91 91 91 90 
F 4.76*** 3.17** 3.17** 4.81*** 4.96*** 5.84*** 
R 2 .117 .118 .122 .162 .202 .222 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.1       
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TABLE 18                                                                    
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Variables in the Study of                                    
Performance Effects of Post-IPO Executive Exit, with Firm Performance Measured with Average ROA 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Average ROA -42.624 37.556       
2. Exits of managerial executives .205 .531 -.151*      
3. Exits of financial executives .117 .340 -.019 .127     
4. Top management team size (Log) 2.175 .488 .111 .066 .109    
5. Firm size 3.130 .943 .465*** .007 -.167* .034   
6. R&D expenditures of exiting year 7.516 5.880 .050 .157* -.099 .188* .491*** 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N=117 
*** p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
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TABLE 19                                                                     
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Variables in the Study of                                            
Performance Effects of Post-IPO Executive Exit, with Firm Performance                                             
Measured with Average Shareholder Return 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Average shareholder return .222 .693       
2. Exits of managerial executives .209 .538 .083       
3. Exits of financial executives .117 .341 -.138 .136      
4. Top management team size (Log) 2.179 .497 -.095 .066 .118     
5. Firm size 3.105 .956 .003 .011 -.167* .038    
6. R&D expenditures of exiting year 7.266 5.385 -.035 .128 -.090 .220** .515***   
7. Shareholder return of exiting year .220 1.109 -.083 -.058 -.075 -.100 .069 .233**  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N=163 
*** p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
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TABLE 20                                                           
Results of Multiple Linear Regression with Robust Standard Errors on                                   
Performance Effects of Post-IPO Executive Exit with Firm Performance Measured with Average ROA 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept -127.137*** -125.75*** -127.662*** -126.427*** 
Top management team size (Log) 10.829† 11.143† 10.443† 10.605† 
Firm size 23.581*** 23.128*** 23.818*** 23.443*** 
R&D expenditures of exiting year -1.711** -1.553** -1.698** -1.524** 
Managerial executive exits  -8.984†  -9.533* 
Financial executive exits   4.474 6.465 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
F 16.62*** 13.06*** 12.44*** 10.74*** 
R 2 .278 .293 .279 .297 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N=171 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.1 
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TABLE 21                                                                
Results of Multiple Linear Regression with Robust Standard Errors on                                               
Performance Effects of Post-IPO Executive Exit with Firm Performance                                            
Measured with Average Shareholder Return 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept .527 .508 .560 .539 
Top management team size (Log) -.148 -1.150 -.124 -.124 
Firm size .008 .013 -.007 -.003 
R&D expenditures of exiting year .001 -.001 .000 -.002 
Shareholder return of exiting year -.060† -.055† -.064† -.058† 
Managerial executive exits  .111  .137 
Financial executive exits   -.278* -.308** 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
F 1.02 1.12 2.54* 2.28* 
R 2 .018 .025 .036 .047 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N=163 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.1 
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TABLE 22                                                                
Summary of the Results Regarding the Antecedents of Pre-IPO Management Team Restructuring,                            
Executive Entry, Executive Exit and Post-IPO Executive Exit * 
 
Variable 
Pre-IPO 
Management team 
restructuring 
Pre-IPO 
Executive Entry 
Pre-IPO 
Executive Exit 
Post-IPO Executive 
Exit 
Independent variables     
VC control     
VC prestige + (s) *** + (s)   
Technical skills   – (s) + (s) 
External directorships     
Founding status     
Addition of outside directors    – (r) 
Pre-IPO management team restructuring    – (s) 
Addition of post-IPO new senior executives    + (s) 
Prior public company management experience    – (s) 
Formal business education (graduate)    + (r) 
Prior public company financial experience     
Addition of outside directors * Poor return    + (s) 
Addition of post-IPO new senior executives * Poor return    
Control variables **     
Firm age – –   
Number of employees (Log) – + –  
Executive tenure   + – 
Top management team size    + 
Firm size( average total assets, log)    – 
Poor return    + 
     
* The sign "+" represents a positive association, and the sign "–" represents a negative association.   
** Only significant associations with DVs are reported    
***  "s" represents the association supports the hypothesis, "r" represents the association rejects the hypothesis.  
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FIGURE 1                                                                
A Power Model of Management Team Restructuring and Executive Exit in IPO-Stage Firms 
 
 
 Pre-IPO Stage 
Firm Level Factors 
            VC Control (+) 
            VC Prestige (+) 
Individual Factors 
            Technical Skills (-) 
            External Directorships (-) 
            Founding Status (-) 
Post-IPO Stage 
Firm Level Factors 
            Addition of Outside Directors (+) 
            Pre-IPO Management Team Restructuring (-) 
            Addition of post-IPO new senior executives (+) 
Individual Factors 
            Prior Public Company Managerial Experience (-) 
            Formal Business Education (-) 
            Prior Public Company Financial Experience (-) 
            Technical Skills (+) 
       
Post-IPO 
Executive Exit 
Failure to Meet 
Performance 
Objectives
+
Pre-IPO
Executive Exit 
Pre-IPO
Management 
Team 
Restructuring & 
New Executive 
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APPENDIX (B) 
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LIST OF COMPANIES IN THE SAMPLE 
Firm Number Permno Company Name IPO Date 
1 84511 Aastrom Biosciences Inc 2/4/1997
2 86235 Abgenix Inc 7/2/1998
3 86709 Albany Molecular Research Inc 2/4/1999
4 83111 Alexion Pharmaceuticals Inc 2/28/1996
5 76736 Alkermes Inc 7/16/1991
6 77086 Alteon Inc 11/1/1991
7 77264 Amylin Pharmaceuticals Inc 1/17/1992
8 77020 Anergen Inc 10/10/1991
9 79757 Aprogenex Inc 10/15/1993
10 80918 Ariad Pharmaceuticals Inc 5/20/1994
11 84052 Arqule Inc 10/16/1996
12 82670 Atlantic Technology Ventures Inc 12/14/1995
13 78812 Autoimmune Inc 1/20/1993
14 83475 Avigen Inc 5/22/1996
15 84192 Aviron 11/5/1996
16 80306 Biocryst Pharmaceuticals Inc 3/3/1994
17 77393 Biotime Inc 3/5/1992
18 77207 Bradley Pharmaceuticals Inc 11/12/1991
19 85668 C V Therapeutics Inc 11/19/1996
20 83769 Cadus Pharmaceutical Corp 7/17/1996
21 83849 Cambridge Heart Inc 8/2/1996
22 78815 Cell Genesys Inc 1/26/1993
23 76848 Cellpro Inc 9/24/1991
24 76625 Cephalon Inc  4/25/1991
25 84413 Cerus Corporation 1/30/1997
26 83246 Chirex Inc 3/5/1996
27 79807 Clintrials Research Inc 11/23/1993
28 86254 Collateral Therapeutics Inc 7/2/1998
29 86057 Combichem Inc 5/8/1998
30 85463 Corixa Corp 10/1/1997
31 84414 Coulter Pharmaceutical Inc 1/28/1997
32 85864 Curagen Corp 3/18/1998
33 85686 Depomed Inc 11/5/1997
34 83859 Diacrin Inc 2/12/1996
35 78965 Enchira Biotechnology Corp 3/12/1993
36 83651 Entremed Inc 6/11/1996
37 82695 Ergo Science Corp 12/14/1995
38 81862 Exogen Inc 7/20/1995
39 82700 Fuisz Technologies Ltd 12/14/1995
40 82576 Geltex Pharmaceuticals Inc 11/8/1995
41 77171 Genaera Corp 12/11/1991
42 85549 Gene Logic Inc 11/21/1997
43 80750 Genemedicine Inc 7/13/1994
44 77180 Genta Inc 12/17/1991
45 77274 Gilead Sciences Inc 1/22/1992
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Firm Number Permno Company Name IPO Date 
46 82493 Gliatech Inc 10/19/1995
47 76700 Glycomed Inc 6/13/1991
48 82577 Gynecare Inc 11/22/1995
49 79977 Human Genome Sciences Inc 12/1/1993
50 82824 Hybridon Inc 1/24/1996
51 76693 I C O S Corp 6/6/1991
52 76841 I D E C Pharmaceuticals Corp 9/17/1991
53 76662 Immulogic Pharmaceutical Corp 5/22/1991
54 79906 Incyte Genomics Inc 11/4/1993
55 80539 Inhale Therapeutic Systems 5/3/1994
56 79703 Insite Vision Inc 10/18/1993
57 76661 Isis Pharmaceuticals Inc 5/17/1991
58 80598 L X R Biotechnology Inc 5/6/1994
59 77362 Lifecell Corp 2/27/1992
60 77291 Matrix Pharmaceutical Inc 1/28/1992
61 81724 Metra Biosystems Inc 6/30/1995
62 78131 Microcarb Inc 12/17/1992
63 80560 N P S Pharmaceuticals Inc 5/26/1994
64 82831 Neopharm Inc 1/25/1996
65 83151 Neose Technologies Inc 2/15/1996
66 80258 Neurobiological Technologies Inc 2/16/1994
67 83534 Neurocrine Biosciences Inc 5/23/1996
68 83541 Onyx Pharmaceuticals Inc 5/9/1996
69 79516 Oxigene Inc 8/26/1993
70 82604 Pathogenesis Corp 11/21/1995
71 77292 Protein Design Labs Inc 1/28/1992
72 77270 Protein Polymer Technologies Inc 1/21/1992
73 82610 Sano Corp 11/6/1995
74 76845 Sepracor Inc 9/20/1991
75 82216 Sequana Therapeutics Inc 7/31/1995
76 76773 Somatogen Inc 8/2/1991
77 77280 Sphinx Pharmaceuticals Corp 1/23/1992
78 77437 Stemcells Inc 3/25/1992
79 81012 Sugen Inc 10/3/1994
80 87418 Symyx Technologies Inc 11/18/1999
81 81665 Systemax Inc 8/6/1991
82 80577 Targeted Genetics Corp 5/20/1994
83 84136 Transkaryotic Therapies Inc 10/16/1996
84 83378 Trega Biosciences Inc 3/29/1996
85 77320 Univax Biologics Inc 2/4/1992
86 85382 Valentis Inc 9/15/1997
87 76744 Vertex Pharmaceuticals Inc 7/24/1991
88 80053 Viagene Inc 12/16/1993
89 79022 Vical Inc 3/9/1993
90 83707 Virus Research Institute Inc 6/5/1996
91 80485 Vivus Inc 4/6/1994
92 83432 Xenometrix Inc 10/17/1995
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Firm Number Permno Company Name IPO Date 
93 79025 Zonagen Inc 3/25/1993
94 77298 Zynaxis Inc 1/30/1992
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